James Klein

The applicant sought reconsideration of a decision denying him income replacement benefits beyond 104 weeks post-accident.

The applicant argued the adjudicator made errors of fact and law regarding his pre- and post-accident employment, medical restrictions, and the legal test for post-104 IRBs.

The tribunal found no errors of fact, noting the applicant returned to work at a reduced capacity and failed to provide medical evidence restricting him from working full-time.

The tribunal also found no error of law, as the adjudicator properly assessed the applicant's disability and employment competencies in a real-world setting.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The Applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) following a motor vehicle accident, claiming that chronic pain syndrome prevented him from working full-time.

The Applicant had returned to his pre-accident role but at reduced hours.

The Respondent denied the IRBs, arguing the Applicant did not meet the post-104 test of suffering a complete inability to engage in suitable employment.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that while the Applicant suffered from chronic pain, he had successfully returned to work at two-thirds capacity and maintained his status and reward.

The Tribunal preferred the Respondent's medical evidence that the Applicant was not medically restricted from working and would benefit from workplace accommodations and exercise.

The defendants moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) obtained by the plaintiffs without notice.

The dispute involved a family hardware business, with the plaintiff son claiming his late father promised him the business and a 50% interest in the land.

The court found that the plaintiffs egregiously breached their duty under Rule 39.01(6) to make full and fair disclosure of all material facts when obtaining the ex parte order.

The plaintiffs omitted key facts about negotiations, the plaintiff's departure to start a competing business, and relied on inadmissible double hearsay regarding a purported sale of the property.

The court set aside the CPL and declined to maintain it under the Dhunna factors, concluding this was primarily a damages case.

Costs of $69,000 were awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiffs, Tarpin Lumber Incorporated and Tarpin Truss Inc., brought an undefended motion to consolidate eleven Superior Court actions and for summary judgment against the defendants, Kaveh Tabibi and Sara Meshgi.

The defendants, a former employee and his wife, had absconded after misappropriating over a million dollars from the plaintiffs through forged contracts and discounted cash sales.

The defendants were self-represented, did not file responding materials, and did not appear at the motion.

The court found no genuine issues requiring a trial, granted the consolidation and summary judgment, awarding the plaintiffs $827,394.97 for losses and $238,270.30 in substantial indemnity costs.

Following a preliminary issue hearing where the insurer successfully argued that the applicant's claim for statutory accident benefits was barred by s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act, the parties made written submissions on expenses.

The insurer sought its legal expenses of $6,939.02, arguing it was wholly successful and had made a Rule 76 offer to settle.

The arbitrator found that the offer to settle was not a firm, binding offer and that the preliminary issue involved a novel interpretation of s. 268(1.1) with no direct precedent.

Balancing the insurer's success against the novelty of the issue and the modest amount in dispute, the arbitrator ordered that each party bear its own expenses.

The applicant was a passenger on a public transit bus that made a sudden stop to avoid a collision with another vehicle.

The bus did not collide with any object.

The applicant claimed statutory accident benefits from the insurer of the other vehicle.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing that s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act bars accident benefits for occupants of a public transit vehicle involved in a no-collision incident.

The arbitrator agreed, finding that the provision acts as a complete bar to statutory accident benefits from any source for such passengers.

The application for arbitration was barred.

On a written Rule 2.1 review, the court dismissed an action arising from power of sale proceedings, the subsequent sale of a property, and allegations that multiple defendants colluded to deprive the plaintiff of property and belongings.

The court held the plaintiff lacked standing because the property had been owned by a dissolved corporation, found no pleaded cause of action against the various defendants, and accepted that the claims were also abuse of process and statute-barred on their face.

The court further relied on overlap with an earlier Brampton action concerning the same underlying property dispute.

The entire action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Following an earlier endorsement in a commercial dispute, the court issued a corrigendum to correct two matters raised by counsel.

First, the formal endorsement had omitted the judge’s decision striking a specific paragraph of the applicants’ amended amended application, which had previously been recorded only in a handwritten endorsement.

Second, the reasons incorrectly stated that a newly constituted board had approved the sale of a 10% share in a corporation to a respondent, when in fact the scheduled board meeting had not proceeded because the application had already been commenced.

The court clarified both issues and amended the reasons accordingly.

The applicants brought an oppression application regarding a family investment company, Naim Investments Limited.

They alleged that the proposed sale of a 10% shareholding by an estate to a third party, Dr. Low, was a disguised sale to a rival family branch that would breach an unwritten control agreement and a written ownership restriction agreement.

The court found no evidence of a control agreement, determined that Dr. Low was an arm's length purchaser, and concluded that the election of a new board to approve the sale was a proper exercise of corporate governance to resolve a deadlock.

The application was dismissed with costs.

The appellants defaulted on a commercial mortgage, prompting the respondent mortgagee to issue a Notice of Sale and accept an offer to purchase the property.

The appellants subsequently obtained a higher offer and sought to enjoin the sale, arguing the Notice of Sale was defective and the accepted offer was improvident.

The application judge declined to enjoin the sale, and the sale closed before the appeal was heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Notice of Sale was reasonable and the mortgagee could not be restrained from exercising its power of sale after entering into a binding agreement in good faith.