J. Klukach

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that similar fact evidence was improperly admitted and that the jury charge was inadequate regarding potential 'tainting' of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the similar fact evidence admissible, particularly given the defence evidence concerning semen stains.

The court also held the jury charge was adequate, noting the lack of objection from the defence at trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after choking the victim during consensual sexual activity.

At trial, the appellant admitted culpability for manslaughter but argued he lacked the requisite intent for murder.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the only possible verdicts were second degree murder or manslaughter, removing the option of an acquittal.

On appeal, the appellant argued this violated his right to a jury trial, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the meaning of 'reckless' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly respected the appellant's tactical decision to admit manslaughter, and that the jury instructions on intent, read as a whole, did not constitute reversible error.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following a consensual fist fight outside a bar.

The victim was knocked unconscious but the accused continued to strike him, resulting in the victim's death.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the victim had consented to a fair fight.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and substituted a manslaughter conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that public policy and common law principles limit the legal effectiveness of consent to assault.

Consent is vitiated between adults who intentionally apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl.