J. Dannial E.S. Baker

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for the repayment of a $100,000 loan.

The defendant argued the loan was unenforceable due to the involvement of his former lawyer, who allegedly arranged the loan to pay off a debt owed to the defendant and may have received secret commissions from the plaintiff.

The court found no evidence to support the defendant's speculative defenses or to implicate the plaintiff in any wrongdoing.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and awarded full indemnity costs.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim regarding his sponsorship of his former spouse as a permanent resident.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that his former spouse was not entitled to social assistance she received and a return of monies confiscated due to his sponsorship obligation, arguing an implied term that repayment only applied to rightful payments and that estoppel applied.

The court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, held that a sponsor's statutory obligation to reimburse social assistance is absolute, regardless of whether the sponsoree obtained benefits fraudulently, and that estoppel does not apply against a statute.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action against Ontario was dismissed.

The appellants, unsecured creditors, sought to appeal a motion judge's order approving an amended proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and refusing to adjourn the approval motion to allow further examination of the debtor's president.

The Court of Appeal held that leave to appeal was required because the issues were procedural and did not directly involve property exceeding $10,000.

The Court denied leave, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, raised no issues of general importance, and the motion judge's conclusions on the reasonableness and good faith of the proposal were unassailable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding 120 km/h in an 80 km/h zone.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including alleged Charter violations regarding the use of the word "Offence" on the Notice of Trial, challenges to the radar device testing procedures, concerns about the certification of speed on the Certificate of Offence, jurisdictional issues, and objections to the amendment of the Certificate.

The appeal court dismissed all submissions, finding no Charter breach, no impropriety in the radar testing or certification, proper jurisdiction, and valid amendment procedures.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The representative for the insured appealed an arbitration order requiring him to personally pay the insurer's expenses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insurer sought its appeal expenses of $3,918.77 against the representative personally.

The representative argued the expenses should be limited to Small Claims Court levels.

The Director's Delegate rejected this argument, finding that arbitration expenses are governed by the Dispute Resolution Practice Code and the expense regulation, not Small Claims Court rules.

The Director's Delegate ordered the representative to personally pay the insurer's appeal expenses fixed at $3,300.

The representative of an insured appealed an arbitrator's decision ordering him to personally pay the insurer's fixed expenses of $1,566 for costs thrown away prior to the withdrawal of the insured's application for arbitration.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the arbitrator's conclusion that the representative caused expenses to be wasted by unreasonable delay under s. 282(11.2) of the Insurance Act by failing to withdraw the claim when it was apparent that the underlying dispute had been resolved.