Holly Schmid

The applicant, who was catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident, sought entitlement to various statutory accident benefits including home modifications, assistive devices, and medications.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application in its entirety.

The claim for home modifications was denied under s. 38(2) of the Schedule because the expenses were incurred before the treatment plan was submitted.

The claims for a bathmat, blender, and various supplements were dismissed as the applicant failed to establish they were reasonable and necessary or causally related to the accident.

Claims for interest, a s. 10 award, and costs were also dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after fracturing his foot while disembarking from a parked shuttle van onto uneven pavement.

The respondent insurer denied benefits, arguing the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal applied the purpose and causation tests, finding that disembarking is an ordinary use of a vehicle and that this use was a direct cause of the injuries, despite the uneven surface also being a contributing factor.

The Tribunal concluded the incident was an accident.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after fracturing his foot while disembarking from a parked shuttle van onto uneven pavement.

The respondent insurer denied benefits, arguing the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Tribunal applied the purpose and causation tests, finding that disembarking is an ordinary use of a vehicle and that the use of the vehicle was a direct cause of the injuries, despite the uneven surface being a contributing factor.

The Tribunal concluded the applicant was involved in an accident.

During a trial on liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while pitching in a school softball tournament, the plaintiff brought a motion to exclude the expert evidence of the defendant school board's proposed expert on student physical health and safety.

The proposed expert opined that the standard of care was strictly defined by the OPHEA Safety Guidelines, which did not mandate face masks for pitchers.

The court excluded the expert evidence, finding it was not necessary as the jury could understand the facts and assess the foreseeable risks without her assistance.

Furthermore, the court found the evidence would likely distort the fact-finding process because the expert acted as an advocate, rigidly adhered to an incorrect legal standard, and offered opinions beyond her expertise.