Goran Tomljanovic

A criminal appeal challenged a conviction for possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition under s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the trial judge reasonably inferred the required knowledge element from circumstantial evidence.

The Court held the verdict was not unreasonable and agreed with the majority of the intermediate appellate court.

The conviction was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving.

The Crown and the appellant entered into a plea agreement for a lesser charge of careless driving.

However, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Criminal Justice Division subsequently repudiated the agreement, concluding it was contrary to the interests of justice.

The appellant alleged this repudiation breached her s. 7 Charter rights as an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repudiation of a plea agreement is an act of prosecutorial discretion, reviewable only for abuse of process.

Finding no evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or trial unfairness, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, he admitted guilt to manslaughter but argued he lacked the mental state for murder.

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to explain the difference between manslaughter and second degree murder and to provide a specific definition of manslaughter.

The trial judge explained the difference lay in the mental state but declined to provide examples or a specific definition of manslaughter.

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge responded correctly to the jury's questions and there was no reasonable possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for a conviction.

The appellant was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

After an unsuccessful attempt to contact his preferred lawyer, he spoke with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

He subsequently provided an incriminating statement to the police.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police did not breach the appellant's right to counsel, as he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and voluntarily chose to speak with duty counsel.

The appellant appealed her conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation, including references to capacity, may have confused the jury regarding the role of the accused's intoxication.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

During an undercover operation, he confessed to police officers posing as members of a criminal organization who claimed they could use corrupt police contacts to influence the murder investigation.

The trial judge admitted the statements without a voluntariness voir dire, finding the undercover officers were not 'persons in authority'.

The trial judge also excluded defence evidence suggesting a third party committed the murder due to an insufficient connection to the crime.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the undercover officers were not persons in authority because the appellant believed they were acting against the state's interests, and that the third-party evidence was properly excluded as lacking probative value.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, was convicted of sexual assault after assaulting an intoxicated and unconscious 18-year-old victim.

The sentencing judge imposed a 20-month custodial sentence, finding that deterrence and denunciation were paramount and a conditional sentence would be inappropriate, despite the offender's aboriginal status.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while s. 718.2(e) requires a different methodology for assessing a fit sentence for an aboriginal offender, it does not necessarily mandate a different result.

The sentencing judge reasonably concluded that the serious nature of the offence required a custodial sentence to satisfy the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was charged with first degree murder and planned to testify in his own defence.

At the close of the Crown's case, defence counsel made a Corbett application to exclude the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The trial judge refused to rule on the application until after the appellant had testified in chief, prompting the appellant to elect not to testify.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a Corbett application must be decided immediately after the close of the Crown's case to allow the accused to make an informed decision about whether to testify.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to introduce rebuttal evidence relating to an alibi defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the rebuttal evidence was properly admitted as it went to the context and essential fabric of the alibi defence, and the Crown could not have known in advance what testimony the appellant would give.

The Court further held that even if part of the rebuttal evidence was improperly admitted, the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code would apply given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Alberta regarding convictions for both robbery and aggravated assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the charge of aggravated assault was an included offence in the robbery charge.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the Court held that the two charges arose out of the same delict, and therefore multiple convictions could not be entered.

The trial judgment was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Alberta Court of Appeal that the trial judge properly applied the elements of the offence as set out in R. v. Hundal and did not impose an incorrect standard of care.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his estranged wife's lover in a parking lot.

At trial, the judge left the defence of provocation with the jury but failed to instruct them that the Crown bore the burden of disproving provocation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the defence should not have been left with the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that there was sufficient evidence of both the objective and subjective elements of provocation to leave the defence with the jury, and the trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof necessitated a new trial.

The respondent, a physician, was charged with 14 counts of sexual assault against seven female patients.

Prior to trial, a chambers judge ordered the counts severed and divided based on the part of the body involved in the alleged assault.

At trial, the trial judge excluded evidence relating to the severed counts and the testimony of the respondent's ranking medical officer, and subsequently granted a motion for a non-suit.

The Crown appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the pre-trial severance order was subject to review despite the rule against collateral attack, and that it was jurisdictionally and substantively flawed.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence and in granting the non-suit by improperly weighing the evidence and applying the wrong standard.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused was acquitted at trial of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a fatal collision at an intersection.

The trial judge found the accused negligent but lacking the necessary criminal element.

The Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider all relevant evidence and the totality of the driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's assessment of the facts and evidence did not constitute an error of law, and the Court of Appeal improperly interfered with factual findings.