Emilio Binavince

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim against the respondent university.

The Court of Appeal found that although the procedure followed below was unclear, the motion judge was entitled to strike the pleading under Rule 25.11 as being untenable in law, given the dispute was essentially an academic matter.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant leave to file a fresh statement of claim in contract, concluding the claim could not possibly succeed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Auditor General of Canada sought access to Cabinet documents and Crown corporation records relating to Petro-Canada's acquisition of Petrofina, relying on section 13(1) of the Auditor General Act.

The government denied access, citing Cabinet confidentiality and the limits of the Auditor General's mandate.

The Auditor General applied to the courts for a declaration of his right to access the information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dispute was not justiciable.

The Court found that the Auditor General's exclusive remedy for a denial of access to information is the political remedy provided in section 7(1)(b) of the Act, which requires him to report the denial to the House of Commons.

The appellants challenged the federal cabinet's decision to permit the United States to test cruise missiles in Canada, alleging it violated their right to life, liberty, and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter by increasing the risk of nuclear war.

The respondents moved to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while cabinet decisions are reviewable under the Charter, the statement of claim must be struck out.

The Court found that the causal link between the testing of the cruise missile and an increased risk of nuclear war was entirely speculative and incapable of proof, meaning the facts alleged could not establish a violation of s. 7.

The Governor in Council referred a constitutional question to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding whether Canada or Newfoundland has the right to explore and exploit, and the legislative jurisdiction over, the mineral and other natural resources of the continental shelf offshore Newfoundland.

The Court held that the continental shelf rights are an extraterritorial manifestation of external sovereignty.

Since Newfoundland did not possess external sovereignty prior to joining Confederation, and international law did not recognize continental shelf rights at that time, the rights accrued to Canada.

Consequently, Canada has both the right to explore and exploit the resources and the legislative jurisdiction over them under its residual peace, order, and good government power.

The respondent Crown corporations were charged under the Combines Investigation Act with conspiring to unduly lessen competition in the uranium industry.

They sought prohibition orders to prevent the Provincial Court from proceeding, arguing they were immune from prosecution as agents of the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act does not bind the Crown.

Furthermore, because both corporations were statutorily designated as agents of the Crown 'for all its purposes' and were acting within their authorized corporate objects, they were entitled to Crown immunity.

The appeals by the Crown were dismissed.

The appellant church trustees applied to demolish a building on their property.

The City of Ottawa subsequently designated the property as a heritage building under The Ontario Heritage Act, which required the City's consent for demolition.

The Act provided that if the City failed to notify the applicant of its decision within ninety days, it would be deemed to have consented.

The City decided to refuse the application and expropriate the property within the ninety days, and the appellants knew of this decision, but the City failed to give formal notice as required by the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the notice provisions were substantive protections for the landowner and could not be ignored.

Because the City failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements, it was conclusively deemed to have consented to the demolition.