Elaine Peritz

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for an equalization payment of $320,713.66 from the defendant corporations, arising from a prior trial decision regarding the division of corporate assets between two siblings.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking to recalculate the equalization payment to include the value of preference shares, which would result in the plaintiff's principal owing $2,625,000.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, finding that the calculation of the equalization payment and the exclusion of the preference shares had already been determined in prior proceedings and were therefore res judicata.

The court also resolved several ancillary issues, including the transfer of burial plots and the return of original documents, and prohibited the parties from commencing further litigation without leave.

The applicant brought an oppression application seeking an order that the respondent corporation pay $999,007.50 to redeem her preference shares.

The respondents argued the payment would render the corporation insolvent under s. 32(2) of the Business Corporations Act and sought a stay pending a related appeal.

The court found the appeal had already been dismissed and did not affect the preference shares.

The court also rejected the insolvency argument, finding the corporation had sufficient assets and equity.

The court ordered the corporation to pay the redemption amount, finding it unnecessary to determine if the failure to pay constituted oppression.

The respondents defaulted on a second mortgage held by the appellant.

Following a fire that rendered the property uninhabitable, the appellant took possession without notice.

The application judge found the appellant did not take 'peaceable possession' and ordered the appellant to return possession, fix the redemption amount, and assign the mortgage to a new lender.

The appellant appealed but failed to comply with the assignment order.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred by applying the criminal law definition of 'peaceable possession' to a mortgage enforcement context.

The Court found the appellant did take peaceable possession because the property was uninhabitable and vacant.

Consequently, the appellant was entitled to property management fees.

However, due to the appellant's failure to comply with court orders, the Court exercised its discretion to uphold the requirement that the appellant assign the mortgage upon payment of the redemption amount.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation and disclosure of real estate transactions regarding a property he previously occupied.

The defendant second mortgagee brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action against it and for a judicial sale of the property.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding damages were an adequate remedy and the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate a prior default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court granted the defendant's motion, dismissing the action against it on the basis of res judicata and ordering a judicial sale of the property.

The plaintiffs, shareholders in several real estate corporations, sought leave to commence a derivative action and amended their statement of claim to add new causes of action following the discovery of a multi-million dollar fraud by a co-investor.

The defendants moved to strike the new claims and opposed the derivative action.

The court held that the motion for leave to commence a derivative action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in CIBC v. Green regarding the unavailability of nunc pro tunc orders to circumvent expired limitation periods.

The court also struck the new claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence as statute-barred, but allowed the unjust enrichment and oppression claims to proceed.

The respondents sold trademarks and a customer base to a corporation under a purchase agreement, with the purchase price payable by post-dated cheques.

The appellant, the sole director of the corporation, signed the agreement personally under a clause requiring him to cover any bounced cheques.

After the corporation went into receivership and cheques bounced, the respondents obtained partial summary judgment against the appellant on the personal guarantee.

The appellant appealed, arguing inadequate reasons, lack of a liability finding against the corporation, and that the clause was not a guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate, noting a guarantee is enforceable even if the principal debtor is bankrupt, and concluding the clause clearly constituted a personal guarantee.