D. Elliott

Following the dismissal of the parents' appeal in a child protection matter, the successful Society sought costs.

The parents argued that costs should not be awarded in child welfare proceedings and that they acted in good faith.

The court found that the parents engaged in bad faith litigation by making baseless allegations of professional misconduct, racism, and collusion against the Society's counsel and the court.

To express disapproval of this reprehensible conduct, the court awarded the Society substantial indemnity costs fixed at $44,703.60.

The plaintiff brought actions claiming ownership of a 1973 Dino Ferrari and interests in his parents' motel business, alleging improper conversion of assets by his mother's attorneys for property.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the motel was a partnership between the parents, the plaintiff was merely an employee, and the Ferrari was an asset of the motel business despite being registered in the plaintiff's name.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment, oppression under the Business Corporations Act, and conversion of personal property, granting summary judgment in favour of the defendants.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for a capacity assessment of his mother, the successful respondents sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $115,000 based on Rule 49 offers to settle.

The court held that Rule 49.10 does not apply to award substantial indemnity costs when a plaintiff's claim fails entirely.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court found the time spent by the respondents' counsel was excessive and not proportional to the straightforward nature of the issues.

Costs were fixed at $25,000 for the respondent mother and $10,000 for the respondent attorneys.

The parties, who were partners in a land development project, disputed the interpretation of their Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) and a subsequent 2005 document regarding the allocation of building lots.

The application judge declared the 2005 document enforceable and held that actions against a defaulting partner under Article 8.2 of the LPA required unanimous consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the enforceability of the 2005 document, finding it clarified an unclear term and was supported by functional consideration.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Article 8.2, concluding that interpreting it to require unanimous consent would render other provisions meaningless and lead to commercially absurd results.