Chikeziri Igwe

The appellants, Gavra and Karl Largie, were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on private communications intercepted with the consent of an informant under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that s. 184.2 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it does not require the state to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that s. 184.2 satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of s. 8 and is not unconstitutional despite the absence of an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court also dismissed several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assault and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment consecutive to a sentence he was already serving.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment and that the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings, which were supported by police observations of bite marks, and concluding the cross-examination was relevant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the domestic context, the injuries, and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting two young brothers.

During the trial, a Crown witness testified that his son had called the appellant a 'rapist pedophile'.

The trial judge refused the appellant's application for a mistrial, opting instead to give a mid-trial curative instruction to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing the mistrial and in failing to repeat the caution in his closing instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's exercise of discretion was not clearly wrong and the mid-trial instruction was sufficient to remove the potential prejudice.

The appellant pleaded guilty to threatening death, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance arising from a dysfunctional domestic relationship.

He was originally sentenced to four years in custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly unfit given the unusual circumstances, noting the appellant had attempted to extricate himself from the relationship but the victim repeatedly followed him.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to time served, equivalent to 35 months.