Carole Lebeuf

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial.

The issue on appeal was whether the trial judge's charge to the jury was unfair because the judge provided opinions on the evidence while summarizing the theory of the defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed with the dissenting judge in the Quebec Court of Appeal that the trial judge's charge compromised the fairness of the trial, and ordered a new trial.

A prisoner appealed the setting aside of a stay entered after a trial judge found a section 7 breach arising from severe mistreatment by a state actor during transport custody.

The Court held that appellate review of section 24(1) remedies is highly deferential and intervention is justified only for legal error, reviewable factual error, or a clearly unjust result.

On the trial findings, the stay remained an available and proportionate remedy in exceptional circumstances where continuation would undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court also held that, when setting aside a stay, an appellate court may in appropriate cases remit the matter for continuation of trial under Criminal Code sections 686(4) and 686(8).

The appellant appealed his convictions on 15 counts of sexual assault, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal that the circumstantial evidence had so little weight that it was unreasonable to convict the appellant of the initial assault.

As the other 14 convictions relied on similar fact evidence tied to the first conviction, the appeal was allowed and acquittals were substituted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and three counts of attempted murder.

The issues on appeal included whether the trial judge erred in not putting the defence of mental disorder automatism to the jury, in summarizing expert testimony, and in charging the jury on the mens rea for criminal harassment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The accused was acquitted at trial after his statements were ruled inadmissible.

The Crown appealed, and the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by confusing the evidentiary rule relating to the admissibility of free and voluntary statements with the test for exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The order for a new trial was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based on circumstantial evidence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt, which included references to 'moral certainty', was flawed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's instructions were in substantial compliance with the principles set out in Lifchus and did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

The accused was charged with sexual assaults on two young male children.

At trial, he sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence, including penile plethysmograph test results, to show he lacked the distinctive personality traits of someone who would commit such offences.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding it did not meet the Mohan criteria for admissibility, and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the novel scientific evidence due to its lack of reliability and failure to establish a standard profile for the distinctive group of offenders.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had allowed the accused's appeal from convictions for sexual touching and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal had found that the trial judge erred in failing to take expert testimony into account.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge neither was mistaken about the purpose of the expert evidence nor abused his discretion in dealing with the expert's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, with three justices dissenting.