Alison Mintoff

In an appeal concerning adverse possession of municipal parkland, the appellants sought possessory title to a fenced portion of backyard land registered to the municipality.

The majority held that recognizing a common law immunity for municipal parkland would conflict with Ontario’s statutory scheme under the Real Property Limitations Act and related legislation, which preserves matured possessory claims unless a statutory exception applies.

Because the statutory test for adverse possession was satisfied and no applicable statutory immunity barred the claim, the municipality’s title had been extinguished.

The appeal was allowed and the appellants were entitled to fee simple title to the disputed land.

The appellants sought title to a portion of municipal parkland that their predecessors had fenced off and exclusively used since at least 1971.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding that municipal parkland is immune to adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while there is no absolute common law immunity, municipal parkland is presumptively unavailable for adverse possession under the 'public benefit' test unless the municipality has waived its rights or acquiesced to the possession.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, arguing that the Real Property Limitations Act provides a complete code that does not exempt municipal parkland.

The self-represented appellants appealed the dismissal of their Small Claims Court action against Winners and the Toronto Police Services Board arising from the detention and arrest of the appellant for shoplifting.

The appellants alleged false arrest, assault, and spoilation of video evidence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions that the security personnel reasonably believed a theft occurred and lawfully detained the appellant.

The court also rejected arguments regarding delay in calling police, spoilation of evidence, and the admissibility of hearsay statements in medical records.

The City of Toronto brought a motion for directions regarding property tax relief appeals filed by a self-represented property owner for the 2015 and 2017 taxation years.

The owner sought tax exemptions, relief for additional unappealed taxation years, and an adjournment due to medical issues.

The Assessment Review Board held it lacked jurisdiction to grant tax exemptions or extend the statutory deadline to appeal the other taxation years.

Given the owner's extreme medical needs, the Board granted a sine die adjournment of the 2015 and 2017 appeals.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking out their negligence claim against the Toronto Police Services Board without leave to amend.

The appellants alleged the police owed them a duty of care in investigating a crime affecting their family.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the precedent in Wellington v. Ontario established that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime and their families in relation to police investigations.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments that their case was distinguishable based on their lack of certain victim remedies or their assistance to police in the investigation.

The applicant applied for a refund of her 2016 property taxes under s. 323(1)(e) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, claiming inability to pay due to sickness and extreme poverty.

The Assessment Review Board accepted the applicant's evidence of sickness, noting she received disability benefits.

However, the Board found she was not living in extreme poverty and had the ability to pay her taxes.

Financial evidence showed the applicant had substantial assets, including over $68,000 in bank accounts, and had already paid her 2016 taxes in full.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a cancellation, reduction, or refund of her 2016 property taxes under s. 323(1)(e) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, citing sickness and extreme poverty.

While the Assessment Review Board accepted that the applicant met the sickness criterion, it found she was not living in extreme poverty and had the ability to pay her property taxes.

The Board noted the applicant's significant equity in her property, receipt of a tax refund, and substantial discretionary spending, including a trip to Florida and frequent taxi use.

The application was dismissed.

The Applicant applied to the City of Toronto for a cancellation, reduction, or refund of her 2015 property taxes on the grounds of sickness or extreme poverty.

The Assessment Review Board found that while the Applicant demonstrated a condition of sickness, she did not establish an inability to pay her property taxes as a result.

The Board also found that the Applicant was not in a condition of extreme poverty, noting she had significant bank balances and had paid off her mortgage during the year.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal a costs order made three years prior.

The applicant argued that his periods of incarceration prevented him from filing the materials on time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to adequately explain the lengthy delay and that he could have prepared the materials while incarcerated.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as there were no strong grounds to suggest the motion judge erred in exercising his discretion regarding costs.