Killeen

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in an uninsured vehicle.

She sought uninsured motorist coverage under the policy of the other driver, who was insured by the respondent.

The motion judge dismissed the action against the respondent, finding the plaintiff was not a 'person insured under the contract' under s. 265 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying its previous decision in Taggart.

The Court held that the broader definition of 'insured' in s. 224 informs s. 265, meaning that because the plaintiff was entitled to statutory accident benefits under the respondent's policy, she was also entitled to uninsured motorist coverage.

The Court declined to overrule Taggart, finding it was not decided per incuriam.

The respondent, a licensed driver and trainer, was disciplined by track judges for providing an improper urine sample.

He appealed to the Ontario Racing Commission, which held a hearing de novo.

At the hearing, the Commission allowed the senior track judge from the initial panel to testify.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commission's decision, finding this created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the track judge had relevant factual evidence to give and his testimony did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Commission Panel's ruling did not show preconceived views or give undue weight to his evidence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action.

The action had been dismissed without notice pursuant to Rule 37.07(2) after the appellant failed to comply with a previous affidavit order.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, noting the appellant was attempting to re-litigate the affidavit order, an appeal of which had already been quashed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding her bankruptcy discharge, arguing she was entitled to an automatic discharge because the trustee in bankruptcy failed to include a recommendation on her discharge in his report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had failed to perform several duties and tender required funds, and that the trustee's actions did not invalidate the procedure.

The appellants commissioned an investigative report in preparation for a fraud action.

A senior official mistakenly believed a former lawyer for the appellants was still part of their legal team and sent him a copy of the report to review as a potential witness.

The appellants later added the lawyer's former firm as a defendant in the action without first retrieving the report.

When the appellants demanded the return of the report claiming litigation privilege, the lawyer refused.

The Court of Appeal held that while the initial disclosure did not waive privilege against the adversaries, the appellants lost the right to assert privilege over the document in the lawyer's hands once they sued his firm without first demanding its return.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to vary a procedural consent order and order the disclosure of an audit report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge properly varied the consent order because the respondent's counsel was unaware of material facts when consenting.

The Court also upheld the disclosure of the audit report, as there was unanswered evidence that the Trustee had already declared its existence and contents to a third party, making it unnecessary to decide the broader issue of whether a Trustee in Bankruptcy can claim litigation privilege.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Backhouse.

The Court of Appeal found that, assuming it had jurisdiction, the appeal was moot in light of a subsequent judgment by Justice Siegel, except for the issue of costs.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the costs order and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $2,000 to the respondent.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment finding that coverage under a homeowner's policy was not excluded by a 'trade, profession or occupation' clause.

The insured was performing casual handyman activities when a fire broke out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the policy or reliance on findings from the underlying tort action that the activities were personal and fell within the grant of coverage.