Jonathan Schwartzman

The applicants were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident and inadvertently applied for statutory accident benefits to the insurer of the motorcycle rather than their own auto insurer, with whom they had purchased optional enhanced benefits.

When they attempted to claim the optional benefits, their auto insurer denied the claim on the basis that they had already applied to another insurer.

The applicants brought an application to the Superior Court for relief from forfeiture.

The court dismissed the application, finding that under section 280 of the Insurance Act, exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding entitlement to statutory accident benefits lies with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT), stripping the court of jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in this context.

At a case management conference, the plaintiff sought an extension of time to serve expert reports because a pediatric neurologist required an MRI to finalize her opinion, and the MRI was delayed until December 2019.

The court granted the request and amended the timetable for the service of expert reports, setting new deadlines for the plaintiff's and defendants' reports.

During a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought to qualify an anesthesiologist as an expert in chronic pain.

The court permitted the expert to testify regarding his diagnosis, observations, and prognosis of the plaintiff's chronic pain.

However, applying the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, the court restricted the expert from opining on whether the accident caused the pain or whether the impairments met the statutory threshold for damages, reserving those ultimate issues for the jury.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $35,000 in general damages and $20,000 in past loss of income for injuries sustained in a rear-end motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion.

The court found that while the plaintiff suffered a permanent impairment from chronic pain, she failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that her ongoing complaints were caused by the accident rather than pre-existing severe degenerative disc disease.

Furthermore, the court found that the impairment was not 'serious' within the meaning of the Insurance Act, as she was able to work and perform most tasks of daily living.

The threshold motion was granted, barring the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages.

In a personal injury jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought to use demonstrative evidence, including medical illustrations, charts, and photographs, during their opening statement.

The defendants objected on the grounds of authenticity, accuracy, and prejudice.

The court ruled that most of the proposed demonstratives, including photographs and a subjective prescription chart, could not be used in the opening statement as their admissibility remained in dispute.

However, the court permitted the use of a factual physician chronology chart, finding it contained admissible evidence that could be proven without prejudice to the defendants.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff was awarded $2,000 for future housekeeping expenses, with all other heads of damage reduced to zero by statutory deductibles.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment, arguing the housekeeping award should not be reduced by a prior $3,650 accident benefits settlement.

The court found the settlement release covered past, present, and future housekeeping expenses, reducing the jury award to zero.

As the successful parties who had made a better offer to settle, the defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs of $138,416.42.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle insured by the moving party, despite having a suspended driver's licence.

The other vehicle involved was uninsured.

The plaintiff sued the other driver and claimed uninsured automobile coverage from the moving party.

The moving party brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and a cross-claim brought by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, arguing the plaintiff breached a statutory condition by driving while suspended.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that under the Insurance Act, statutory conditions do not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly stated in the contract, which was not the case here.

The court also held the cross-claim was not statute-barred.