J. N. Morissette

The accused was scheduled for a Charter application regarding voluntariness, but the provided Laotian interpreter was not accredited.

Noting the fundamental rights conferred by section 14 of the Charter and the pressures of trial delays, the court adjourned the application to the start of the trial and directed the administration of justice to ensure a properly accredited interpreter is made available.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court medical negligence action.

He argued that the deputy judge erred by presiding over a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02 after having presided over a settlement conference in the same matter, relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Hussain regarding summary judgment motions.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that a Rule 12.02 motion is not analogous to a summary judgment motion and that the Small Claims Court Rules grant broad powers to dismiss unmeritorious claims, particularly where the appellant failed to provide required expert reports.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in an action alleging excessive force by police officers.

The plaintiff argued that because the Woodstock Police Services Board is funded by the municipality, the action constitutes relief against a municipality, which precludes a jury trial under section 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Police Services Board maintains independence from the municipality and that an action against the Board is not equivalent to an action against the municipality.

The motion to strike the jury notice was dismissed.

The appellant contractor appealed an arbitrator's decision which found that its letters to the respondent subcontractor did not constitute a 'claim made in writing' under their construction contract.

The arbitrator had distinguished between provisions requiring 'written notice of a claim' and 'claims made in writing', declining to apply established jurisprudence.

The Superior Court of Justice found this distinction to be an error of law.

Applying the established test, the court held that the appellant's correspondence did constitute an unsettled claim made in writing, thereby preserving its right of set-off.

The arbitrator's decision was set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded both lay opinion evidence and expert evidence from police officers trained as Drug Recognition Experts (DREs), as well as a toxicology report, concluding that such evidence was inadmissible or failed to meet the Mohan criteria for expert evidence.

The appeal court held that lay witnesses, including police officers, may provide opinion evidence about impairment, and that trained DRE officers may give expert opinion evidence concerning drug impairment.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by excluding the officers’ expert evidence and failing to consider the toxicology report.

As a result, the acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision when the defendant driver failed to yield the right-of-way at an intersection.

The plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, depression, and chronic pain, which substantially interfered with her employment and daily life.

The court found the defendant driver fully liable and his employer vicariously liable.

The court held that the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary damages and awarded $100,000 in general damages, $50,000 for loss of competitive advantage, and $45,000 in Family Law Act damages.

The court also discharged the jury due to inflammatory opening statements by defence counsel.

The plaintiff, a 16-year-old driver, was injured in a single-vehicle accident after failing to stop at a stop sign at a rural intersection and crashing into a concrete abutment.

The plaintiff had consumed alcohol prior to the crash.

The plaintiff sued the municipality, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair because it lacked warning signs for a change in road alignment (an 'offset' intersection).

The court found that the intersection posed a hidden hazard and required a warning sign in addition to the stop sign.

The court apportioned liability 50% to the municipality for failure to warn and 50% to the plaintiff for failing to stop and driving after consuming alcohol.