J. Gold

The accused, charged with second degree murder following a vehicular confrontation with a pedestrian, applied for release on bail pending trial.

The Crown conceded that the accused met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on a $200,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including house arrest and supervision by named sureties, to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on charges including kidnapping and multiple firearm offences.

The case was entirely circumstantial and relied on cell phone tower evidence, a firearm magazine found at the scene, and the ownership of a vehicle linked to the incident.

The court held there was sufficient evidence capable of supporting a reasonable inference of the applicant’s involvement in the kidnapping for the purpose of committal.

However, the preliminary inquiry judge erred in concluding that the presence of a firearm magazine supported an inference that a firearm was used during the offence.

As there was no evidentiary foundation capable of satisfying a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used, the firearm-related committals were quashed while the kidnapping and related offences remained.

The applicant brought an application to stay his criminal charges, arguing that the 32-month delay to trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court analyzed the chronology of the proceedings, attributing portions of the delay to intake, institutional delay, and the applicant's tactical decisions regarding the preliminary hearing.

The court concluded that the total institutional delay of 17.75 months across two levels of court was within administrative guidelines and that the prejudice suffered by the applicant was largely inherent to being charged with serious offences.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent in a family proceeding brought a motion to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation registered against residential property, arguing the applicant had no reasonable claim to an interest in the land.

The applicant asserted a constructive, resulting, or implied trust based on unjust enrichment arising from an eight‑year cohabitation during which she performed domestic and caregiving roles that allegedly enabled the respondent to focus on his business activities.

Applying the test under s. 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act and the principles in Kerr v. Baranow, the court held that although the claim appeared weak, it was not devoid of merit and constituted a reasonable claim to an interest in land.

The court further exercised its equitable discretion to maintain the certificate, noting evidence that the moving party had previously engaged in sham transfers and asset shielding.

The motion to discharge the Certificate of Pending Litigation was dismissed.