Jeffrey Fisher

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of an undertaking.

She was on bail pending appeal for a prior trafficking conviction at the time of the offence.

The court weighed her guilty plea, remorse, and the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (including triple bunking and lockdowns) against the large quantity of cocaine and her related criminal record.

The court imposed a total sentence of 6 years and 3 months, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a bush party.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, but the trial judge rejected his testimony and convicted him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about human behaviour to reject the appellant's testimony and by failing to consider corroborative defence evidence before concluding the appellant was not credible.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, charged with firearm offences, applied to vary his bail conditions to delete the house arrest requirement after nearly two years of compliance.

The Crown opposed the variation.

The court recognized the applicant's good track record but noted the seriousness of the charges.

The court crafted a compromise, modifying the house arrest condition to allow the applicant to leave the residence with written permission from his surety, subject to a curfew and other conditions.

The offender was convicted of possession of a restricted firearm, a prohibited over-capacity magazine, and possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the commercial nature of the drug operation and the presence of a firearm, against mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of a criminal record and strong family support.

The court imposed a total sentence of 4 years' imprisonment, with the firearm offences to be served consecutively to the drug offences.

The offender received enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions and strict bail conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 631 days.

The Crown applied for an order under section 752.1 of the Criminal Code to remand the respondent for a psychiatric assessment to determine if he might be found a dangerous or long-term offender.

The respondent had recently been convicted of attempted sexual assault, weapons dangerous, and voyeurism, marking his third conviction for sexual offences against young women.

Given his history of escalating sexual violence, mental health diagnoses including schizophrenia, and lack of insight, the court found reasonable grounds to believe he might be designated a dangerous or long-term offender.

The application was granted and an assessment by a CAMH psychiatrist was ordered.

The accused was charged with firearm and drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at his family home, finding a loaded handgun, cocaine, heroin, and cash in a bedroom.

At trial, a defence witness unexpectedly testified that the firearm belonged to him.

Police arrested and interviewed the witness mid-testimony, prompting the defence to bring an abuse of process application alleging witness tampering.

The court dismissed the application, finding the police acted within their lawful ancillary powers to investigate the witness's confession.

On the merits, the court rejected the witness's confession as not credible and found the accused guilty of all charges based on constructive possession.

The appellant was convicted of possessing heroin and cocaine after a police officer entered his unlocked public washroom stall without a warrant and discovered him with drugs.

The trial judge found a section 8 Charter breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his application of the Grant framework, specifically regarding the seriousness of the police conduct and the impact on his privacy interests.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable determination in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.