Jason Beitchman

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's 60-paragraph statement of claim, which alleged a broad conspiracy of mortgage fraud involving numerous parties and properties.

The court struck the claim in its entirety under Rule 25.11, finding it unduly prolix, confusing, and likely to prejudice a fair trial.

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to re-plead specific, legally viable claims related to her own property, while denying leave to re-plead claims that constituted a collateral attack on a prior judgment or sought relief on behalf of third parties.

In a securities class action arising from the collapse of a forestry company, the plaintiffs sought approximately $2.6 million in costs following certification and leave motions brought under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and the Securities Act.

Several defendants argued that costs should not be awarded because the plaintiffs had already recovered legal expenses through settlements with other defendants and because the claimed costs were excessive.

The court held that the plaintiffs were largely successful but not entirely successful due to an unresolved assignment issue affecting certain class members.

The court also ruled that disbursements could not be recovered again because they had already been indemnified through settlements.

Exercising its discretion, the court ordered a hybrid costs award: part payable immediately and part payable in the cause.

The defendant law firm moved under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a professional negligence and conflict of interest action for delay.

The action had been commenced in 1993 concerning legal advice provided in a 1987 building code appeal and alleged conflict arising from representation of another developer in 1990.

Over more than two decades the plaintiff repeatedly failed to move the case forward, delayed discoveries, postponed expert evidence for many years, and allowed significant periods of inactivity.

The court found the delay both inordinate and inexcusable and concluded that the presumption of prejudice to the defendant had not been rebutted.

The court also held the delay constituted an abuse of process under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14(1).

The action arose from alleged environmental contamination by the defendants' dry cleaning operations.

The court applied the four-factor test for setting aside a dismissal order.

While finding no prejudice to the defendants, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to adequately explain the litigation delay or their failure to meet the set down deadline.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs' claims were already preserved in a crossclaim in a related, more advanced action.

To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed.

The provincial regulator applied for a declaration that a financial product marketed as a “Basic Line of Credit” constituted a payday loan under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The respondents argued that the product was a true line of credit and therefore outside the statutory definition and provincial jurisdiction.

The court applied the statutory direction to examine the real substance of the transaction rather than its outward form.

Despite structural features resembling a line of credit, the product functioned in practice as a series of short‑term advances tied to borrowers’ pay cycles and subject to high interest and brokerage fees.

The court held that the arrangement was substantively equivalent to payday lending and therefore subject to the Act and related regulatory regime.

In a certified class action alleging price maintenance and conspiracy by a franchisor and its designated food supplier, the parties brought reciprocal motions regarding refusals on examinations for discovery.

The court applied the principles of relevance, materiality, and proportionality, emphasizing that the action was certified based on a 'top-down' systemic approach rather than a 'bottom-up' product-by-product analysis.

The court largely upheld the refusals, finding many questions to be irrelevant, disproportionate, or inconsistent with the certified common issues, while ordering a small number of questions to be answered.