William Manuel

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The liquidator of an insolvent insurance company brought a motion to approve settlement agreements with two tobacco companies.

The settlements included a condition requiring court approval of releases that would bar third-party claims against the insurer.

Several provincial Crowns and class action representatives opposed the settlements, arguing they had direct statutory claims against the insurer and were not bound by the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act (WURA).

The court held that the WURA does not expressly or implicitly bind the Crown, nor did the Crowns waive immunity under the benefit/burden doctrine as they had not yet made claims in the liquidation.

The motion to approve the settlements was dismissed.

Multiple tobacco manufacturer defendants sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $300,000 after withdrawing previously scheduled motions to strike the Crown’s statement of claim in a health care cost recovery action under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.

The defendants argued they were the successful parties because their motions prompted extensive amendments to the pleading and that the Crown delayed notifying them of its intention to amend.

The court held that the amendments addressed only some of the alleged deficiencies and that significant legal issues remained unresolved when the defendants chose to withdraw the motions.

As a result, success on the motions was considered divided.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs.

Following a successful Rule 21 motion striking the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the defendant sought costs of approximately $32,247.

The plaintiff argued the amount was excessive and emphasized his limited financial means, reliance on social assistance, and mental health challenges preventing stable employment.

The court reviewed the principle of reasonableness governing costs awards and the jurisprudence on whether a party’s impecuniosity may be considered.

The court concluded the claimed amount was excessive and determined that, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to consider the plaintiff’s financial hardship.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award any costs.

The provincial regulator applied for a declaration that a financial product marketed as a “Basic Line of Credit” constituted a payday loan under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The respondents argued that the product was a true line of credit and therefore outside the statutory definition and provincial jurisdiction.

The court applied the statutory direction to examine the real substance of the transaction rather than its outward form.

Despite structural features resembling a line of credit, the product functioned in practice as a series of short‑term advances tied to borrowers’ pay cycles and subject to high interest and brokerage fees.

The court held that the arrangement was substantively equivalent to payday lending and therefore subject to the Act and related regulatory regime.

The plaintiff, having been found not criminally responsible, was ordered detained at a mental health facility but was instead held in a provincial jail for 50 days due to a lack of hospital beds.

The plaintiff sued the Crown for false imprisonment and Charter breaches.

The Crown moved to strike portions of the Statement of Claim.

The court struck the false imprisonment and Charter damages claims with leave to amend, finding the Crown statutorily immune based on the current pleadings and noting the failure to plead bad faith for Charter damages.

The court allowed the underlying Charter breach claims to proceed.

The plaintiff, who was acquitted of manslaughter in a judge-alone trial, sued the Attorney General for malicious prosecution.

The Attorney General had previously attempted to override the plaintiff's election for a judge-alone trial without providing reasons, which the criminal trial judge found to be an abuse of process.

The Attorney General moved to strike the civil claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts establishing that the prosecution was continued without reasonable cause or motivated by malice, noting that overriding a trial election is a non-core element of prosecutorial discretion outside the scope of malicious prosecution.

The Crown brought an action under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act against several domestic and foreign tobacco companies, claiming $50 billion for health care costs related to tobacco disease.

Six foreign defendants brought motions to set aside service ex juris and stay or dismiss the action, arguing the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the Crown had established a good arguable case that the foreign defendants conspired and acted in concert to commit tobacco-related wrongs, establishing a real and substantial connection to Ontario.