James S.G. Macdonald

The plaintiffs and defendants were part of a group of ten investors who purchased a property to improve and sell for profit.

Following the sale, a dispute arose over the distribution of the net proceeds.

The plaintiff claimed entitlement to three shares of the proceeds and compensation for lost rental income, while the defendants argued he was only entitled to one share, subject to a deduction for an unpaid promissory note.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to a single one-tenth share, from which his debt under the promissory note was deducted, resulting in an award of $8,237.82.

The claims for additional shares and lost rental income were dismissed.

The respondents brought a motion to stay or dismiss the application as an abuse of process, alleging the applicant failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with a co-respondent, failed to disclose surveillance evidence, and improperly commenced the proceeding as an application.

The court found that the applicant had made immediate and proper disclosure of the settlement agreement to both the non-settling parties and the court, and that the handling of surveillance evidence did not constitute an abuse of process.

The motion to stay was dismissed, but the court ordered the application converted into an action.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge the plaintiff's construction lien for pre-publication work and to vacate the remaining lien for post-publication work upon payment into court.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants were precluded by promissory estoppel from relying on the statutory limitation period to perfect the lien, based on a promise to pay made during settlement discussions.

The court found that the pre-publication lien had expired because it was not perfected in time.

The court held that promissory estoppel did not apply because the defendants never promised to waive or not rely on the limitation period.

The motion was granted, the pre-publication lien was discharged, and the post-publication lien was ordered vacated upon payment into court.

The plaintiff mortgage broker arranged financing for the defendants' convention centre project.

The plaintiff alleged it was entitled to a 5% ownership interest in the defendant corporation pursuant to an equity agreement, but share certificates were never issued.

Over eight years later, the plaintiff sued.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to amend its claim to seek only declaratory relief, arguing that under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act, claims for declaratory relief alone are not subject to a limitation period.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to amend its claim and dismissed the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue for trial as to whether the plaintiff acquired a beneficial interest that could be subject to declaratory relief without consequential relief.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs succeeded on liability for nuisance and trespass against a neighbouring trucking company, the Court of Appeal ordered that the plaintiffs recover their costs of the liability portion of the trial, with quantum to be determined by the trial judge.

The court considered the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality, indemnity, reasonable expectations of the losing party, complexity, and the hours reasonably expended.

The court rejected arguments that the plaintiffs’ trial preparation time was excessive and accepted that approximately 75% of the trial concerned liability rather than damages.

Applying partial indemnity rates and allocating costs proportionately, the court fixed the recoverable trial costs and apportioned joint and several liability for the trespass portion of the claim.

The applicant beneficiary brought an application against estate trustees alleging they improperly caused estate funds to pay legal fees incurred in litigation that primarily advanced their personal beneficiary interests.

The dispute arose from prior litigation concerning ownership of a family home that had vested in estate beneficiaries under the Estates Administration Act.

The court held that estate trustees are not entitled to indemnification from estate assets for legal costs incurred to protect their own personal interests, and where both personal and estate interests are engaged, trustees must segregate the costs.

The court found the impugned legal fees were incurred in the respondents’ personal capacities and ordered reimbursement of the applicant’s proportionate share.

The court also held that trustee compensation taken without court approval or beneficiary consent was improper and required repayment of the applicant’s share.

Following a prior decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiff against one defendant, the court determined the quantum of costs payable.

The plaintiff relied on a valid Rule 49 offer to settle and sought substantial indemnity costs after the offer and partial indemnity costs before it.

The court reviewed the reasonableness of the fees claimed, reduced certain hours and travel expenses, and apportioned costs to reflect that judgment was obtained only against one defendant.

Applying the appropriate indemnity scales and reductions, the court fixed the total recoverable fees, taxes, and disbursements.

The plaintiffs, who operate a commercial lighting manufacturing business, brought an action against the defendants, who operate an adjacent transport and warehousing business.

The plaintiffs claimed that dust from the defendants' unpaved parking lot constituted a nuisance that interfered with their manufacturing process, causing a loss of productivity.

They also claimed that the defendants' transport trucks repeatedly trespassed onto their driveway, damaging curb stones and displacing concrete blocks.

The court found that the dust constituted an actionable nuisance and awarded damages for loss of productivity and refinishing costs.

The court also found that the trucks trespassed on the plaintiffs' property, holding the corporate defendants and their director personally liable.

Damages were awarded for the trespass, and a permanent injunction was granted to restrain further trespassing.