Singh v. Harpreet, 2025 ONSC 48

COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-00678255-0000

DATE: 20250102

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: SURINDER PAL SINGH and INSURANCE DEPOT INC., plaintiffs

- AND -

HARPREET HARPREET, defendant

BEFORE: Justice Linda Shin

COUNSEL: James S. G. Macdonald, counsel for the plaintiffs

Supriya Joshi and A. Jammu, counsel for the defendant

HEARD: December 12, 2024

ENDORSEMENT

1The plaintiffs move for summary judgment awarding $71,343.80 in damages for breach of a loan agreement; $14,400 in damages for occupation rent; and that these amounts be paid out of monies being held in trust for the parties. The defendant’s position is that this action is barred as res judicata, for both issue estoppel and/or cause of action estoppel.

BACKGROUND

2The plaintiff Mr. Singh and the defendant Ms. Harpreet were tenants in common with a registered ownership interest of 50% each of the property at 30 Ixworth Road, Toronto (the “Property”) which was the subject of earlier proceedings between the parties. Ms. Harpreet lived in the Property, Mr. Singh did not.

3In March 2020, the plaintiffs commenced an application against Ms. Harpreet under the Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4 for the sale of the Property and for a taking of accounts and equitable allowances in respect of his contributions and occupation rent (“Partition Application”).

4During the Partition Application proceedings, the parties agreed to a sale of the Property to Mr. Singh. The sale was completed on January 18, 2021 and the net proceeds of $230,608.36 have been held in trust for the parties by Saini & Kamal Law Professional Corporation ever since. The parties had agreed that the proceeds would be held in trust pending agreement by the parties on distribution or an order of the court.

5The balance of the Partition Application was heard by Justice Sanderson in November 2021: Singh v. Harpreet, 2021 ONSC 7708. Before Sanderson J., the plaintiffs (the applicants in that proceeding) sought a declaration that Mr. Singh was the beneficial owner of a 97.5% interest in the Property before it was sold due to his contributions to the Property and the resulting unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs also sought a declaration of trust over the entire $230,608.36. Ms. Harpreet’s evidence was that the parties always agreed to 50/50 ownership of the Property while Mr. Singh denied any agreement as to their respective ownership interests. Moreover, while Ms. Harpreet did not deny that Mr. Singh made greater financial contributions to the Property than she did (though there were disputes as to the specific amounts), she denied any agreement that he was loaning her funds to pay for her for her 50% ownership or that she agreed or had an obligation to repay any of his excess contributions.

6Affidavit evidence from, and transcripts of the cross-examinations of, Mr. Singh and Ms. Harpreet were before Sanderson J. Sanderson J. was initially concerned whether she would be able to make the “crucial factual findings upon which the resolution of the legal issues would hinge” without viva voce evidence. Of particular concern was the conflicting evidence on the parties’ discussions/intentions/and agreements regarding their property rights and their other rights and obligations arising out of their respective contributions (see paras. 84-90, 117). However, after having “pored over the application records and transcripts,” she ultimately concluded the materials “constitute a sufficient basis upon which the crucial factual findings of fact on intention and on what the parties agreed can be fairly made” and that the law could be applied to those factual findings (see paras. 92-96).

7Sanderson J. made the following key findings relevant to this action and motion under the heading “Application of the Law to the Facts as Found”:

173I have found that at the time they agreed on 50/50 ownership, they agreed that their proportionate ownership would always be 50/50 and that [Ms. Harpreet] would repay the unsecured loan for his excess contributions plus 50% of the ongoing expenses of the property.

174On the facts as found, I deny [Mr. Singh’s] request for a declaration that he held a disproportionate interest in the property before the sale.

175I have found that a disproportionate interest was never in the contemplation of the parties at the time they agreed to the 50/50 split.

176On the loans as of January 18,2021 I have calculated as at January 2021 Harpreet owed Singh $71343.80 including interest on the loans.

177She also owed him $14,400 for the occupation value.

178$71,343.80 + $14,400 = $85,743.80.

179On these factual findings, there is no unjust enrichment or deprivation.

180The applicant has no entitlement to an ownership interest in excess of 50%.

181He does, however, have entitlement to have their loan contract fulfilled / to be repaid on his loans to her for his excess contributions.

182Singh received fair value for his contributions, a 50% interest in the property and Harpreet’s loan obligation of $71,343.80

183I have found he proposed repayment of the loans to compensate for unequal payments, not unequal property interests and she agreed.

184Since he was the one who proposed repayment of the loans as the remedy for the unequal payments, he must have been satisfied with the fairness/ justice of the repayment solution

185Given her repayment obligation, Harpreet has not been unfairly enriched and Singh has not been unfairly deprived.

186Given the existence of the verbal contract between the parties at the time of closing, and her ongoing indebtedness with interest, the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply.

187In addition, I have found that Harpreet also owes Singh $14,400 for occupation value between September, 2019 and January 18, 2021.

188Taken together, Harpreet still owes him an amount that in my view will fairly compensate him for his excess contributions on their purchase of the property and will provide him with fair value for her occupation of the property for sixteen months.

189Her ongoing indebtedness to Singh is an unsecured debt.

8In summary, Sanderson J. found that Mr. Singh’s contributions to the Property which exceeded Ms. Harpreet’s did not lead to a pro rata or disproportionate ownership split as the parties intended and agreed to 50/50 ownership consistent with legal title regardless of their individual contributions to the Property. Sanderson J. also found that both parties intended and agreed that each be responsible for half of the ownership costs and expenses and Ms. Harpreet agreed to repay Mr. Singh for his excess contributions which they both agreed constituted loans made to her. As a result, Ms. Harpreet owes Mr. Singh $85,743.80 for his excess contributions and for the value of Ms. Harpreet’s occupation of the Property.

9Sanderson J. did not order that the $85,743.80 Ms. Harpreet owes Mr. Singh be paid out of the proceeds held in trust as that debt is unsecured and not owing under a proprietary trust. Sanderson J. proposed that the parties “shall agree upon the timing and manner of the distribution of the $230,608.36, having regard to the content of these Reasons and the disposition set out below” (see paras. 224-225).

10Sanderson J. ultimately dismissed the Partition Application given her findings that the amounts owing did not entitle Mr. Singh to a beneficial ownership interest beyond the agreed upon 50% and there was no constructive trust over the $230,608.36 being held in trust.

11Following Sanderson J.’s decision, the defendant did not engage in any discussions about the distribution of the funds held in trust and therefore no agreement was reached. As a result, the plaintiffs commenced this action in March 2022 seeking: (a) the amounts owing in accordance with Sanderson J.’s decision; (b) $50,000.00 in damages for breach of a contractual obligation of good faith; (c) a declaration that the defendant has abandoned her interest in the proceeds of sale of the Property; (d) an order that those proceeds be paid to the plaintiffs; (e) pre and postjudgment interest; and (f) costs.

12On this summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs are not advancing the damages claim for breach of good faith. Nor does he seek any declarations on this motion. In essence, the plaintiffs seek to enforce the findings made by Sanderson J. through a judgment:

(a) awarding the $71,343.80 and $14,400 Sanderson J. found Ms. Harpreet owes Mr. Singh; and

(b) ordering the proceeds held in trust be paid out to the parties, taking into account any amounts awarded to the plaintiffs on this motion. The plaintiffs submit that in the face of the defendant’s failure to engage in any discussions regarding the disbursement of the funds held in trust, it would be appropriate, expeditious and just to make this order in accordance with r. 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, O. Reg. 575/07, s. 6(1).

13In her factum¹ the defendant agrees that this claim can be determined by way of summary judgment as the only issue to be determined is a legal one – whether the action is barred as res judicata – and otherwise, there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

ANALYSIS

14Rule 20.04(2) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. Summary judgment rules “must be interpreted broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims”: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, para. 5.

15Rule 1.04 provides:

1.04 (1) These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.

(1.1) In applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding.

16Res judicata is a doctrine aimed at preventing abuse of the decision-making process. Its overall goal is judicial finality. It is concerned with harm that comes with the relitigation of claims or issues that have already been, or should have been, decided in prior litigation: Dosen v. Meloche Monnex Financial Services Inc. (Security National Insurance Company), 2021 ONCA 141 at paras. 30, 33; Telatin v. Shoumali, 2021 ONSC 5290 at para. 6.

17As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44:

18The law rightly seeks a finality to litigation. To advance that objective, it requires litigants to put their best foot forward to establish the truth of their allegations when first called upon to do so. A litigant, to use the vernacular, is only entitled to one bite at the cherry.… An issue, once decided, should not generally be re-litigated to the benefit of the losing party and the harassment of the winner. A person should only be vexed once in the same cause. Duplicative litigation, potential inconsistent results, undue costs, and inconclusive proceedings are to be avoided.

19Finality is thus a compelling consideration and judicial decisions should generally be conclusive of the issues decided unless and until reversed on appeal. However, estoppel is a doctrine of public policy that is designed to advance the interests of justice. [emphasis added]

18Res judicata has two main branches. Cause of action estoppel prohibits an action when the same cause of action has been determined in an earlier proceeding by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when a party seeks to relitigate a claim that should have been raised in an earlier proceeding. Issue estoppel applies to prohibit the relitigation of an issue that has already been decided in an earlier proceeding. A court has the residual discretion to decline to apply res judiciata where its application would work an injustice: Dosen v. Meloche Monnex Financial Services Inc. (Security National Insurance Company), 2021 ONCA 141 at paras. 31-32, 36; Telatin v. Shoumali, 2021 ONSC 5290 at paras. 7, 25.

19In this action and on this motion, the plaintiffs do not seek to relitigate or question any issue or factual finding determined by Sanderson J., Mr. Singh accepts and adopts them in their entirety, including the issues on which he was the losing party such as his beneficial ownership of the property and the amounts he contributed. The plaintiffs are not seeking “another bite at the cherry” as argued by the defendant. Rather, they simply seek to enforce Sanderson J.’s final determinations with respect to the amounts Ms. Harpreet owes to Mr. Singh.

20The defendant’s argument, if successful, would turn the principles underlying res judicata on its head and cause an injustice in the unusual circumstances of this case where Ms. Harpreet was ultimately successful on the Partition Application, yet unsuccessful on the issue of whether she agreed to repay Mr. Singh and owes any amounts to him. It would be perverse to allow Ms. Harpreet to avoid paying the amounts Sanderson J. properly determined were owing by allowing her to simply ignore Sanderson J.’s direction that the parties ought to come to an agreement on the distribution of the proceeds held in trust that takes account of her reasons; and by the court finding the plaintiffs’ claim is estopped.

21I agree with the plaintiffs that barring them from advancing their claim for debts Sanderson J. found were owing and leaving them with no way to collect or enforce would be fundamentally unfair. I note that in submissions, the defendant accepted that Sanderson J. arrived at the correct amounts regarding the parties’ contributions and occupation value. Res judicata does not apply to estop the plaintiff’s claim in these circumstances.

22In oral submissions, counsel for the defendant raised an additional argument for the first time – that I should dismiss this motion even if I find the claim is neither issue nor cause of action estopped. It was submitted that while the defendant accepts that Sanderson J. arrived at the correct amounts, I should allow a trial to proceed as the existence of any loan agreement will be contested. It was argued that there was insufficient evidence on this motion to allow me to find that there was any loan agreement or agreement to repay. Additionally, at trial, the defendant would put forward evidence that there never was a loan agreement and thus, she does not owe any amounts to Mr. Singh despite his excess contributions.

23This argument is not persuasive for at least three interrelated reasons. First, the defendant chose not to file any evidence or cross-examine Mr. Singh on his affidavit on this motion. Rule 20.02(2) requires a respondent to set out in an affidavit or other evidence, “specific facts showing there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.” The only evidence before me is there was an agreement that Ms. Harpreet would pay Mr. Singh back for his excess contributions. In his affidavit on this motion, Mr. Singh accepts and adopts the findings of Sanderson J.; attests to the loans and contributions he made and Ms. Harpreet’s agreement to pay him back (paragraphs 4-17); and attaches copies of his cheques to Ms. Harpreet on which he wrote “personal loan” and she cashed.

24Second, this issue of what the parties intended and agreed to with respect to their contributions was squarely before Sanderson J. and fundamental to her findings. Ms. Harpreet was clearly aware that the parties’ intentions was a key issue on the Partition Application, and she had the full opportunity to file evidence, cross-examine and make argument on this issue. Sanderson J. determined, on the evidence before her, that Ms. Harpreet agreed to pay back Mr. Singh for his excess contributions. While I appreciate that the defendant was unable to appeal Sanderson J.’s decision on the Partition Application, she is required to put her best foot forward on this motion and chose not to file any evidence that suggests that Sanderson J.’s findings are incorrect. A bald statement by counsel about hypothetical evidence in these circumstances does not raise a genuine issue requiring a trial.

25Third, duplicative litigation that could potentially lead to inconsistent results ought to be avoided. As I indicated, the issue of what the parties agreed to was finally decided by Sanderson J. The defendant is now proposing a trial to answer this exact same question while the plaintiffs seek to enforce the findings of Sanderson J. In my view, relitigating this issue at trial would likely be issue estopped. As noted by our Court of Appeal, “[i]ssue estoppel protects against the abuse of the court’s process by preventing an unsuccessful party from re-litigating a material fact or issue previously and finally decided in proceedings involving the same parties or their privies.”: Qin v. Ontario Securities Commission, 2021 ONCA 165, para. 16; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, at paras. 20, 24-25.

26There is no genuine issue requiring a trial – the defendant clearly owes $71,343.80 and $14,400 to the plaintiffs in accordance with the Sanderson J’s decision and the uncontroverted, unopposed evidence before me. Moreover, it is in the interests of justice and expediency that these amounts be paid out from the proceeds held in trust. The parties have been unable to come to an agreement as to the distribution of those proceeds and the only remaining way to avoid the funds being held in trust in perpetuity is through a court order. There is no evidence of prejudice to the defendant. I have also considered the history of this dispute and the amounts at issue. This protracted dispute must end.

27To be clear, the amounts to be paid out to the parties from the funds held in trust must conform with Sanderson J.’s calculation. Specifically, when the $71,343.80 and $14,400 owing are taken into account, $39,688.34 of the $230,608.36 held in trust remains as belonging to Ms. Harpreet and the balance to Mr. Singh (see paras. 217-222). In addition, my award of costs, and pre and postjudgment interest ought to be paid out from the proceeds held in trust (i.e., subtracted from the $39,688.34). The entire $230,608.36 held in trust must be distributed to Mr. Singh and Ms. Harpreet accordingly.

COSTS

28I urge the parties to resolve the costs of this motion.

29If they are not able to do so, if the plaintiffs have any costs submissions (no more than three double-spaced pages) in addition to their costs outline uploaded to Case Center prior to the hearing of this motion, they may be emailed to my judicial assistant ade.minassian@ontario.ca on or before January 9, 2025. The defendant may deliver any responding submissions (no more than three double-spaced pages) on or before January 16, 2025. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.

DISPOSITION

30The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

31There are three issues with respect to the plaintiffs’ draft judgment that was uploaded to Case Center prior to the hearing of this motion: (1) the issue of pre and postjudgment interest requires clarification which I will seek via email to counsel; (2) the amount of costs to be awarded as discussed above; and (3) paragraphs 7 and 8 must be amended in accordance with paragraphs 26-27 of this endorsement. I ask counsel for the plaintiffs to provide a revised draft judgment in word format by email to my judicial assistant.

Footnotes

1. 1This factum was provided the day this motion was heard, and the defendant sought leave to file it. The plaintiffs objected to the filing of this factum pursuant to r. 20.03. As the factum was short and provided only an outline of the legal submissions to be made orally with respect to res judicata, I granted leave to file the factum and offered the plaintiff latitude in reply or further submissions on a later date if requested.