James Jagtoo

The appellant challenged a trial judgment in a contractual compensation dispute involving a consulting services agreement.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments based on alleged fiduciary breach, amendment of the agreement by later invoices, acquiescence, and breach of good faith, holding that the pleaded fiduciary theory did not establish compensable loss and that no amendment to the compensation terms was proved.

The court further held that acquiescence was unavailable against a legal claim for contractual compensation, and that estoppel had neither been pleaded nor pursued.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following dismissal of an appeal from an arbitrator’s decision, the successful party sought full indemnity costs on the basis that the appeal was hopeless and should never have been brought.

The court reviewed the governing principles under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that full indemnity costs require reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct.

The court found that although the appellant was unsuccessful, the appeal was not frivolous or vexatious and counsel’s conduct was professional.

The request for full indemnity costs was therefore rejected.

Partial indemnity costs of $10,492.46 were awarded as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff was successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought to increase the agreed partial indemnity costs amount and to obtain substantial indemnity costs based on a Rule 49 offer under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s misleading conduct justified denying the plaintiff costs and awarding costs to the defendant instead.

The court held that the parties’ agreement that $41,000 represented reasonable partial indemnity costs should be respected and declined to increase the amount.

The court also refused substantial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff’s misleading conduct but declined to award costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff consulting firm brought an action against the defendant for unpaid fees based on an hourly rate under a written agreement.

The defendant argued that the parties had orally agreed to a new flat-rate agreement, or alternatively, that the plaintiff's conduct—including concealing hourly tracking in invoices using white font—amounted to acquiescence, breach of good faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and fundamental breach.

The Superior Court of Justice found that no new agreement was reached and rejected all of the defendant's equitable and common law defences.

The court held that the original agreement remained in force and ordered the defendant to pay the outstanding invoices, as well as damages for failing to provide the required one month's written notice of termination.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator’s ruling under ss. 45(2) and (3) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 after the arbitrator dismissed a motion seeking to strike or limit the respondent’s claims based on an exclusion clause in a distribution agreement.

The court held that the arbitrator’s decision was interlocutory rather than a final award because it did not dispose of the substantive dispute and instead required factual findings at a full hearing.

Under the Arbitration Act, interlocutory rulings in arbitration are not subject to appeal.

The court further found no error in the arbitrator’s conclusion that interpretation of the contractual limitation clause required consideration of the factual matrix.

The appeal and challenge to the arbitrator’s costs award were dismissed.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order made after an uncontested family trial that imputed income to him and required payment of child support, while the respondent brought a cross‑appeal seeking retroactive child support and full indemnity costs.

The appellate court found that the uncontested trial proceeded without proper service or notice to the appellant despite an upcoming scheduled hearing and unresolved disclosure issues.

The court held that fundamental procedural fairness requires that a litigant receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before a final order affecting legal rights is made.

Because the order was obtained ex parte without justification, it was set aside and the matter directed to proceed to trial.

Interim support and disclosure orders were imposed to move the matter forward.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a consent order that had dismissed his action.

The original action sought the return of funds paid pursuant to a promise of marriage.

The parties had settled, but the appellant alleged the respondent failed to fulfill her obligations and committed fraud in entering the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the respondent had commenced a new action against the appellant, and all relief sought regarding the alleged breach of the settlement could be asserted in the appellant's counterclaim in that new action.

The plaintiff appealed a master's decision regarding forum non conveniens.

The master had found that the contract underlying the claim was subject to Virginia law and the parties had agreed to Virginia courts for dispute resolution.

The Divisional Court held that the master did not err in law in addressing the test for 'carrying on business' in Ontario or in weighing the factors in favour of the defendant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal a $10,000 costs decision made by the motion judge after two actions were consolidated.

The plaintiff argued the costs awarded were too high and that the motion judge failed to adequately consider an offer to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the motion judge exercised his extraordinarily wide discretion properly, the offer to settle was not in the motion record, and there was no conflicting decision or matter of general importance.

Costs of the motion for leave were fixed at $8,500 payable forthwith.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment upholding his dismissal, arguing that the trial judge substituted different reasons for dismissal than those advanced by the employer and failed to apply the test for voluntariness of his confession.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's factual findings based on the appellant's admissions fully supported the employer's stated concern about trust.

The court further held that the voluntariness issue had not been pleaded and, in any event, the evidence did not support any claim of duress or anything approaching it.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.