James Douglas Armstrong

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that denied his claim for a psychological Treatment and Assessment Plan costing $3,588.18 following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant argued the Tribunal made several errors of fact and law, including mischaracterizing the plan as an assessment rather than treatment, improperly weighing medical evidence from various doctors, and failing to consider the remedial nature of the Schedule.

The Executive Chair dismissed the request, finding that the Tribunal's underlying conclusion that the applicant did not suffer from a psychological condition requiring the claimed expense applied equally to both assessment and treatment.

The Chair also found no error in the Tribunal's weighing of the medical and affidavit evidence, nor any breach of procedural fairness.

The insured person was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

After his death, his Estate commenced arbitration proceedings for denied treatment plans.

The insurer brought a motion to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, arguing that the treatments could not be provided to a deceased person and that some claims were statute-barred.

The Arbitrator agreed, finding that the obligation to pay for medical and rehabilitation benefits ends with the insured person's death, as the treatments cannot reduce or eliminate impairments.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant in a motor vehicle accident claim brought a motion seeking production of the plaintiff's Children's Aid Society (CAS) records, arguing they were relevant to the plaintiff's claim for psychological injuries.

The court found that because the action had already been set down for trial, leave was required under Rule 48.04, which the defendant failed to justify as there was no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

Furthermore, the court held that the CAS file was not relevant under Rule 30.10, as it contained no psychological or medical records, and ordering its production would be a disproportionate invasion of privacy amounting to a fishing expedition.

The motion was dismissed.