Ian Roher

The solicitors brought a motion to transfer the assessment of their bills from Toronto to Ottawa, arguing that systemic delays in Toronto would prevent a hearing until 2024, whereas Ottawa could hear it within three months.

The clients did not appear or object.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Toronto was the appropriate venue as the legal work, the lawyers' office, the clients, and the underlying litigation were all located in or connected to the Greater Toronto Area.

The court noted that while the assessment system in Toronto is plagued by delays, transferring cases to unrelated regions is not the appropriate solution.

The plaintiffs, a group of affiliated wine manufacturers and retailers, brought an action against the LCBO, the AGCO, and the Crown challenging the 'Made Policy', which regulates where wineries can sell their products.

The parties brought six competing motions, including motions to strike pleadings, motions for summary judgment, and a motion regarding the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' pleadings over the tolling agreement, finding it did not alter the expected adversarial landscape.

The court struck significant portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim against the LCBO and AGCO, particularly allegations relating to pre-2001 conduct that had been settled in prior litigation, and claims for intentional interference with economic relations.

The Crown's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against it.

The AGCO's and the plaintiffs' respective motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as the complex factual matrix and allegations of bad faith required a trial.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master upholding numerous refusals made during Rule 39.03 examinations of non-party witnesses.

The examinations related to interlocutory motions concerning the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The plaintiffs alleged 14 errors of fact and law, primarily challenging the Master's findings on litigation privilege, common interest privilege, and the scope of permissible questions for Rule 39.03 witnesses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law, and affirming that the documents and communications surrounding the tolling agreement were protected by privilege.

A case conference was held to manage the scheduling of the defendants' outstanding motions to strike and for summary judgment, as well as the plaintiffs' proposed cross-motion and summonses to witness.

The court established a timetable for the delivery of affidavits of documents, notices of cross-motion, and the scheduling of motions to quash the summonses.

The court emphasized the need for efficient scheduling and discouraged the strict enforcement of procedural rights that would cause unnecessary delay.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 37.14(1)(a) to set aside an ex parte order extending time to serve a statement of claim.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure on the ex parte motion, including misrepresenting the existence of settlement discussions and failing to disclose a defendant’s bankruptcy, which stayed proceedings.

The affidavit supporting the ex parte motion also improperly relied on hearsay without identifying the source of information, contrary to Rule 39.01(4).

The court concluded that proper disclosure might have affected the granting of the order and that the evidentiary record was insufficient to justify the extension.

The ex parte order and the subsequent service of the statement of claim were set aside.