Wayne Ferron v. Peel Regional Police Services et al., 2015 HRTO 1339

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Wayne Ferron Applicant

-and-

Peel Regional Police Services Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Wayne Ferron Applicant

-and-

Ministry of the Attorney General, John Gerretsen, Arlene Gorewicz, Santiago Orbe and Joy Webster Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Wayne Ferron Applicant

-and-

Ministry of the Attorney General, John Gerretsen, Arlene Gorewicz, Sandra Theroulde, Gail Hugh and Desire Viceral Respondents

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir Date: October 7, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 1339 Indexed as: Ferron v. Peel Regional Police Services

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Wayne Ferron, Applicant Self-represented

1In its Final Decision 2015 HRTO 665, the Tribunal dismissed these Applications because it was plain and obvious that they were outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide. The applicant has filed Requests for Reconsideration of the Decision.

2For the reasons that follow the applicant’s Requests are denied.

Background

3The applicant has filed several related Applications under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). In this Decision I explain why three of these Applications must be dismissed because they are outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide.

4In a fourth Application, Tribunal File # 2014-19377-I, the applicant alleged reprisal by unrelated respondents for his having filed one of these Applications. This Application was dismissed in 2015 HRTO 597.

5The first of the Applications filed by the applicant, Tribunal File # 2012-12585-I, was deferred pending the conclusion of one or more civil proceedings launched by the applicant. The civil proceeding was stayed and the applicant declared a vexatious litigant in the courts of Ontario by Order of Justice Irving Andre dated July 8, 2013. This Application was dismissed in 2015 HRTO 1056.

6In each of these remaining three Applications the applicant alleges that he experienced reprisal. Although there were no facts plead in this regard, the applicant self-identifies as Black Canadian. There was no apparent connection between the alleged actions the applicant complained of and any Code-protected ground.

7The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) in each of these Applications giving the applicant a further opportunity to explain how his complaints are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

8The material text of the NOIDs were largely the same. The issues identified by the Tribunal in each of these three files were as follows:

a. That the Application appeared to be out of time.

b. That the narratives of the Applications failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondents.

c. That the applicant alleged “reprisal or threat of reprisal” but failed to explain how the respondents’ behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code.

9In addition in respect of 2015-19681-I the Tribunal asked for the applicant’s submissions on the following additional issue:

a. That one or more of the identified respondents was an arbitrator, adjudicator or judge and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal based on the execution of adjudicative duties or decision-making because of the doctrine of judicial or adjudicative immunity.

10The applicant responded to the NOIDs in each of these cases. His submissions were not responsive to the issues raised by the Tribunal. At best he merely reiterated the complaints made in the Applications. The applicant’s submissions in each case also include a motion to transfer the applicant’s application to a court of competent jurisdiction. In 2015 HRTO 597, issued on May 8, 2015, I concluded that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider such a motion.

11After considering the applicant’s submissions, the Applications were dismissed because in each case it was plain and obvious that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine the issues raised by the applicant.

Decision

12Under section 45.7 of the Code, the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules.

45.7(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.

(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.

13The Tribunal has issued Rules governing such requests as well as a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the community on the Tribunal’s exercise of its reconsideration powers (Practice Direction on Reconsideration, January 2008 amended June 2008). Most relevant to this Decision is Rule 26 which states:

26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within (thirty) 30 days of the date of the decision.

26.5. A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that

(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

14The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration begins with the following statements:

Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.

Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.

15As is evident from the above, reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That is, while the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to reopen and reconsider its own decisions, it is not obliged to do so. It may decide when reconsideration is advisable, both through the promulgation of rules setting out conditions for the exercise of its discretion, and through the application of its discretion on a case-by-case basis.

16In each of these Requests the applicant relies on Rule 26.5 (c). The applicant makes essentially the same submissions in each Request in what can only be described as voluminous and highly repetitive submissions. Almost none of applicant’s submissions appear to relate to the requirements of Rule 26.5 (c) but include lengthy excerpts from the Criminal Code of Canada; the Statutory Powers Procedure Act; excerpts from what appear to be judgments in a number of criminal cases; excerpts from the NOIDs issued in these cases; and other extraneous materials. The applicant has also included correspondence with respect to a request he has made under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. The applicant also repeats his request that a police officer return some personal items which the applicant alleges were stolen from him in 2011. It is not at all clear how these materials relate to the issue at hand.

17The applicant does argue that because he believes his right, for example, to not have his property illegally seized by a police officer was violated, the Decision contradicts the purpose of the Code, which he says is intended to vindicate his human rights. The submission as I understand it is that because he believes his cases have merit the Decision must be in conflict with established jurisprudence.

18The Tribunal stated in Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34, that a “conflict with established jurisprudence or procedure” requires (at a minimum) that there be a settled understanding about the legal rules that apply, and a clear and surprising departure from those legal rules. The applicant, despite voluminous submissions, makes no real attempt to show how the Decision is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal practice. His argument as set out above is illogical and without merit. The applicant clearly disagrees with the conclusions of the Tribunal; however, that is not a proper basis for reconsideration and I am satisfied that his submissions on this Request do not establish that the Tribunal’s Decision conflicts with established jurisprudence.

19In conclusion, I find that the applicant has not established the existence of any of the criteria in Rule 26 that would lead to reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Decision. The Request is denied.