Ferron v. Toronto Metropolitan Police Services Board – Division 13, 2015 HRTO 597

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Wayne Ferron

Applicant

-and-

Toronto Metropolitan Police Services Board-Division 13 and P.C. Green

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir Date: May 8, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 597 Indexed as: Ferron v. Toronto Metropolitan Police Services Board – Division 13

1The applicant filed five Applications under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), on November 17, 2014.

2In his Application the applicant alleges reprisal and no other ground by the respondents Toronto Police Service and an individual police officer. The applicant alleges that he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The applicant was riding a bicycle at the time. The applicant appears to allege that he attempted to come to an understanding with the other driver but that either the other driver either would not agree or agreed and then changed his mind. The applicant alleges that he then reported the accident to the respondent police service but was directed to the accident reporting centre. When the applicant reported to the accident reporting centre he was told that unless he was an owner of a motor vehicle with a valid insurance policy for the vehicle he could not file a report of accident.

3The applicant alleges that he had to wait for a long time before officers on patrol could come and take his statement about the accident. The applicant alleges that the police officer did not conduct a proper investigation and threatened to throw the applicant’s evidence in the garbage. .

4There is no apparent link between these alleged actions and any Code issue having been raised by the applicant. The applicant alleges however that these actions by the respondent were in reprisal for his having filed Application 2012-12585-I. This Application which has been deferred pending the conclusion of legal proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice involved allegations against the Regional Municipality of Peel and The Governing Council of the Salvation Army. None of the respondents in the instant Application appear to have been involved or even aware of the prior Application, nor does the applicant make any such allegation.

5On February 5, 2015 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to dismiss this Application for a number of reasons including that it appeared that the Application may be out of time for two reasons:

a. Having reviewed the Application it appeared that the applicant had failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondents.

b. That the applicant alleged reprisal but the applicant had failed to explain how the respondents’ behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code [s. 8]. See for example Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32; Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273.

6The applicant responded to the NOID but his submissions are difficult to follow and do not appear to respond to the issues raised in it. The applicant’s submissions take the form of a motion to transfer the applicant’s application to a court of competent jurisdiction. In his motion the applicant seeks to call witnesses and requested that the motion be heard orally. In any event the issue at hand is whether or not this Application can proceed further in the Tribunal process or whether it must be dismissed because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the issue(s) raised.

DECISION

7I have no jurisdiction to hear a motion to transfer this case to another adjudicative forum. I would note in this regard that the applicant has been declared a vexatious litigant by the Ontario Court of Justice and is apparently prevented from commencing any further proceeding in any Ontario court without leave.

8To the extent that the applicant addresses the NOID he merely reiterates his allegations in the narrative that he was repeatedly denied police services by the respondent following a motor vehicle accident, but makes no connection between the alleged denial of service and any protected ground in the Code. He also fails to suggest any factual foundation for his assertion that the alleged denial of service was in reprisal for a prior Application involving another set of respondents entirely.

9Under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121.

10In my view it is plain and obvious that this Application must be dismissed because there is no factual foundation to the applicant’s central claim that the treatment he received from the respondents as outlined briefly above was in reprisal for a prior Application involving another set of respondents completely unconnected to the respondents in this case. As unlikely as it would be that police officers in another jurisdiction would be aware of a prior Application involving other respondents it may not be impossible. However given the nature of the allegation it is incumbent on the applicant to plead some facts which would tend to support such a claim. The applicant has not done so despite voluminous descriptions of the events surrounding his Application and equally lengthy submissions about how his rights have been violated.

11At the end of the day the applicant provides no basis to believe that there is any evidence and in fact does not assert that there is any such evidence that would tend to establish that the respondents’ acts and omissions as described by the applicant were motivated in any way by his prior Application or that they would even have been aware of it.

12For these reasons the Application is dismissed because it is plain and obvious that it is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.