HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Wayne Ferron Applicant
-and-
Peel Regional Police Services Respondent
Wayne Ferron Applicant
-and-
Ministry of the Attorney General, John Gerretsen, Arlene Gorewicz, Santiago Orbe and Joy Webster Respondents
And B E T W E E N:
Wayne Ferron Applicant
-and-
Ministry of the Attorney General, John Gerretsen, Arlene Gorewicz, Sandra Theroulde, Gail Hugh and Desire Viceral Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir Date: May 21, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 665 Indexed as: Ferron v. Peel Regional Police Services
1The applicant has filed several related Applications under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). In this Decision I explain why three of these Applications must be dismissed because they are outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide.
2A fourth Application alleging reprisal by unrelated respondents for his having filed one of these Applications was dismissed in 2015 HRTO 597.
3The first of the Applications filed by the applicant, Tribunal File # 2012-12585-I was deferred pending the conclusion of one or more civil proceedings launched by the applicant. These proceedings appear to have been stayed and the applicant declared a vexatious litigant in the courts of Ontario by Order of Justice Irving Andre dated July 8, 2013.
4The applicant appears to have begun one or more private prosecutions against some of the respondents in these various Applications. These prosecutions all appear to have been stayed as well.
5In each of the remaining three Applications the applicant alleges that he experienced reprisal. Although there are no facts plead in this regard the applicant also appears to self-identifies as Black Canadian. There is no apparent connection between the actions he complains of and any Code protected ground. The Tribunal has issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss in each of these Applications giving the applicant a further opportunity to explain how his complaints are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
6The material text of the NOIDs are largely the same. The issues identified by the Tribunal in each of these three files were as follows:
a. That the Application appeared to be out of time.
b. That the narratives of the Applications failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondents.
c. That the applicant alleged “reprisal or threat of reprisal” but failed to explain how the respondent s’ behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code.
7In addition in respect of 2015-19681-I the Tribunal asked for the applicant’s submissions on the following additional issue:
a. That one or more of the identified respondents was an arbitrator, adjudicator or judge and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal based on the execution of adjudicative duties or decision-making because of the doctrine of judicial or adjudicative immunity.
8The applicant responded to the NOIDs in each of these cases. His submissions are not at all responsive to the issues raised by the Tribunal. At best he merely reiterates the complaints made in the Applications. The applicant’s submissions in each case also include a motion to transfer the applicant’s application to a court of competent jurisdiction. As I indicated in 2015 HRTO 597 issued on May 8, 2015. I have no jurisdiction to consider such a motion. The issue before me at this stage is whether or not the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with this Application.
9Under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121.
10For the reasons that follow I find that it is plain and obvious that these three Applications are outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide. I will deal with them in turn below.
2015-19792-I
11In this Application the applicant alleges reprisal by the Peel Regional Police Services and police officers. In the narrative of the Form 1 he makes a great number of allegations which appear to flow from what the applicant alleges from an incident in 2011 where he claims his “identification” was wrongfully retained by a police officer employed by the respondent. The narrative is often difficult to follow but appears to relate to a great number of interactions with the respondent and a number of other individuals and institutions. The connection between these events are entirely unclear.
12As indicated above the applicant has commenced a number of other proceedings against these and a number of other respondents. References to these other proceedings recur throughout the narrative of his complaints further complicating an understanding of the applicant’s submissions. In fact the bulk of this Application appears to concern these other events although this is far from clear.
13However at its core this Application appears to concern an allegation that in August 2011, some personal property of his including his identification was “stolen” by a police officer. This allegation appears to have been included in the civil proceeding which the applicant commenced and to which Tribunal file 2012-12585-I was deferred. The thrust of this Application appears to be that because of a policy change by an third party the applicant was unable to access services provided by it because he lacked this identification in January 2015.
14The subsequent lengthy narrative describes the applicant’s interactions with a number of persons and institutions including a number of physicians, hospitals, court officials, police officers and Crown Attorneys. There are no allegations that the identified respondents in this case had any knowledge of his prior Application and given that all of the applicant’s legal proceedings that potentially raise human rights issues were commenced after the alleged illegal seizure of this identification this is unsurprising.
15In his response to the NOID the applicant does reiterate what may be the central allegation in the Application that an alleged violation of the Code in August 2011 limited his ability to access certain services supplied by a third party in 2015.
16In my view it is plain and obvious that this Application ought to be dismissed because it is out of time and there is no good faith explanation offered for the delay.
17Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Code provide:
34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
18This Application is out of time. The Application was filed on January 5, 2015 and as indicated makes allegations about this respondent which appear to have occurred in August 2011 and perhaps a year later. Clearly the Application is out of time. Accordingly the applicant must meet the requirements of section 34(2) - provide a good faith explanation for the delay and establish that there will be no substantial prejudice to any party. ( See Farwell v. Northumberland Services for Women, 2010 HRTO 1126).
19The Tribunal has held on many occasions that where an applicant seeks to establish that the delay in filing their application was “incurred in good faith”, the applicant must show something more than the absence of bad faith. At a minimum there must be a reasonable explanation for the delay.
20In this case the applicant has provided no explanation for the delay in filing this Application. I am not able to infer a good faith defence from the applicant’s silence and accordingly the Application must be dismissed.
21Having found that there is no good faith explanation for the delay in filing the Application I need not consider whether any party might have been prejudiced by such delay.
22Having dismissed the Application because it is out of time I would also observe that there are no facts plead which would support the applicant’s allegation of reprisal. Whether or not the respondents wrongly seized his property in 2011 the applicant has plead no facts that that would tend to establish that the respondents in this Application would have had any knowledge of his prior human rights complaint nor does the applicant make any such an allegation. In order to prove a violation of section 8 of the Code there must be some evidence that the applicant was being punished for having raised a Code concern with the respondent or for refusing to violate another person’s Code rights etc. There are no such facts in the lengthy narrative that the applicant has provided or otherwise in his very lengthy submissions.
23I would also observe that if the prior Code claim being relied on by the applicant (and this is entirely unclear) is the civil proceeding he commenced in February 2012, amended statement of claim issued in August 2012 (Court file CV-12-0716-00), it is evident that this action was commenced after the alleged reprisal in 2011.
24For all of these reasons this Application must be dismissed because it is plain and obvious that there is no link between the actions complained of any Code ground and further no link made between the actions complained of and any intended punishment or threat of punishment by the respondents for a prior attempt on the part of the applicant to vindicate his Code protected rights.
2014-19680-I and 2014-19681-I
25These Applications are largely the same in form. They both include lengthy narratives of invariably difficult to understand complaints of errors and omissions on the part of individuals who may be court administrative staff and other court officials.
26In these Applications the applicant alleges reprisal and no other ground. As indicated above although race, colour etc. are not selected as a ground of discrimination the applicant does identify as Black Canadian.
27In the narrative of 2014-19680-I the applicant describes a number of errors and omissions in the transcription of a number of court proceedings in which the applicant may have been involved over the years. The allegations which are very difficult to understand appear to relate to various errors and omissions in the production of transcripts in 2012, 2013 and 2014. He also appears to complain about the conduct of other court officials and judicial officers however this is not entirely clear.
28In 2014-19681-I the applicant also alleges reprisal and no other grounds. In the narrative of the Application the applicant alleges a number of errors, acts or omissions by various court services staff and court officers employed by the Ministry of the Attorney General. The narrative is very difficult to understand and accordingly with respect to many of the allegations it is often very difficult to know what the applicant’s complaints are about other than he appears to believe that he received inadequate service from court staff. There is no link made between these alleged omissions or errors and any Code protected ground. The lengthy narrative is also notable for the complete absence of a link between these alleged errors and omissions and any Code related issue having been raised by the applicant issue having been raised by the applicant.
29In response to the specific questions about discrimination on the grounds of reprisal in both Applications the applicant refers to an Application filed by the applicant on November 17, 2014 involving completely unrelated parties (2014-19377-I); 2012-12585-I an Application involving completely unrelated parties and what may be a court file number. In the narrative in box C29 the applicant refers to a private prosecution against another individual J.S. who does not appear to be a respondent in any of the applicant’s Applications.
30In both Applications there are references throughout the narrative to the Order of Andre J. staying all of the applicant’s proceedings and declaring him a vexatious litigant. It may be that these Applications are an attempt to re-litigate those issues at the Tribunal. That would likely constitute an abuse of the Tribunal’s process.
31In my view it is plain and obvious that these incidents complained of in this Application have no connection to the Code and there is no link made between any of the complained of behaviour and the applicant having sought to enforce or secure his rights under the Code. It is incumbent on an applicant alleging reprisal to provide a factual foundation that would tend to support the conclusion that an act or omission of a respondent was intended as a punishment for the applicant having sought to enforce their rights under the Code. The narrative of this Application and the voluminous submissions of the applicant are completely lacking any such facts. I also note that when specifically asked to make this connection the applicant refers to a prior Application involving completely unrelated respondents and an Application filed after all of the events described in the complaints and again which involve allegations against unrelated respondents. Finally in his narrative in response to this issue he refers to a private prosecution against another individual, J.S., who may be a Crown Attorney but again no connection is made between the individual respondents and this individual or any related Code issue which might form the basis of a claim of reprisal.
32I have also considered whether or not there might be some connection between the allegations made in these Applications and the court action he commenced in February 2012. That proceeding involved 30 individual and institutional respondents. It is worthy of note that none of the individual respondents in these cases was a defendant in that proceeding. As previously indicated the applicant has made no connection between that proceeding (or any other) and the allegations in these Applications. Despite the applicant’s failure to make the necessary links I have reviewed the applicant’s voluminous materials and there appears to be no basis to conclude that the further processing of these Applications might reveal the necessary linkages.
33Accordingly I have concluded that these Applications must also be dismissed because it is plain and obvious that they are both outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because there is no connection between any of the incidents complained of and the Code.
34For these reasons these Applications are dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 21st day of May, 2015.
“Signed by”
__________________________________
David Muir Vice-chair