Ontario Human Rights Tribunal
Seberras v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario (No. 5)
2009-02492-I
2012-01-17
2012 HRTO 115
CHRR Doc. 12-0615
Jeffrey Seberras Applicant
v.
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario Respondent
and
Human Rights Legal Support Centre, Office of the Employer Advisor, Office of the Worker Advisor and Ontario Human Rights Commission Interveners
Before: Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, David A. Wright, David Muir and Jay Sengupta
Appearances by:
Jeffrey Seberras, on his own behalf
Gurjit Brar, Counsel for the Respondent
Bay Ryley, Counsel for the Intervener Human Rights Legal Support Centre
Cathy Pike, Counsel for the Intervener Ontario Human Rights Commission
Daryl Seupersad, Counsel for the Intervener Office of the Employer Advisor
Teresa A. Gianfelice, Counsel for the Intervener Office of the Worker Advisor
JURISDICTION — ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS — court of competent jurisdiction to hear complaint concerning workers' compensation benefits — exclusive jurisdiction — judicial immunity — HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS — authority of tribunal to review actions of another administrative tribunal— EXEMPTIONS — adjudication agencies — PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES — INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — definition of "service" — adjudicative function
Summary: The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario issued an interim decision to clarify whether a complaint alleging discrimination in the provision of services on the basis of disability falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction when the complaint relates to benefits under a statutory scheme.
Jeffrey Seberras filed a complaint against the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board ("WSIB") alleging that he was discriminated against because of a disability when he was denied benefits. In 2008, Mr. Seberras filed a claim for WSIB benefits due to gradual onset chronic stress at work. The claim was denied by a decision of a WSIB case manager because the claim did not relate to "an acute reaction to a sudden and unexpected traumatic event arising out of and in the course of his or her employment", as required by s. 13(5) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act ("WSIA").
Mr. Seberras alleged that it was discrimination based on disability to deny him benefits because of s. 13(5). He did not suggest that the particular decision at issue is discriminatory except insofar as it applies the statute and the policy based on it.
There has been extensive jurisprudence, some of it conflicting, on when and whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction when a challenge is made to a decision relating to benefits under a statutory scheme. A panel of three Tribunal members was appointed in this case to hear submissions on this point.
The Tribunal found that it has jurisdiction over the complaint of Mr. Seberras. It concluded that benefits provided under a statute are services within the meaning of the Code. The Tribunal does not have the power to review decisions under a benefit program, including those based on disability, to determine if they are correct under the legislation, regulations or policies governing the program. An allegation that a decision-maker misapplied the rules of a program or misinterpreted medical documentation cannot be considered under the Code. However, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a complaint alleging discrimination in the provision of benefits, even when the benefits are provided through a decision made under a statutory scheme.
Mr. Seberras' complaint is not simply an attempt to appeal a particular WSIB decision; it challenges the statutory scheme itself. Accordingly, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the application.
See also (No. 1) (2010), CHRR Doc. 10-1320, 2010 HRTO 1114; (No. 2) (2010), CHRR Doc. 10-2842, 2010 HRTO 2192; and (No. 4) (2011), CHRR Doc. 11-1041, 2011 HRTO 541.
CASES CITED
Baird v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-0154, 2009 HRTO 99: 10
Ballieram v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario (No. 1) (2010), 70 C.H.R.R. D/124, 2010 HRTO 712: 12
Barron v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario (2011), CHRR Doc. 11-2668, 2011 HRTO 2168: 21
British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422, 73 C.H.R.R. D/1, 2011 SCC 52: 23
Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre (No. 4) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-2875, 2009 HRTO 2208: 16
Cochrane v. Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care) (2010), CHRR Doc. 10-2127, 2010 HRTO 1477: 18
Dopelhamer v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario (No. 2) (2010), 70 C.H.R.R. D/146, 2010 HRTO 765: 13
Frankson v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario (No. 4) (2011), 73 C.H.R.R. D/143, 2011 HRTO 2107: 14, 20
Gomez v. Sobeys Milton Retail Support Centre (No. 2) (2011), CHRR Doc. 11-2797, 2011 HRTO 2297: 23
Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered Corp. (2009), 69 C.H.R.R. D/155, 2009 HRTO 2180: 16
Hendershott v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 1) (2011), 72 C.H.R.R. D/1, 2011 HRTO 482: 18
Matthews v. Chrysler Canada Inc. (2011), CHRR Doc. 11-2439, 2011 HRTO 1939: 21
Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. O'Quinn (No. 1) (1995), 1995 NSCA 216, 131 D.L.R. (4th) 318, 1995 CanLII 18144 (NS CA), 27 C.H.R.R. D/146 (N.S.C.A.): 18
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) (No. 1) (2005), 54 C.H.R.R. D/116, 2005 HRTO 31: 18
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) (2007), 2007 CanLII 56481 (ON SCDC), 88 O.R. (3d) 455, 62 C.H.R.R. D/315 (Div.Ct.): 18
Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) and Roberts v. Ontario (Ministry of Health) (1994), 1994 CanLII 1590 (ON CA), 19 O.R. (3d) 387, 21 C.H.R.R. D/259 (C.A.): 18
Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Board of Inquiry) (1999), 1999 CanLII 12368 (SK CA), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 34 C.H.R.R. D/400 (Sask. C.A.): 18
Seberras v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario (No. 3) (2011), CHRR Doc. 11-0699, 2011 HRTO 199: 2
Steele v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) (No. 2) (2010), CHRR Doc. 10-2078, 2010 HRTO 1428: 16
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Dir., Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513, 56 C.H.R.R. D/1, 2006 SCC 14: 18
Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 1) (2009), 71 C.H.R.R. D/122, 2009 HRTO 1595: 11
Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 3) (2011), CHRR Doc. 11-2297, 2011 HRTO 1797: 22
LEGISLATION CITED
Ontario
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19
s. 1: 5
s. 45.1: 3, 23
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sched. A
s. 2(1): 8
s. 13(1): 7
s. 13(4): 7, 27
s. 13(5): 6, 27
INTRODUCTION
1The applicant was denied benefits by a decision of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board ("WSIB"). He alleges that he [has] been subject to discrimination with respect to services because of disability. He argues that the denial of benefits is discriminatory because the statutory provision in the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sched. A ("WSIA") under which the decision was made violates the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the "Code"). The question before us is whether the application falls with[in] the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
2As noted in a previous interim decision in this case, 2011 HRTO 199 [CHRR Doc. 11-0699], there has been extensive jurisprudence, some of it conflicting, on when and whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction when a challenge is made to a decision relating to benefits under a statutory scheme. Accordingly, a panel of three Tribunal members was appointed to hear submissions.
3At the hearing, the applicant confirmed that his application alleges that the statutory provision in question is discriminatory, and it is the application of that provision that disentitled him from benefits. He does not suggest that the particular decision at issue is discriminatory except insofar as it applies the statute and the policy based on it. On the basis of this clarification, the respondent conceded that the Tribunal has jurisdiction. No party has raised the application of s. 45.1 of the Code.
4A concession cannot provide the Tribunal with jurisdiction it does not have. Given this, the extensive argument, and the fact that some case law suggests that the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction in a case like this, we believe it is important to fully analyze the issues. We find that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over this application. We note, however, that there may be other issues arising in this application which raise other important questions about the Tribunal's authority, including the appropriate remedy that could be awarded should the Tribunal conclude that there has been a violation of the Code.
5Our conclusions on the applicable principles can be summarized as follows:
· The Tribunal has jurisdiction over an application alleging that the denial of WSIB or other statutory financial benefits violates the Code, even if this was done by decision. The provision of such benefits is a "service" under s. 1 of the Code.
· The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over an application against a neutral third party deciding a dispute between others when the doctrine of judicial immunity applies.
· The Tribunal is not precluded from hearing this application on the basis that the WSIB and WSIAT have exclusive jurisdiction.
· This Tribunal does not have the power to review decisions under benefit programs, including those based on disability, to determine if they are correct under the legislation, regulations, or policies governing the program. An application related to a denial of benefits should be dismissed if there is not an allegation of discrimination under the Code. A Code application alleging merely that a decision-maker misapplied the rules of a program or misinterpreted medical documentation cannot be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation and has no reasonable prospect of success. In addition, under s. 45.1 of the Code, the Tribunal cannot reevaluate the substantive or procedural correctness of a decision under another statutory scheme.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
6On December 18, 2008, Mr. Seberras filed a claim for WSIB benefits due to gradual onset chronic stress at work. The claim was denied by decision of a WSIB case manager because the claim did not relate to "an acute reaction to a sudden and unexpected traumatic event arising out of and in the course of his or her employment", as required by s. 13(5) of the WSIA for claims of mental stress, but not physical injuries. The applicant acknowledges for purposes of this proceeding that his mental stress was not an acute reaction to a sudden and unexpected traumatic event.
7Sections 13(1), (4) and (5) of the WSIA read as follows:
13(1) A worker who sustains a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment is entitled to benefits under the insurance plan.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (5), a worker is not entitled to benefits under the insurance plan for mental stress.
(5) A worker is entitled to benefits for mental stress that is an acute reaction to a sudden and unexpected traumatic event arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. However, the worker is not entitled to benefits for mental stress caused by his or her employer's decisions or actions relating to the worker's employment, including a decision to change the work to be performed or the working conditions, to discipline the worker or to terminate the employment.
8Accident is defined in s. 2(1) of the WSIA as follows:
2(1) ...
"accident" includes,
(a) a wilful and intentional act, not being the act of the worker,
(b) a chance event occasioned by a physical or natural cause, and
(c) disablement arising out of and in the course of employment;
9The WSIB has a team of claims management professionals dedicated to handling traumatic mental stress ("TMS") claims for all of Ontario. Case Managers from this team make determinations regarding initial entitlement to benefits for traumatic mental stress claims. In making its decisions the TMS team applies the relevant WSIB policy, Operation Policy Manual Document No. 15-03-02, Traumatic Mental Stress, which implements ss. 13(4) and (5).
ANALYSIS
The Development of the Jurisprudence
10In a series of cases beginning with Baird v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2009 HRTO 99 [CHRR Doc. 09-0154], the Tribunal held that [at § 12] "[t]he content, reasons and result contained in a decision of a statutory decision-maker cannot be understood to be part of the 'service' a statutory Tribunal is providing to the public". Baird decided an allegation that a decision of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, an independent tribunal that heard appeals from the WSIB, was discriminatory.
11Decisions following Baird diverged on the question of whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction over an application alleging there was discrimination when an individual was denied a benefit through a decision made pursuant to statute. Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 1), 2009 HRTO 1595 [reported 71 C.H.R.R. D/122] ("Zaki (No. 1)"), noted that Baird and other leading cases on this issue dealt with circumstances in which the adjudicator had determined a "dispute between others" and distinguished this from a case in which the respondent was a benefit provider. It held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over cases where the allegation is that the denial of a benefit constitutes discrimination, even if the denial was through a decision.
12Two decisions released after Zaki disagreed with aspects of its approach, although for different reasons. Ballieram v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (No. 1), 2010 HRTO 712 [reported 70 C.H.R.R. D/124], held that the result of any decision of a statutory body with a "robust system of internal appeals", whether a first-level or higher-level decision maker, was not a "service" within the meaning of the Code. The "fundamental basis" for the decision, set out at § 39, was that "the Legislature did not intend the Tribunal to usurp the function of the Divisional Court and act as a tribunal of appeal from all other adjudicative decisions within the WSIB system". If the approach in Ballieram and other cases that follow the same approach applies to this case, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, since the denial of WSIB benefits to Mr. Seberras would be found to be the "result" of a decision in which there is a robust system of internal appeals, and therefore not a "service".
13Dopelhamer v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (No. 2), 2010 HRTO 765, [reported 70 C.H.R.R. D/146] concluded that it was inappropriate to impose any category-based limitations on the concept of services. It agreed with the result in Baird but held that the result should have been reached on the basis of the application of judicial immunity rather than the exclusion of decision-making from the social area of "services". Its approach is similar to that of Zaki, although it reached the conclusion that challenges to decisions of third party neutral decision makers are services but are outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction because of judicial immunity.
14In its recent decision in Frankson v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (No. 4), 2011 HRTO 2107 [reported 73 C.H.R.R. D/143], the Tribunal found WSIB benefits to be a service, reasoning as follows [at § 77–78]:
Many government programs depend at some stage on the exercise of a statutory decision-making power. These include, as described by the Tribunal in Dopelhamer v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2010 HRTO 765 [reported 70 C.H.R.R. D/146], driver's licenses, a Coroner's inquest, or disability support benefits. It is reasonable to surmise, without reviewing every benefit-granting statute, that the primacy of the Code means that the benefits under most such statutes must be administered without discrimination. If this is so, it would, in my view, be a curious result if no claim of discrimination under the Code could be made, simply because the denial of the benefit or change in the benefit rests on a decision made under a statutory scheme.
In the case of the WSIB, the function of the claims adjudicators is to make decisions on certain aspects of claims, as an integral component of the overall WSIB's operations in administering the benefits under the WSIA. I see no basis to distinguish between the action of amending or denying benefits to a claimant, and the decision that led to the action. The decision to deny benefits to Mr. Frankson does not stand alone as a "service" provided by the WSIB and claims adjudicators do not provide a freestanding decision-making "service" to claimants that can be separated from the result of their decisions.
WSIB Benefits Are Services
15We believe that there is little practical difference between Zaki (No. 1) and Dopelhamer, and that the principles of these cases reflect the approach the Tribunal should take. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear an application alleging discriminatory benefit provisions, even when the benefits are provided through a decision made under a statutory scheme. We do not agree with the conclusion that an application is not "in respect of services" when it relates to a matter that has been determined through a decision made pursuant to statute where there is a system of internal appeals. However, we agree with and echo the important caution set out in Ballieram that the Tribunal is not a mechanism for the appeal of statutory decisions that relate to disability benefits; see also the cases discussed below at § 21-23.
16Both Zaki (No. 1) and Dopelhamer found that an alleged discriminatory denial of statutory benefits falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, but that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over allegations that an independent decision-maker deciding a dispute between others issued a discriminatory decision. Dopelhamer found that the lack of jurisdiction in the latter case arises from the principle of judicial immunity, while Zaki (No. 1) found, following Baird, that the "content, reasons and result" of the decision were excluded from the social area of services. As noted in Steele v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) (No. 2), 2010 HRTO 1428 [CHRR Doc. 10-2078], although Zaki (No. 1) did not explicitly refer to the concept of judicial immunity, the motivations for excluding the decisions of third party neutral adjudicators were excluded from the social area of "services" were the same as those for the doctrine of judicial immunity: Zaki (No. 1) at § 9; Dopelhamer at § 48–53; Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered Corp., 2009 HRTO 2180 [reported 69 C.H.R.R. D/155]; Cartier v. Nairn (No. 4), 2009 HRTO 2208 [CHRR Doc. 09-2875]; and Frankson at § 81–87. As noted in Steele at § 23, "the independence of the decision-maker is the central rationale and function of limiting the scope of the application of the Code."
17Dopelhamer held that decisions of neutral third party decision-makers that do not control access to benefits are "services", although outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction because of judicial immunity. Zaki (No. 1) found that the social area of "services" excludes the type of decisions that are protected by judicial immunity. In our view there is little principled difference between these approaches. Neither departs, in our view, from the previous approach to the definition of services and both recognize that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear applications relating to decisions of a third party neutral decision-maker protected by the principles of judicial immunity. We favour an approach that explicitly focuses on whether judicial immunity applies. In future cases, in our view, the important question should be whether the decision in question is protected by judicial immunity. It is not necessary to resolve the issue of whether the concept of judicial immunity narrows the definition of services or rather whether decisions are services, but outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction because of judicial immunity.
18There are several reasons we prefer this analysis to Ballieram. In our view, it is consistent with established principles of human rights law regarding the interpretation of "services". Many cases have found that benefits, including those granted through delegated decisions under statute, are "services"; examples are Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14 [reported 56 C.H.R.R. D/1]; Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) v. Ontario (Ministry of Health) (1994), 1994 CanLII 1590 (ON CA), 19 O.R. (3d) 387 [21 C.H.R.R. D/259] (C.A.); Braithwaite v. Ontario (Attorney General) (No. 1), 2005 HRTO 31 [reported 54 C.H.R.R. D/116], rev'd on other grounds, 2007 CanLII 56481 (ON SCDC), 88 O.R. (3d) 455 [62 C.H.R.R. D/315] at § 40 (Div.Ct.); Ball v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2010 HRTO 1277 [ sic]; Cochrane v. Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2010 HRTO 1477 [CHRR Doc. 10-2127]; and Hendershott v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 1), 2011 HRTO 482 [reported 72 C.H.R.R. D/1]. In two other provinces, courts of appeal have held that workers' compensation boards are providing a service within the meaning of human rights legislation: O'Quinn v. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) (No. 1) (1995), 1995 NSCA 216, 131 D.L.R. (4th) 318 [ 1995 CanLII 18144 (NS CA), 27 C.H.R.R. D/146] (N.S.C.A.); Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm.) (1999), 1999 CanLII 12368 (SK CA), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 391 [34 C.H.R.R. D/400] (Sask. C.A.).
19We do not agree with the proposition that statutory benefits can be a "service" under the Code when a matter is raised before another Tribunal, but not before this Tribunal. In our view, this is not consistent with the scheme or wording of the Code, under which each social area has the same definition whether it is this Tribunal or another applying the Code. We also do not see a statutory basis for an approach whereby the question of whether an application relating to benefits under statute is "in respect of services" depends upon the existence of a system of appeals from the statutory decision.
20Applying this approach would, in essence, lead to a statutory presumption under the Code in favour of exclusive jurisdiction when there is a possible appeal from a statutory decision. As discussed in detail in Frankson, however, the question of exclusive jurisdiction is complex and depends upon an analysis of both statutory schemes. Although the respondent does not argue that in the circumstances of this case the WSIB has exclusive jurisdiction, we agree with and adopt the principles set out in Frankson at § 88–121 regarding concurrent jurisdiction between the HRTO and the WSIB/WSIAT.
21We agree that the Legislature did not intend for the Tribunal [to] be a mechanism for appeal of decisions of the WSIB and other statutory decision makers. We believe that this concern is addressed by a proper understanding and definition of substantive discrimination under the Code. Indeed, in various decisions since Ballieram the Tribunal has dismissed applications that allege merely that a decision relating to government or private disability benefits has been incorrectly made: see, for example, Barron v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2011 HRTO 2168 [CHRR Doc. 11-2668], and Matthews v. Chrysler Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 1939 [CHRR Doc. 11-2439].
22As emphasized in Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 3), 2011 HRTO 1797 [CHRR Doc. 11-2297] at § 15 ("Zaki (No. 3)"), to proceed through the Tribunal's process there must be something more than an assertion that the applicant's particular disability was not dealt with properly in a particular case to establish discrimination, such as systemic problems, policies, or considerations unrelated to the implementation of the program that differentiate based on Code grounds. As the Tribunal stated at § 1:
... [T]he prohibition against discrimination because of disability in the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code") does not give this Tribunal the power to review decisions under disability-based benefit programs to determine whether they are correct under the legislation, regulations, or policies governing the program; this would be giving an appeal function to the Tribunal that the Legislature did not intend. Of course, as the Tribunal has recognized in other cases, discrimination in government and other benefit programs may be found in other ways such as policies, systemic practices, or considerations based on prohibited grounds irrelevant to the decision being made.
An application that is merely an appeal of a decision under statute should be dismissed on the basis that it cannot be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation and therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.
23In addition, s. 45.1 of the Code provides for the dismissal of an application, in whole or in part, on the basis that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 [reported 73 C.H.R.R. D/1, the Tribunal cannot consider the substantive or procedural correctness of a decision made in another proceeding when applying s. 45.1: see Gomez v. Sobeys Milton Retail Support Centre (No. 2), 2011 HRTO 2297 [CHRR Doc. 11-2797]. Section 45.1, like the summary hearing process, assists in addressing the legitimate substantive concern that the Tribunal not become a mechanism for the mere appeal of decisions made under other statutory schemes.
24For these reasons, we conclude that a benefit provided under statute is a "service" under the Code, even if entitlement is determined through a decision. Applying the doctrine of judicial immunity identifies those statutory decisions over which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction.
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
25The applicant alleges that the statutory scheme for WSIB benefits is discriminatory on the basis of disability. The provision of WSIB benefits is a service, and there is no suggestion that judicial immunity could apply in these circumstances. This is evidently not an attempt to simply appeal a particular WSIB decision as it challenges the statutory scheme itself. Accordingly, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over this application.
26We note that no party argues that s. 45.1 of the Code applies in these circumstances. We make no comment on whether any or all of the remedies requested by the applicant fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
NEXT STEPS
27The issues in this application have evolved since the original application was filed. This has become a particularly complex case involving a challenge to the WSIA. In the circumstances, it is appropriate that new and detailed pleadings be filed, fully setting out each party's position on the issues in dispute. Within two weeks of the date of this interim decision, the interveners shall deliver to the other parties and file with the Registrar letters advising whether they wish to intervene on the merits of the application. Within four weeks of the date of this interim decision, the applicant and any interveners supporting him shall deliver to the other parties and file with the Registrar statements setting out fully the basis on which they allege that s. 13(5) of the WSIA is discriminatory and their proposed remedies. The respondent and any interveners supporting it shall deliver to the other parties and file with the Registrar complete statements setting out their positions within eight weeks of the date of this Interim decision. The statements of the respondent and any interveners should clarify, to the best of their knowledge, the status of any other cases at the WSIAT or before an Appeals Resolution Officer dealing with whether ss. 13(4) and/or (5) violate the Code, as it may be appropriate for the Tribunal to await a pending decision before proceeding with hearings in this matter.
28This panel is not seized of this matter.