Matthews v. Chrysler Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 1939

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Philip Matthews

Applicant

-and-

Chrysler Canada Inc., National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Canadian Auto Workers Local 1285, The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company and Green Shield Canada

Respondents

INTERIM Decision

Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson

Date: October 26, 2011

Citation: 2011 HRTO 1939

Indexed as: Matthews v. Chrysler Canada Inc.

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment and membership in a vocational association because of disability, age, family status and marital status. By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated March 15, 2011, the Tribunal ordered a Summary Hearing to determine whether the Application should be dismissed, in whole or in part, on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that it will succeed. The Summary Hearing took place on September 16, 2011 with all parties participating.

Background

2The applicant is an employee of the respondent Chrysler Canada Inc. (“CCI”) and commenced working for CCI at its Brampton Assembly Plant (the “plant”) in or about September 1996. The materials provided by the applicant indicate that he has several physical and psychological disabilities. The applicant is a member of a bargaining unit covered by a collective agreement between CCI and the respondent National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) and the respondent Canadian Auto Workers Local 1285 is the union local to which the applicant belongs (CAW-Canada and Local 1285 henceforth collectively referred to as “CAW” or the “Union”).

3The applicant suffered a myocardial infarction, i.e. a heart attack, while at work on September 29, 2010. The applicant was transported to hospital by ambulance and underwent angioplasty the next day. In his Application, the applicant alleges that he attempted to return to work on October 7, 2010 to a “sedentary job”, but CCI refused to allow him to work, thereby denying the “applicant his right to “accommodation to the point of undue hardship”, resulting in “a severe adverse impact” for the disabled applicant.”

4In 2008, CCI and CAW agreed to amendments to the Health Care Program in their collective agreement. Effective January 1, 2009, employees in the bargaining unit were required to pay a co-payment of 10% of the cost of prescription drugs up to an annual maximum that increases by twenty dollars each year. In the face of CCI’s precarious financial position in 2008-2009, CCI and CAW also agreed that commencing January 1, 2010 all eligible employees, retired employees and surviving spouses enrolled for health care coverage would pay a monthly heath care contribution. Active employees and retirees under the age of 65 pay $30.00 per month; those over 65 pay $15.00 per month. Surviving spouses and temporary part-time employees pay $15.00 per month regardless of age. In his application, the applicant alleges that both the “annual prescription drug deductible or co-payment” and “monthly health care premium” discriminated against him because of marital status and family status since the payments are the same regardless of employees’ marital or family status. The applicant asserts that, as a single person without children, he should not have to pay the same annual deductible or monthly premium as employees who are married, or have children, or both. The applicant also alleges that the reduction of the monthly contribution at age 65 is age discrimination. The applicant states that the premium reduction at age 65 is arbitrary, made without actuarial justification and imposes a “severe adverse impact” for the “single membership, both pre and post 65”.

5CAW is the bargaining agent for the employees it represents at the plant. The CAW’s affairs are conducted by members selected to fill a number of union positions or offices. When the Union needs to fill a position, it places a posting on notice boards and every member of the plant’s bargaining unit has an opportunity to apply and be considered for each position. The union selection committee considers the criteria of skill and ability, participation in the union / union involvement and seniority. In September 2010, the applicant applied for two union positions, one of which was for an Alternate WSIB Representative (i.e., someone to fill in when the regular representative was unavailable) and the other was a Part-Time Health and Safety Trainer. The applicant requested that union disregard seniority and union participation / involvement because application of these factors would have an adverse effect on him due to his disabilities. For example, he stated that his disabilities prevented him from participating in the union. He asserted that he was the best qualified candidate because of his three university degrees and other experience; therefore, the Union should have appointed him to both positions to create a full time position in order to accommodate his disabilities. The Union did not appoint him to either position. In his application, the applicant asserts that failure to appoint him to the positions was discrimination because of disability and a failure to accommodate him to the point of undue hardship.

6The respondent Manufacturers Life Insurance Company of Canada (“Manulife”) provides administrative services, specifically adjudication services, for CCI regarding Sickness and Accident (“S&A”) benefit coverage for CCI’s eligible employees. In such an Administrative Services Only (“ASO”) arrangement, Manulife determines which employees are entitled to S&A benefits and CCI pays the benefits to employees who are so entitled. In his Application, the applicant alleged that Manulife refused to pay benefits for any short term absence, despite comprehensive knowledge of his medical conditions.

7The respondent Green Shield Canada provides adjudication services for employer sponsored health and dental benefits, including those provided by CCI. Green Shield adjudicates claims based on prescriptions from physicians and the eligibility for benefits under the contract with the plan sponsor (in this case CCI) and the appropriateness of the prescription for the indicated condition. In his Application, the applicant states that Green Shield refused to pay his eyeglass provider directly and denied him medication to treat diabetes, pain and his heart condition. The applicant asserts that Green Shield has considerable information regarding his health conditions and should have accommodated him by approving payment for these medications. Denial of these drugs could have serious negative effects on his health and these potential consequences are “severe adverse impacts” for the applicant.

Summary Hearings

8The summary hearing process is described in Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. The issue in a summary hearing is whether the application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the application or part of the application will succeed.

9In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paras. 8-10, the Tribunal made the following observations on the type of inquiry that may be involved in a summary hearing:

In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.

In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.

In considering what evidence is reasonably available to the applicant, the Tribunal must be attentive to the fact that in some cases of alleged discrimination, information about the reasons for the actions taken by a respondent are within the sole knowledge of the respondent. Evidence about the reasons for actions taken by a respondent may sometimes come through the disclosure process and through cross-examination of the people involved. The Tribunal must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence may lead to a finding of discrimination. However, when there is no reasonable prospect that any such evidence could allow the applicant to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities, the application must be dismissed following the summary hearing.

Applicant’s Submissions

CCI and Disability

10The applicant noted that CCI accommodated him after June 30, 2010 because of an injury he sustained outside of work. On October 7, 2010, he attempted to return to work after his heart attack, but CCI sent him home and directed him to provide information regarding his medical restrictions. Accordingly, the applicant provided CCI with his restrictions on October 14, 2010 and returned to work on October 18, 2010. The applicant states that his pre heart attack position was within his restrictions. Rather than return him to this position, however, CCI placed him in another position. The position was unsuitable and the applicant worked in it for only one day. CCI took the position that it could not accommodate him in work. He has not worked since, but stated that he had “bid” or applied for several positions, but was not the successful candidate because employees with more seniority were chosen.

CCI / CAW and Marital Status, Family Status and Age

11The applicant submitted that both the co-payment for prescription drugs and the monthly health care contribution discriminate against him on the basis of marital status and family status. In his view, he should not be required to pay the same amounts as couples and families. The applicant also submitted that reduction of the monthly health care contribution at age 65 without actuarial justification amounts to age discrimination. The applicant acknowledged that he was not treated differently regarding the co-payment or health care contribution, but submitted the effect of these provisions may be adverse effect discrimination. The applicant submitted that the exemptions set out in sections 25(2) and section 25(2.1) of the Code, upon which the Union relies, do not apply because benefits under the Chrysler Canada Health Care Benefits Plan are not provided pursuant to a contract of group insurance between an insurer and an employer. Rather, the benefits are provided directly by CCI, but administered by Green Shield pursuant to an ASO contract. Sections 25(2), 25(2.1) and 25(2.2) state as follows:

(2) The right under section 5 to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, marital status or family status is not infringed by an employee superannuation or pension plan or fund or a contract of group insurance between an insurer and an employer that complies with the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and the regulations thereunder. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 25 (2); 1999, c. 6, s. 28 (12); 2005, c. 5, s. 32 (15); 2005, c. 29, s. 1 (4).

(2.1) The right under section 5 to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of age is not infringed by an employee benefit, pension, superannuation or group insurance plan or fund that complies with the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and the regulations thereunder. 2005, c. 29, s. 1 (5).

(2.2) Subsection (2.1) applies whether or not a plan or fund is the subject of a contract of insurance between an insurer and an employer. 2005, c. 29, s. 1 (5).

CAW and Disability

12The applicant submitted that the selection process the Union employed to fill its positions was irrelevant and made no provision for accommodation. Accordingly, the applicant argued that failure to appoint to the union offices he pursued violated section 11 of the Code. The applicant asserted that his disabilities, of which he asserts the Union was well aware, prevented him from union involvement. Relying on Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, the applicant stated that seniority cannot be the basis for denying a position when accommodation is required. In his cover letters for the union positions, respectively dated September 16 and 28, 2010, the applicant deemed himself to be the most qualified applicant because of his university education and experience. The applicant submitted that if he was unable to meet the standards for the positions because of disability, then the Union was obliged to accommodate him.

Allegations against Manulife

13The applicant adopted a different position regarding Manulife at the Summary Hearing from that in his written Application. The applicant stated that his complaint against Manulife was not that it refused to pay him S&A benefits, but that in 2008 Manulife imposed more onerous reporting requirements on him because of his frequent use of these benefits. The applicant submitted that the additional reporting requirement had an adverse effect on him because of his disabilities in the form of additional expense, delay and stress incurred in qualifying for benefits. The letter setting out these requirements is dated February 25, 2008 and required the applicant to contact a Manulife case manager within 72 hours each time he becomes disabled. The letter also stated that the applicant may be required to undergo independent medical examinations to determine eligibility of benefits and to assess the true merits of his claim. To facilitate scheduling of such examinations, the applicant was also required to submit medical substantiation within 72 hours of attending his physician. The applicant stated that he understood these requirements remained in place today, but acknowledged that he never sought to be exempted from these requirements, in whole or part, as an accommodation.

Allegations against Green Shield

14The applicant’s allegations against Green Shield during the Summary Hearing also differed from those set out in the Application. The applicant noted that his extensive history of accessing benefits under CCI’s health care plan should have led Green Shield to conclude that he has disabilities. The applicant stated that the “Conditional Formulary” applied by Green Shield, whereby certain drugs are approved only if the patient meets certain specific medical conditions, poses a difficulty for him because it requires him to obtain further medical information each time he needs drugs covered by the formulary. The applicant alleges that he asked Green Shield to accommodate him by accepting “blanket medical information” about his conditions that would eliminate the need for him to gather and submit additional medical information when he was prescribed drugs on the conditional formulary. The applicant asserts he made this request to Green Shield in a letter dated October 5, 2010.

Analysis

15In my view, having heard the applicant’s submissions, it is clear that – with one exception – his allegations have no reasonable prospect of success.

16The duty to accommodate figures prominently in this Application; therefore, it is appropriate to briefly review how the duty arises under the Code. In Baber v. York Region District School Board, 2011 HRTO 213, the Tribunal pointed out that the duty to accommodate is not a free standing obligation under the Code. Rather, it arises only pursuant to sections 11, 17 or 24 of the Code where a person is disadvantaged because of a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Code. In other words, the duty to accommodate only arises where an applicant has been subject to direct or adverse effect discrimination. The applicant bears the onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which, if established shifts the evidentiary burden to the respondent to show that it accommodated the applicant to the point of undue hardship.

17Jurisprudence regarding the duty to accommodate clearly establishes that all parties to the accommodation process have obligations. An employee seeking accommodation, for example, is responsible for initiating the process by stating the need for accommodation and must act in a reasonable and cooperative manner. See for example, Renaud at page 31. In Simpson v. Commissionaires (Great Lakes), 2009 HRTO 1362, the Tribunal described how the duty to accommodate is triggered at paragraph 35:

In order to trigger the duty to accommodate, it is sufficient that an employer be informed of the employee’s disability-related needs and effects of the condition and how those needs and effects interact with the workplace duties and environment. As such, an employee does not necessarily have to disclose a detailed diagnosis of the disability in order for an employer to respond to a request for accommodation. This is not to detract from the well-established principle that accommodation is a collaborative process and the applicant should endeavour to provide as much information as possible to facilitate the search for accommodation.

Therefore, to establish the respondents were obliged to accommodate him, the applicant must provide evidence demonstrating that he identified his need for accommodation in relation to a requirement or factor that discriminated against him, directly or in effect, because of his disabilities.

18Regarding the applicant’s allegations against Manulife and Green Shield, I note the application of benefits plans necessarily involves decisions regarding eligibility for benefits, which will often be related to a claimant’s disability. The fact that a claimant has a disability related to his claim does not make an administrator’s decision to deny benefits or seek additional medical information discriminatory. Neither does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine whether decisions made under a benefit plan are correct. The Tribunal recently summarized the limits of its jurisdiction regarding benefits plan in Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) 2011 HRTO 1797, as follows:

Many types of benefits depend on the nature and extent of a person’s disability, and those administering such programs must make decisions about whether a person qualifies and the extent of benefits they will receive. Such decisions will often be connected with the person’s disability and be based on the nature and extent of that disability. Examples include payments by government, such as Workplace Safety and Insurance Board or Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”) Benefits, and programs provided by private service providers, such as long-term disability and health benefits. In my view, the prohibition against discrimination because of disability in the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code’) does not give this Tribunal the power to review decisions under disability-based benefit programs to determine whether they are correct under the legislation, regulations, or policies governing the program; this would be giving an appeal function to the Tribunal that the Legislature did not intend. Of course, as the Tribunal has recognized in other cases, discrimination in government and other benefit programs may be found in other ways such as policies, systemic practices, or considerations based on prohibited grounds irrelevant to the decision being made.

In Zaki, the Tribunal also noted that having a greater need for benefits under program or plan may be because of a disability, but is not a disability in and of itself (see paragraph 15). Consequently, an administrator requiring a claimant to provide additional information to establish higher use of a benefit is not, without more, a violation of the Code.

CCI and Disability: Duty to Accommodate Not Engaged

19The applicant stated CCI’s failure to accommodate him occurred after he returned to work on October 19, 2010 when CCI did not place him in his pre-heart attack position and did not provide him with any work after that date, not October 7, 2010 as asserted in the Application. CCI stated that the applicant was not expected at work on October 7, 2010 and was sent home because he had provided no information about his ability to work and restrictions. The applicant subsequently provided a note from his physician, included with the Application, that stated that the applicant could return to work on October 18, 2010 to a “sedentary job” involving minimal standing, no strenuous activity, no lifting, very little walking and no use of his left arm for two months. CCI obviously concluded that these significant restrictions precluded the applicant from performing his pre-heart attack job. Other than the applicant’s bald assertion, the applicant described no evidence that would contradict that conclusion. Neither did the applicant suggest that he asked to be returned to his pre-heart attack position. The jobs bids to which the applicant pointed are set out on a “JOB POSTING BID SHEET”, also submitted with the Application. The sheet is dated September 2, 2010, i.e., before his heart attack, and therefore cannot be a request for accommodation for his post heart attack restrictions. In my view, the applicant has no reasonable prospect of proving CCI failed to accommodate his disability.

CCI / CAW and Marital and Family Status: No Differential Treatment

20The respondents made limited submissions regarding the application of sections 25(2) and 25(2.1) of the Code and fuller evidence would be required to determine whether this defence is made out. Nonetheless, the respondents argued that the prescription drug co-payment and the monthly health care contribution do not in any event violate the Code. In particular, CCI submitted that the applicant has pointed to no evidence, beyond his bald assertion, that the design of the co-payment or monthly health premium results in a disadvantage to him such that the Tribunal could find discrimination in a substantive sense. The other respondents adopted CCI’s submissions on this point.

21I agree with the respondents with respect to the prescription drug co-payment. The applicant’s complaint is actually that CCI and CAW did not differentiate on the basis of marital or family status in setting the level of the co-payment. Employees pay the same co-payment regardless of marital and family status. Section 25(2) of the Code permits differentiation in employees’ benefits and contributions under health benefits plans because of marital or family status in certain circumstances (which the applicant submitted did not apply). This legislation, however, does not require such differentiation. The fact that CCI and CAW arguably could have applied a different co-payment to single employees, but chose not to cannot in my view, without any evidence showing adverse effect discrimination in a substantive sense, amount to differential treatment or discrimination. Consequently, I find the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success of proving discrimination because of marital or family status regarding the prescription drug co-payment.

CCI / CAW and Age: Reasonable Prospect of Success

22CCI and CAW did differentiate on the basis of age regarding the monthly health care contribution. The applicant, an employee under the age of 65, pays a higher monthly contribution than employees and retirees who have reached 65 years of age. While it is a well established principle in human rights law that not all distinctions are discriminatory, I am not prepared to find at this stage, based on the materials filed, that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing substantive discrimination. Paying a higher premium than others because of age seems at first blush to be a disadvantage. Whether it is a distinction that amounts to substantive discrimination requires evidence and findings of fact regarding the respondents’ reasons for making the distinction, or possible defences under the Code, such as section 25(2), which requires a hearing.

CAW and Disability: No Discrimination; No Duty to Accommodate

23The applicant did not meet at least two of the three criteria the Union considered by the selection committee regarding the union offices for which he applied, as he was not the most senior applicant and had not participated in union activities. To get around these deficiencies, the applicant asserted that the duty to accommodate obliged the Union to appoint him to both positions. The duty to accommodate, however, only arises when a requirement or qualification is discriminatory. There is nothing discriminatory per se in using seniority as a criterion for selecting candidates for union positions. The applicant asserted that seniority adversely affected him because of his disabilities, but did not point to any evidence of such an effect. Similarly, there is no evidence supporting the applicant’s assertion that his disabilities prevented him from union involvement other than the applicant’s bald statement to this effect. In fact, the applicant did not suggest that he ever tried to become involved in the union or requested accommodation in order to become involved. CAW stated out that it has a wide range of volunteer opportunities available to its members and that any member could become involved, regardless of functional limitations. For example, CAW explained that some activities require limited time commitment and some can be performed from home. The applicant offered no evidence to contradict this statement. Consequently, there is no evidence the criteria applied by the Union discriminated against him because of disability.

24I agree that the duty to accommodate may in some circumstances require the relaxation or non-observance of selection criteria, such as seniority. In Renaud, the complainant could not work a Friday evening shift because of his religious beliefs and therefore required accommodation in the form of alternative shifts for which he did not have the requisite seniority or which required derogation from the collective agreement. However, I also agree with CAW that the duty to accommodate does not necessarily arise merely because an applicant to a position is a person with a disability. When the applicant applied for the union positions, which was before his heart attack, he was working in an accommodated position provided by CCI. While it appears the applicant did not like this position, he made no suggestion that the position was not appropriate or that there was any reason at the time to believe he would not continue to hold it. Consequently, there is no evidence the applicant required accommodation when he applied for the union positions. I conclude therefore that there is no reasonable prospect the applicant can succeed in proving CAW’s decision not to appoint him to Union offices violated the Code.

Manulife and Green Shield: Duty to Accommodate Not Engaged, No Discrimination

25As noted, the applicant’s submissions at the Summary Hearing regarding Manulife bore no resemblance to the allegations against this respondent set out in his Application. The applicant acknowledged that Manulife did not in fact deny him S&A benefits. Rather, the applicant asserts that in February 2008, Manulife imposed additional reporting requirements on him because of his frequent use of these benefits. However, the applicant also acknowledged that he never asked Manulife to accommodate him regarding these requirements. In these circumstances, there is no basis for finding that Manulife’s duty to accommodate was engaged regarding the reporting requirements for S&A benefits.

26Of course, the duty to accommodate arises only when an applicant has been subject to direct or adverse effect discrimination. Requiring additional information when a claimant has a higher need for a benefit is also not itself discriminatory. In my opinion, the characterization of discrimination as direct or adverse effect does not change this conclusion. Claimants seeking S&A benefits must provide proof of their eligibility for the benefit and those seeking more of the benefit will be required to provide more proof. The applicant submits the effort and expense required to obtain this additional proof creates a disadvantage for him because his disabilities cause him to use S&A benefits more often. This disadvantage, however, is relative to those who also receive less, or none, of the benefit. I see nothing illogical or discriminatory in such a differentiation. In my view, an administrator’s decision to require additional information in exchange for more benefits is not one the Tribunal should review unless there was evidence the decision was taken for discriminatory reasons. There is no evidence that Manulife treated the applicant differently than other higher needs claimants because of his particular disabilities or any other prohibited ground of discrimination.

27Further, the issue the applicant has now particularized regarding Manulife allegedly occurred in February 2008. This Application was filed in October 2010. The first time the applicant provided the details of this allegation was in September 2011 in his submissions during the Summary Hearing. The Rules of the Tribunal require an Application or Response to “set out all the facts that form the substance of the allegations of discrimination including the circumstances of what happened, where and when it happened”. The applicant believed the additional reporting requirements discriminated against him because of disability in February 2008, yet he chose not to even make these allegations until the Summary Hearing in September 2011. The applicant has not shown that any delay in raising this significant component of his Application was in good faith.

28The applicant stated that he sought accommodation from Green Shield regarding the Conditional Formulary process in a letter dated October 5, 2010, two weeks before filing the Application. In fact, the letter is a demand letter wherein the applicant sought compensation from Green Shield, failing which the applicant would add Green Shield as a respondent to his pending “omnibus S34 human rights application.”

29In the letter, the applicant alleges the prescription drug benefit program is set up to regularly refuse necessary medication to persons with disabilities. The applicant also states that the purpose of the Application against Green Shield would be to “correct the use of the benefits program such that it “accommodates the disabled to the point of undue hardship.”” While the letter refers to the process for approving benefits, the focus of the letter is on the denial of benefits, which the applicant states is the reason for bringing an Application against Green Shield. The only adverse impact to which the applicant refers is the denial of compensation for necessary medication. Nowhere in the letter does the applicant refer to the requirement to submit additional documentation to be approved for some drugs or the effect this requirement has on him. There is nothing in the letter requesting an exemption from or alternatives to the benefit adjudication process, such as accepting “blanket medical information”. The only request or demand contained in the letter is as follows:

You have 30 days to voluntarily correct the process by providing proper and appropriate compensation (as deemed by me) should you not wish to appear at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) to explain your actions and how you intend to address the issue of “accommodation to the point of undue hardship”, in this regard.

This is not surprising, since the letter shortly pre-dates the filing of the Application, which focuses entirely on the denial of benefits and compensation for same in respect of Green Shield. The Application suggested no other evidence of a request for accommodation from this respondent. In these circumstances, the applicant in my view has no reasonable prospect of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that he requested accommodation from Green Shield in the manner described during the Summary Hearing.

30In my view, the applicant has also not offered any evidence that the Conditional Formulary is discriminatory. Eligibility for benefits often depend on the nature and extent of a claimant’s condition or disability. Administrators of benefit plans are entitled to set eligibility criteria provided the criteria are not themselves discriminatory or applied in a discriminatory manner. Providing medical information to validate the need for certain drugs in exchange for reimbursement of the cost of the drugs does not create any disadvantage or adverse effect. The applicant offered no evidence that would indicate the Conditional Formulary criteria are discriminatory or were applied in a discriminatory manner.

31In my view, the applicant has not established a reasonable prospect of success regarding all but one of his various claims in this Application. The exception is his allegation of age discrimination against CCI and CAW in respect of the monthly health care contribution.

Order

32The Application is dismissed with the exception of the applicant’s allegations against CCI and CAW that the design of the monthly health care contribution discriminates against him because of age. The Registrar shall schedule a one day hearing to consider this issue.

Dated at Toronto this 26^th^ day of October, 2011.

“Signed by”

____________________________________

Douglas Sanderson

Vice-chair