Weigl v. Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation, 2013 HRTO 2107

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Ben Weigl

Applicant

-and-

Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation and Wayne Bondy

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Daniel Randazzo

Date: December 20, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 2107

Indexed as: Weigl v. Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation

APPEARANCES

Ben Weigl, Applicant ) Self-Represented

Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation and Wayne Bondy, ) David McNevin, Counsel Respondents )

1This is an Application dated August 17, 2012 and filed under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination and harassment with respect to housing because of disability and reprisal. I note that, although the applicant did not initially allege harassment in his application, at the hearing the applicant argued that the respondents’ conduct was harassment. I have therefore dealt with the applicant’s argument that the respondents’ actions were harassment under section 2(2).

2In summary, the applicant alleges that the respondents did not accommodate his disability when they repeatedly knocked at his apartment door to advise him that they were going to relocate his bicycle, despite a clearly visible do not disturb sign. The applicant alleges that this conduct, the repeated knocking at his door, was in contravention of what he describes as a pre-existing “accommodation agreement” (which he alleges required the respondent to communicate with him only in writing). While he has not done so directly, what the applicant effectively argues is that the respondents breached his right to be free from discrimination in housing. He also alleges the door knocking was harassment and reprisal for filing earlier complaints before the Human Rights Tribunal. It is important to note before going further that there is no free-standing right to accommodation on the basis of disability; the Code provides the right to equal treatment with respect to housing without discrimination on a Code ground and the right to be free from harassment because of a Code grounds. An individual may well be entitled to accommodation on the basis of disability in some circumstances, but they must first establish either direct or constructive (see section 11 of the Code) discriminatory treatment.

3The hearing was held on September 6, 2013 in Windsor, Ontario. I heard evidence from the applicant and from Mr. Jim Mellor, District Manager for the respondent, Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation (the “WECHC”). After the evidence was completed, I heard the parties’ final submissions.

REVIEW OF EVIDENCE

The parties

4The applicant lives in Building #109 of the WECHC. He self-identifies as having a disability that causes him to “shut down like a computer” when dealing with people in authority. To deal with his disability the applicant requires all communication with him to be in writing and posts a do not disturb sign on his apartment door when he is having an episode of depression.

5The corporate respondent, the WECHC, is the housing authority responsible for community housing in the Windsor-Essex communities. The individual respondent, Mr. Wayne Bondy, is the building superintendent for WECHC Building #111. Mr. Brody is the individual whom the applicant claims knocked repeatedly at his door despite the fact that a do not disturb sign was posted and in contravention of what the applicant claims was a pre-existing “accommodation agreement”.

Applicant’s Evidence

6The applicant is a tenant in Building #109 of the WECHC and has lived there for a number of years. The applicant is in receipt of Ontario Disability Support Payments (“ODSP”), a fact which is known by the respondents. The applicant claims that the WECHC, through its representative Mr. Wayne Bondy, constantly knocked at his door at 1:30 p.m. on August 11, 2012. The respondent did so despite the fact that the applicant had a do not disturb sign clearly posted on his door. The applicant states that the respondents knew he had a disability because he was in receipt of ODSP and because at a meeting, two years prior to the incident, the applicant attended a meeting with the Mental Health Association and identified at that meeting as having a disability. The applicant claims that the respondent, Mr. Bondy, was in attendance at that meeting and witnessed the applicant identifying as an individual with a disability.

7The applicant also states that in January 2009 he entered into what he describes as an “accommodation agreement” with the WECHC whereby the WECHC would accommodate him by communicating with him in writing only. The applicant relies on this document as evidence of an agreement between himself and the WECHC to accommodate his disability.

8The applicant states that on August 11, 2012 his bicycle was parked in the courtyard between buildings #109 and #111. At approximately 1:30 p.m. Mr. Bondy repeatedly knocked at his door to advise him that his bicycle was going to be moved to a secure location in the front bicycle rack. The applicant was aware that he could not leave his bicycle in the stairwell so he had parked and locked it in the courtyard. He chose to lock and leave his bicycle in the courtyard despite the fact that there were notices to tenants posted on the bulletin board advising tenants to move their bicycles from the courtyard in anticipation of the upcoming community barbeque. The applicant states that he was aware of, saw and read the postings regarding the location of the bicycles and directing tenants to move their bicycles from the courtyard. The applicant claims that the postings were not correspondence to him because they were not delivered to him and the respondents were obligated, by the January 10, 2009 “accommodation agreement” to "deliver" any correspondence to him. In the applicant's opinion, the posting of notices is not delivery of correspondence as contemplated by the January 10, 2009 document. The applicant not only takes issue with the manner of delivery of the notice but also takes issue with the notices themselves. The applicant points out that the notices do not say that you “can’t park” your bicycles in the courtyard and is of the opinion that the notices are not relevant to the August 11, 2012 incident of the respondents knocking at his door. The applicant clarified that he did not take issue with the fact that his bicycle was moved but with the manner (knocking at his door) in which he was informed that his bicycle was going to be moved. The applicant states that it was not an emergency situation, such as a fire, and that the respondents could have simply written him a note advising that his bicycle was going to be moved.

9The applicant also stated that the knocking at his door and the placement of his bicycle in a less than secure location was a reprisal for filing previous human rights claims. The applicant testified that he had filed two previous complaints against the WECHC that were not factually related to the current applicant and that they were dismissed summarily.

10The applicant stated that it was his opinion that the respondents did not move the bicycle to a secure location on purpose. The applicant testified that as a result of the bicycle not being moved to a secure location, the bicycle’s back wheel was subsequently stolen. The applicant admitted that although the courtyard was not a prohibited area to park your bicycle, on August 11, 2012 there was a barbeque and the bicycle had to be removed from the courtyard. The applicant reiterated that he did not have an issue over what was done (the fact that his bicycle was moved) but how it was done (the fact that the respondents knocked at his door and did not place the bicycle in a secure location).

11In cross-examination the applicant acknowledged that in January 2010 he was engaged in a dispute regarding the manner in which his rent was collected and the timing of the receipt of his ODSP. It was the applicant’s evidence that the document of January 4, 2010 was to accommodate his disability with respect to the ODSP issue and any other issue. The applicant acknowledged in cross examination that he was aware that a barbeque was scheduled to take place and that the barbeque would be held in the courtyard. The applicant also testified that on at least one previous occasion, tenants had moved his bicycle when a barbeque was being held. As a result of that action, the applicant called the Ontario Provincial Police to complain that his bicycle had been moved. The police attended but no actions or charges were laid.

Respondents’ Evidence

12Mr. Jim Mellor testified on behalf of the respondents. Mr. Mellor is the District Manager for Area 4 of the WECHC. Both buildings #109 and #111 are within Mr. Mellor's district. The two buildings are composed of 137 units. Mr. Mellor attends at the building sites 2-3 times a week. He meets with staff and does a walk-through to inspect the buildings. In doing his walk-throughs he has noticed that the applicant often has a do not disturb sign on his door.

13Mr. Mellor tested that in 2009 there was an issue revolving around ODSP and the timing of their payments to their recipients, including the applicant. Mr. Mellor testified that the applicant had been sending a great deal of communication to his MP, MPP and others. Mr. Mellor, in an attempt to bring the situation to a close and to avoid the abundance of emails going to everyone, drafted, signed and sent the January 4, 2010 document to the applicant, the purpose of which was to manage the communication with respect to the ODSP issue.

14Mr. Mellor testified that the bicycle issue started in May 2012. At this time the tenant association for building #109 had asked Mr. Mellor if they could move the applicant’s bicycle. Mr. Mellor perceived the location of the bicycle to be a safety issue and agreed with the tenant association’s request. The bicycle was moved by the tenant association following which the applicant complained to the police. Those involved were interviewed by the police but as it was seen to be a housing issue, no charges were laid. When the August 2012 barbeque was approaching the tenant association posted a notice seeking the cooperation of the person who had parked their bicycle in the courtyard. That person was the applicant. The tenant association approached Mr. Mellor seeking his assistance given the involvement of the police the previous time the bicycle had been moved. Mr. Mellor instructed Mr. Bondy, the superintendent of building #111, to move the applicant's bicycle and return it after the barbeque. Mr. Mellor told Mr. Brody, as a courtesy to the applicant, to advise the applicant that the bicycle was going to be relocated.

15Mr. Mellor testified that he asked Mr. Bondy, the superintendent for building #111, to move the bicycle and to advise the applicant because the superintendent for building #109, the building where the applicant resides, was not present that day. Mr. Bondy was acting under the instructions of Mr. Mellor.

16During cross-examination, Mr. Mellor was questioned with respect to an email exchange between the applicant, Mr. Mellor and others within the WECHC. Mr. Mellor testified that his comment of "now this is funny" recorded in a June 6, 2012 email referring to a request from the applicant for clarification regarding communication with respect to the location of his bicycle was meant to point out how far the issue over the bicycle had gone in that it had involved the tenant association, senior management at WECHC and even the police.

17Mr. Mellor stated during cross examination that he was aware that the applicant was in receipt of ODSP and that he was aware that there was a disability but was unaware of the nature of the disability.

Video Recording

18When Mr. Bondy knocked at the applicant’s door on August 11, 2012, the applicant video recorded the exchange between Mr. Bondy and the applicant. The video recording was reviewed at the commencement of the applicant’s testimony. The applicant testified that it was clear to him that Mr. Bondy saw or at least was aware of the do not disturb sign on the applicant’s door prior to Mr. Bondy knocking at his door.

ARGUMENT

Applicant’s Argument

19The applicant argued that the January 4, 2010 document was an “accommodation agreement”. The applicant pointed to the fact that the document uses the word “accommodation” and that it states that “any and all correspondence” will be delivered to him. The applicant points out further that the document is not limited to the 2010 ODSP issue.

20The applicant argued that the respondents were aware of the do not disturb sign. The respondents’ knowledge of this is admitted in paragraph 6 of Schedule “A” of the respondents’ response to the application. The applicant also points to the video recording, where Mr. Bondy acknowledges that he is aware of the do not disturb sign.

21The applicant argued that the respondents knew he had a disability and that Mr. Bondy, acting as an agent of the corporate respondent, knew that the applicant had a do not disturb sign on his door when he knocked on the applicant’s door. In doing so, the respondents did not treat the applicant with dignity and respect as a disabled person. The applicant argued that the duty to accommodate requires individuals to treat those with disabilities with dignity and respect to the point of undue hardship. By knocking on his door, in the face of a do not disturb sign, the respondents were not treating the applicant with dignity and respect.

22The applicant argued that Mr. Mellor never informed the applicant in writing that his bicycle was to be moved. He also argued that Mr. Bondy did not have the decency to tell the applicant why his bicycle was being moved. The applicant argued that the notices posted on the bulletin board were not “delivered” to him as contemplated by the January 4, 2010 document. The applicant, on several occasions, repeated his argument that the January 4, 2010 document was an accommodation agreement and that any reasonable person would not have knocked on the door when there was a do not disturb sign posted.

23The applicant argued that the issue in this case was not about where the bike was, how it was moved or who moved it, the issue was the manner in which he was informed that the bicycle was to be moved.

24Finally, the applicant argued that the knocking at his door and the placement of the bicycle in a less than secure area was retaliation for making a complaint against the tenant association of Building #109. The applicant argued that the respondents and the tenant association of Building #109 have a close relationship.

25The applicant relied upon Di Marco v. Fabcic, 2003 HRTO 4 in support of his claim. Di Marco v. Fabcic addressed the issue of discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to housing. It dealt with a landlord’s refusal to install a ramp and rail and ultimately the refusal to rent the apartment. Di Marco v. Fabcic is not helpful with respect to the applicant’s claim.

Respondents’ Argument

26The respondents noted that the applicant’s claim focuses on section 2(2) harassment in housing and section 8 reprisal. The respondents argued that, in addition to his reprisal claim under section 8, the applicant’s claim effectively focused on whether the respondents had breached section 2(2) (harassment) rather than whether they had discriminated against him under 2(1).

27Dealing first with the issue of reprisal, the respondents argued that there is no evidence of any conduct which would, at its best, constitute a reprisal. The comments by Mr. Bondy in the video recording of “go ahead call the police” are evidence that Mr. Bondy knew the police were called before. The respondents argued that in order to find reprisal, section 8 of the Code requires a link between the actions and the Code. More precisely, the reprisal must be in response to the applicant asserting a claim under the Code. In this case, the applicant has not established the necessary link to the Code. They take the position that the applicant is attempting to link the police complaint to Mr. Bondy notifying the applicant that his bicycle was to be moved. This, they say, is simply the applicant’s guess or opinion.

28With respect to the applicant’s claim under section 2(2) of the Code, the respondent conceded that Mr. Bondy knocked on the applicant’s door on August 11, 2012 and that there was a do not disturb sign on the door. However, the respondents argued that there is no evidence with respect to the frequency or number of times Mr. Bondy knocked on the door and no evidence that this action (knocking on the applicant’s door) was unusual or excessive. It was merely a knock on the door. The video recording demonstrates that Mr. Bondy said or did nothing inappropriate. All Mr. Bondy did was to advise the applicant that his bicycle was going to be moved.

29The respondents argued that the January 4, 2010 document was not an “accommodation agreement”. It was a unilateral statement regarding how the applicant’s rent would be paid. The respondents argued that the applicant was engaged in a widely dispersed campaign with respect to his ODSP payments and rent. In support of this, Mr. Mellor testified that the purpose of the January 4, 2010 document was to address communications over the ODSP issue and nothing else. The respondents added that the applicant did not request the document and did not sign the document.

30The respondents point out that the applicant admits that he did not disclose the nature of his disability. The respondents conceded that the applicant is not required to provide the details of his disability but argued that the applicant must provide meaningful information to allow the respondents the opportunity to deal with any disability issues in a meaningful manner.

31Finally, the respondents argued that, absent an accommodation agreement or knowledge (by this, I understand the respondents mean knowledge of the applicant’s disability and/or specific disability related needs), there is no connection between the act of knocking on the applicant’s door and a ground of discrimination or a breach of the Code.

DECISION

32For the reasons that will follow, the application is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

Analytical Framework and Relevant Code Provisions:

33The following provisions of the Code are relevant to this proceeding:

2(1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public assistance

Harassment in accommodation

(2) Every person who occupies accommodation has a right to freedom from harassment by the landlord or agent of the landlord or by an occupant of the same building because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public assistance.

8. Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of reprisal for so doing.

10(1) “disability” means,

(a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, a brain injury, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical co-ordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical reliance on a guide dog or other animal or on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device,

(b) a condition of mental impairment or a developmental disability,

(c) a learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the processes involved in understanding or using symbols or spoken language,

(d) a mental disorder, or

(e) an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received under the insurance plan established under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997; (“handicap”)

34It is well established that in an application alleging a violation of the Code, the applicant bears the onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination: Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears Ltd. (“O’Malley”), 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at para 28. In establishing discrimination, the ordinary civil standard of proof upon a balance of probabilities applies: Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) v. Etobicoke (Borough), 1982 CanLII 15 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202.

35In Shaw v. Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155, the Court of Appeal re-stated the long-standing principle from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in O’Malley, above, that the onus rests on the complainant to establish a “prima facie” case of discrimination which is described as “one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant’s favour in the absence of answer from the respondent.”

36Discrimination is not defined in the Code, however, it has been consistently defined by the Tribunal and the Courts to mean adverse treatment, or a distinction which creates a disadvantage, on the basis of a prohibited ground (O’Malley, above; Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (“Andrews”), 1989 CanLII 2 (S.C.C.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. In Andrews, McIntyre J. defined discrimination in this way:

…a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.

37In this case, the applicant self-identifies with the prohibited ground of disability and there is essentially no dispute that he is a person with a disability; although the nature of that disability and any needs arising from it are somewhat less clear. The second part of his burden requires proof that he experienced some form of adverse treatment. The third stage of the analysis requires the applicant to demonstrate that there is some nexus between the adverse treatment and the prohibited grounds alleged.

38The respondent has the onus of demonstrating, on the balance of probabilities, a credible, non-discriminatory justification for its actions. If the respondent is unable or unwilling to establish such a justification, or the complainant proves that the justification is pretextual, the Tribunal will find a breach of the Code and order an appropriate remedy. In most cases, the respective burdens on the parties are assessed at the conclusion of all the evidence.

Discrimination in Housing (section 2.1)

39At its highest, the applicant’s allegations are that knocking on his door and perhaps moving his bicycle without first providing written notice sent directly to him in accordance with what he calls the “accommodation agreement” are a breach of his Code rights. However, as I noted above, the fundamental problem with the applicant’s case is that he has asserted a right to a particular type of treatment (i.e. accommodation) without first establishing that the conduct in question either amounts to adverse treatment – directly or indirectly – or that even if it does, there is any real connection or nexus to any disability that he may have.

40In particular, the applicant has not argued that knocking on his door to advise him his bicycle was to be moved for the community barbeque or that leaving him a notice on his bicycle to similar effect, rather than mailing him a letter, amount to direct discrimination. There is simply no evidence to support that any of this could amount to direct discrimination and on the facts of this case I would dismiss this even if it had been argued. Neither has the applicant explicitly argued that the respondents’ conduct amounts to constructive discrimination under s. 11 of the Code.

41Under section 11, where an otherwise neutral requirement, qualification or factor exists that results in an exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons identified by a prohibited ground (e.g. some type of disability), then a member of that group may be entitled to some form of accommodation of that otherwise neutral requirement to ensure effective equality of treatment. But again, the analysis does not begin with a self-standing right to accommodation; that arises from the application of an otherwise neutral factor that results in an adverse effect on the basis of, for example, some type of disability. All of which, for the reasons below, the applicant has failed to establish.

42In my view, the applicant’s allegations cannot reasonably establish that the respondent’s conduct constructively violated the applicant’s rights under the Code on the basis of disability any more than they can establish direct discrimination. Even assuming the respondents were aware that the applicant has a disability within the meaning of the Code, there is no evidence that telling the applicant his bicycle would be moved for the barbeque in any way amounted to an exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons identified by a prohibited ground.

43Fundamentally, the applicant has failed to establish that either moving his bicycle, leaving a note for him on his bicycle or informing him in person resulted in any disadvantage on the basis of disability.

44Although it is unnecessary for me to consider the applicant’s argument that there was a failure to accommodate because the applicant has not established there was any discriminatory incident; even if he had established this, I would still dismiss this Application on the basis that the applicant has failed to establish he required any accommodation of a disability-related need.

45The applicant conceded that he did not discuss with the respondents the nature of his disability and had not entered into discussions with the respondents with respect to what he claims are his accommodation needs.

46However, the applicant also testified that the respondents were aware that he had a disability. He based his belief on the fact that he was in receipt of ODSP and identified as having a disability at a meeting some two years prior to the incident. It was clear from the applicant’s evidence that he had not provided any information to the respondents regarding the nature of his disability. The respondents did not object or deny that they were aware that the applicant had a disability but maintained that they were unaware of the nature of the disability and unaware of the need to accommodate the applicant’s disability.

47Jurisprudence regarding the duty to accommodate clearly establishes that all parties to the accommodation process have obligations. An individual seeking accommodation, for example, is responsible for initiating the process by stating the need for accommodation. The duty to accommodate is a cooperative duty and requires the applicant, who is seeking accommodation, to provide sufficient information to allow the respondents to understand the nature of the disability. The duty to accommodate would require, at the least, the party seeking accommodation to act in a reasonable and cooperative manner. See for example, Matthews v. Chrysler Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 1939 and Simpson v. Commissionaires (Great Lakes), 2009 HRTO 1362.

48Therefore, to establish the respondents were obliged to accommodate him, the applicant must provide evidence of demonstrating that he identified his need for accommodation in relation to a factor that discriminated against him, directly or constructively, because of his disabilities.

49In this respect, the applicant’s case, at its highest, focused on what the applicant referred to as an “accommodation agreement”. The applicant argues that the act of knocking at his door, in the face of a do not disturb sign, was a violation of the “accommodation agreement” between the applicant and the corporate respondent. The applicant argues that the January 4, 2010 document is an “accommodation agreement” between the applicant and the corporate respondent.

50The January 4, 2010 document, is a letter from Mr. Jim Mellor to the applicant and reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Weigl

Thank you for your email to us on Saturday January 2, 2010. To better accommodate you the Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation would like to inform you that from this point forward any and all correspondence with you will be in written form and sent to you via regular mail or delivery. This will eliminate any need for verbal conversations or meetings. [dated January 4, 2010]

51I find that the January 4, 2010 document is not an “accommodation agreement”. I accept the evidence of Mr. Mellor that the letter was intended to address the issue surrounding the timing of the applicant’s ODSP and the collection of his rent. I find that the letter was intended to address only this issue and was not intended as an “accommodation agreement”. It was clear from the applicant’s evidence that he did not request any accommodation in January 2010 and did not request an “accommodation agreement” from the corporate respondent. The applicant did not negotiate the terms or language of the January 4, 2010 document and did not sign the document. The January 4, 2010 document is simply a letter from the corporate respondent advising that, in the opinion of the corporate respondent, the parties’ communications should be restricted to the written form.

52There is nothing in this document that would allow me to find the respondents had specific knowledge of any disability related needs the applicant may have and certainly not that they had otherwise effectively committed to accommodating any such needs.

53Furthermore, returning to the specific incident in question, I find that the applicant did not act in a reasonable and cooperative manner. The applicant acknowledged he was aware that a community barbeque was scheduled to take place and that the community barbeque would be held in the courtyard. He knew that his bicycle had to be moved as he had observed and read the posted notices. The applicant however chose to ignore the posted notices and to leave his bicycle in an unacceptable location. The applicant knew that his bicycle had to be relocated.

54For all the reasons above there is no basis to find the respondents discriminated against the applicant on the basis of disability.

Harassment and Reprisal

Knocking on the applicant’s door

55The applicant also argues that the act of knocking at his door, in the face of a do not disturb sign, was an act in violation of the Code in that the respondents repeatedly knocked at his door to harass the applicant. The applicant further argued that the repeated knocking at his door was an act of reprisal.

56The applicant called no evidence that the respondents conducted themselves in a course of conduct which could, in any way, be characterized as harassment. The evidence, at best, establishes that Mr. Bondy knocked at the applicant’s door on one occasion. The evidence falls far short of establishing that the knocking was continuous, repeated or constant, or that it was in any way connected to a Code ground.

57It’s important to understand why the respondents knocked at the applicant’s door. I accept Mr. Mellor’s evidence that he instructed Mr. Bondy to advise the applicant that his bicycle was to going to be relocated and that he did so because, in Mr. Mellor’s opinion, it would be best to remove the tenant’s association from the situation. I find the respondents’ decision to knock on the applicant’s door to advise the applicant that his bicycle was going to be moved to be completely reasonable in the circumstances, unrelated to any Code ground, and not an act of harassment and not an act which contravenes the Code. I find that the applicant was fully aware that his bicycle had to be moved but deliberately chose not to do so. The respondents acted reasonably in moving the bicycle and acted reasonably in knocking on the applicant’s door to advise him that his bicycle would be moved.

58Having found that the respondents acted reasonably in knocking at the applicant’s door, I find that this act (knocking at the applicant’s door) was not an act of reprisal. The applicant relied upon the fact that the respondents were aware that he had previously made a complaint to the police alleging that his bicycle had been moved and had previously filed a human rights complaint against the tenant association as the basis for his claim for reprisal. Other than the applicant’s belief or feelings, he called no evidence to substantiate his claim with respect to reprisal.

Reprisal

The relocation of the applicant’s bicycle.

59The applicant also claimed that the placing of his bicycle in a less than secure area was an act of reprisal against the applicant for filing an application under the Code against the building’s tenant’s association. The applicant argued that there was a close relationship between the tenant’s association and the respondents.

60The applicant’s evidence falls far short of establishing that the respondents’ actions in placing the bicycle in an area described by the applicant as less than secure were actions of reprisal by the respondents. The applicant called no evidence to support his belief that there was a close relationship between the tenant’s association and the respondents. Furthermore, if I were to accept that there was a close relationship between the tenant’s association and the respondents, the applicant called no evidence to establish that the act of relocating his bicycle was an act of reprisal.

61It is important to understand that the respondents had to move the bicycle because the applicant, notwithstanding that he knew the bicycle had to moved, chose not to do so. The applicant knew his bicycle could not remain in the courtyard during the community barbeque and knew that it had to be moved.

62I find that the respondents’ actions in relocating the bicycle were not actions of reprisal.

63For all the above reasons, the Application is dismissed.