CITATION: Blair v. University of Waterloo et al, 2026 ONSC 2674

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00000701-00JR

DATE: 20260514

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

O'BRIEN, BROWNSTONE and KAUFMAN JJ.

BETWEEN:

ALEXIS BLAIR, AKA ALEXI BLAIR

Applicant

– and –

UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO, HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

Respondents

Counsel:

Self-Represented Applicant

Kathryn Bird, Jordan Simon and Susan Ivimey, for University of Waterloo

Maija-Lisa Robinson for Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

HEARD in Toronto: April 28, 2026

O’Brien, J.

Reasons for Decision

Overview

[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision and request for reconsideration of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which dismissed and refused to reconsider their[^1] claims against the University of Waterloo. The applicant was a student at the university at the time of the events in issue in 2018. They claimed the university discriminated against them on the basis of disability for failing to administer a disability-related bursary to provide funding for a motorized mobility device, which they described as a powerchair.

[2] The applicant’s disability made it difficult for them to walk across campus. They sought information from the university regarding funding available through bursary programs for the purchase of a powerchair. The university admits it initially provided the applicant with incorrect information. University employees told the applicant there were no disability-related bursaries for students with temporary disabilities. There was no dispute that the applicant’s disability was temporary. The information provided by the university about temporary disabilities was true of the Canada Student Grant for Services and Equipment for Persons with Permanent Disabilities (CSG-PDSE) but not of the Bursary for Students with Disabilities (BSWD). Students with temporary disabilities can apply to the BSWD. However, as the university later advised the applicant in September 2018, the BSWD does not subsidize the purchase of wheelchairs, which the university considered to cover powerchairs.

[3] Although the applicant raised numerous allegations against the university before the Tribunal, the focus of their arguments in this court related to the administration of funding for the powerchair. On that issue, the Tribunal found the university did not administer financial support for the applicant in a discriminatory manner for several reasons. First, the Tribunal noted that, because the applicant could not receive funding for a powerchair through the BSWD, the university directed them to funding available through the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care on four occasions.

[4] Next, in its legal analysis, the Tribunal concluded that it was not its role to determine whether the university applied the correct criteria under the BSWD program, since it concluded it does not have jurisdiction to review decisions under benefit programs. The Tribunal also found the applicant presented no evidence that the university subjected them to arbitrary disadvantage linked to their status as a person with a disability. In addition, it found the fact that university staff initially erred in the interpretation of BSWD eligibility was not, on its own, evidence of discrimination.

[5] The Tribunal dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding that the applicant failed to establish any grounds for reconsideration. They also had applied for reconsideration after the 30-day deadline had passed.

[6] The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider or refer to exhibits in support of their position, particularly those related to the approval of their documents from the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP). They also say the BSWD manual could be interpreted to cover funding for a powerchair, which is different from a wheelchair. The applicant further submits the Tribunal misapplied the test for discrimination. Finally, they emphasize that they suffered damages because of not receiving a bursary for the powerchair.

[7] For the following reasons, I would dismiss the application.

Standard of Review

[8] The standard of review for the Tribunal’s decisions is reasonableness: Ontario (Health) v. Association of Ontario Midwives, 2022 ONCA 458, at para. 83; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 10.

Analysis

Was the Tribunal’s decision unreasonable because it failed to refer to the applicant’s exhibits?

[9] Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Tribunal was not required to refer to all their documents in its reasons. A tribunal’s reasons must be sufficient to justify its decision and explain the decision’s rationale. They must demonstrate justification, transparency, and intelligibility and meaningfully grapple with the key issues or central arguments raised by the parties. However, decisions are not assessed against a standard of perfection. A reasonable decision is not required to deal with every argument or piece of evidence raised by the parties: Vavilov, at paras. 81, 91, 97, 128.

[10] The Tribunal was not required to refer to the documents the applicant drew to the court’s attention. Those documents included an OSAP disability verification form that the applicant completed to apply for disabled status. This form did not reasonably provide evidence that the applicant was guaranteed funding through the BSWD. The form expressly stated that, if verified, the applicant “may…qualify for other funding through the ‘Bursary for Students with Disabilities and the Canada Student Grant for Services and Equipment for Students with Disabilities’.” (emphasis added) The form also stated that the BSWD would require a separate application. It is clear on its face that the form represented an initial step before applying for funding under the BSWD. It was not sufficiently connected to the central issues to require the adjudicator to specifically address it.

[11] Similarly, the Tribunal was not required to address the Ontario government document advising the applicant that their documents were “approved.” The “approving document” showed the documents of the applicant that had been “accepted” by OSAP. The listed documents included the applicant’s “disability status change documents.” The “approving document” stated that the applicant’s documents had been “provided and approved” but did not say that funding for a particular disability support was approved. As set out above, a verified disability only meant the applicant might qualify for funding through the BSWD, which would require a separate application. Again, the Tribunal was not required to expressly address the “approving document”.

[12] Overall, the Tribunal was not required to review each document relied on by the applicant, particularly when those documents were of minimal assistance. This ground of review is dismissed.

Was the the Tribunal’s decision unreasonable in failing to find the university misapplied the benefits manual?

[13] The applicant submits the Tribunal did not sufficiently consider, or misapplied, the manual for the BSWD. They emphasize they were seeking funding for a powerchair, which they say is distinct from a wheelchair, and which in their submission should have been covered by the manual.

[14] I find the Tribunal’s reasons on this point to be reasonable. The Tribunal explained that the university told the applicant they were not entitled to funding under the BSWD because wheelchairs were not covered under the manual. Specifically, the university referred to a section of the manual titled “Non-Eligible Expenses”, which expressly included wheelchairs.

[15] The Tribunal did not make any findings as to whether this was a correct reading of the manual. Instead, the Tribunal said it was not authorized to review decisions under benefit programs, including those based on disability. At para. 31 of its reasons, the Tribunal stated: “Accordingly, I make no finding regarding whether the University was correct in its interpretation of the applicant’s eligibility for the BSWD; rather, I must determine whether the applicant has presented evidence that establishes or supports an inference that the University’s actions were discriminatory.”

[16] The Tribunal’s analysis was reasonable. It relied on established Tribunal jurisprudence that limits the review of decisions under disability benefit programs. In Seberras v. Workplace Safety Insurance Board, 2012 HRTO 115, the applicant filed a complaint at the Tribunal against the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board alleging that he was discriminated against because of a disability when he was denied benefits. The Tribunal held that applications that effectively seek to challenge such decisions must be dismissed, as permitting them would improperly confer an appeal function on the Tribunal that the legislature did not intend: Seberras, at para. 22, citing Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (No. 3), 2011 HRTO 1797. See also Matthews v. Chrysler Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 1939.

[17] This does not mean an applicant can never challenge a benefits scheme as discriminatory. But there must be something more than the denial of benefits to a particular person based on an alleged misinterpretation of the benefits policy. Further, in this case, the university was not the provider of benefits. It only administered the scheme. The applicant was entitled to challenge the university before the Tribunal for the manner in which it interacted with them regarding the benefits, but the Tribunal reasonably found that any challenge to its interpretation of the manual was not for the Tribunal to resolve.

Was the Tribunal’s application of the test for discrimination reasonable?

[18] The applicant next submits the Tribunal erred in applying the test for discrimination They rely, for example, on Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2013 ONCA 39 to say the onus shifted to the university to explain why the applicant was treated differently when their documents were marked as “approved.” The applicant also relies on Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 to say they were discriminated against when they were denied access to the bursary because their disability was temporary. Finally, they submit they were discriminated against based on the intersecting grounds of race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, gender expression, sexual orientation, and age.

[19] In my view, the Tribunal reasonably applied the test for discrimination. It stated the denial of a benefit that does not apply to the applicant does not constitute prima facie discrimination. The applicant’s challenge in their case before the Tribunal was narrow. They were not and could not have been challenging the benefits scheme as a whole since the university was the administrator but not the funder of the bursary. Their challenge was only to the denial of the funding for the powerchair. As set out above, the Tribunal reasonably found it could not review whether the manual applied to powerchair funding. There is also no basis to interfere with the Tribunal’s conclusion that the university staff’s initial error in stating the BSWD only applied to permanent disabilities did not constitute discrimination.

[20] This case is distinguishable from Pieters. In Pieters, a Black lawyer was asked for identification in a lawyers’ lounge. A prima facie case of discrimination was made out because there was sufficient evidence of discrimination that the respondent was called upon to explain their actions. In this case, the Tribunal reasonably found that no prima facie case of discrimination was established because the explanation for denying funding was clear on its face: according to the university, funding for a powerchair was not covered by the bursary as set out in the manual.

[21] Similarly, in Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, prima facie discrimination was established in very different circumstances. The Supreme Court upheld the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal’s conclusion that a school board discriminated against a student with severe dyslexia because it failed to meet his educational needs. The discrimination was caused in part by the school board failing to provide sufficient remediation and the closing of a local diagnostic centre. The case did not relate to the administration of a benefits scheme. That application was brought against the province and the school board, who were responsible for funding and providing education to elementary school students, not against the administrator of a benefits plan. As the Tribunal stated in this case, at para. 33: “Administrators of benefit programs routinely deny benefits to claimants or request more information. These actions are not, in and of themselves, discriminatory. The applicant must adduce evidence that the respondent’s actions were linked to her Code grounds. Her subjective belief that discrimination occurred, in the absence of any supporting evidence, is not sufficient”.

[22] Finally, although the applicant referred to potential intersectional grounds of discrimination, they did not identify any factual basis linking the denial of the bursary to those grounds. The Tribunal reasonably rejected these allegations, stating that the applicant had made a bare assertion, but presented no evidence showing their protected grounds under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O, 1990, c. H. 19 were a factor in the university’s actions. I find this analysis to be reasonable.

[23] In sum, the Tribunal reasonably applied the established test for discrimination to the circumstance of this case. There is no basis for the court to interfere in its analysis or conclusion.

Final Issue – Damages

[24] The final issue I address is the applicant’s claim related to suffering damages because of not receiving the bursary. I understand the applicant experienced a loss because of not being reimbursed for the powerchair. They also felt the experience in dealing with the university was personally harmful. These are issues the Tribunal and court would consider if discrimination were made out. Since the Tribunal reasonably found the applicant did not suffer discrimination, it was not required to consider the issue of damages in this case.

Disposition

[25] I would dismiss the application and order the applicant to pay costs to the university in the requested amount of $1500 all-inclusive.

O’Brien, J.

I agree

Brownstone, J.

I agree

Kaufman, J.

Released: May 14, 2026