HRTO 2010

The complainant requested a reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights complaint against the school board and an individual respondent.

The complainant argued that the decision was contrary to relevant law and disagreed with the outcome.

The Tribunal applied its Rules of Practice and found no new determinative facts, no conflict with established jurisprudence, and no other factors outweighing the public interest in the finality of decisions.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed for abuse of process and that the applicant be declared a vexatious litigant.

The applicant had filed numerous applications under two different names and repeatedly used highly inappropriate, disrespectful, and abusive language toward the respondents, their counsel, and the Tribunal, despite signing an undertaking not to do so.

The Tribunal found that allowing the application to continue would be an abuse of process.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was declared a vexatious litigant, requiring him to obtain leave before filing any future applications.

The applicant sought to add a director of the corporate respondent as a personal respondent after the corporation went into receivership.

The Tribunal applied the three-part test from Smyth and found no allegations that the proposed respondent interacted with the applicant or had knowledge of the alleged discrimination.

The Tribunal denied the request to add the director and granted the request to remove the corporate respondent.

The respondent requested the deferral of a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, arguing that the applicant had filed grievances based on the same facts and issues.

The respondent also requested reconsideration of an earlier interim decision granting the union's request to intervene.

The Tribunal declined to reconsider the earlier decision, finding no basis to interfere.

The Tribunal granted the request to defer the application, noting its general practice of deferring applications where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and issues.

The applicant filed a human rights application on behalf of her partner, alleging discrimination on the basis of place of origin and ethnic origin by two trial judges, a Crown attorney, and the Canadian Embassy in Paris following his convictions for impaired driving.

The Tribunal dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The claims against the judges and the Crown attorney were barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity, respectively.

The claim against the Canadian Embassy was dismissed as it falls under federal jurisdiction.

The applicant filed two human rights applications against her former employer and supervisors, alleging discrimination based on disability (allergies) and reprisal.

The corporate respondent requested that the two applications be merged for mediation, to which the applicant consented.

The Tribunal ordered that the applications be scheduled for mediation together due to their overlapping allegations.

However, the Tribunal also ordered the respondents in the second application to file a Response within 15 days, as the second application contained more detailed allegations, named a different individual respondent, and raised a new ground of reprisal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by hospital security guards.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed or deferred because the applicant had also commenced a civil action based on the same facts.

The Tribunal found that the civil action sought damages for the same alleged Code infringements, even though the Code was not explicitly pleaded.

Consequently, the application was barred by section 34(11) of the Code and dismissed.

The respondent requested that the human rights application alleging disability discrimination in employment be deferred pending the completion of a grievance arbitration concerning the applicant's termination.

The Tribunal found that the grievance and the application shared central facts and issues, and that proceeding concurrently would be inefficient and risk inconsistent findings.

The application was deferred.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, sex, and sexual orientation, as well as reprisal, in the context of her employment.

The respondents argued the application was untimely.

After the applicant twice failed to provide written submissions on the issues of deferral and timeliness as directed by the Tribunal, and failed to communicate with the Tribunal for several months, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant, an occasional teacher, filed a second human rights application alleging age discrimination and reprisal in two 2009 job competitions.

She requested that this new application be consolidated or heard together with her earlier 2008 application, which alleged similar discrimination in previous hiring processes.

The Tribunal granted the request to hear the applications together, finding common issues of fact and law regarding an alleged pattern of discrimination, and adjourned the scheduled hearing dates to allow the respondent time to prepare.

The Tribunal also ordered the production of requested documents and granted the respondent a partial extension of time to file its response.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment and inadequate union representation.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal considered requests to add the applicant's former employer as a respondent, to remove an individual union representative as a personal respondent, and for further particulars.

Applying the Smyth factors, the Tribunal granted the request to add the employer, finding sufficient allegations to support a potential Code violation.

Applying the Sigrist and Carson test, the Tribunal removed the individual union representative, finding no compelling reason to name him personally.

The request for particulars was denied.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and disability after her employment was terminated while she was on maternity leave.

The respondents requested early dismissal on the basis that the applicant had signed a full and final release.

The applicant argued the release was signed under economic duress and that she did not understand it.

The Tribunal found that the applicant voluntarily signed the release and was not subjected to illegitimate pressure or coercion.

The Tribunal dismissed the portion of the application relating to events prior to the signing of the release as an abuse of process.

However, the Tribunal allowed the application to proceed regarding allegations of a negative employment reference that occurred after the release was signed, holding that an agreement to waive future human rights protections is void as contrary to public policy.

The applicant, who uses a motorized wheelchair, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the frequency of accessible bus service provided by the respondent municipality.

When the respondent increased overall bus service frequency to 20 minutes, it did not have enough low floor buses to provide 20-minute accessible service, resulting in accessible service remaining at 40-minute intervals.

The Tribunal found prima facie discrimination but concluded the respondent had accommodated the applicant to the point of undue hardship.

The Tribunal considered the respondent's ongoing fleet replacement program, the cost and delay in acquiring new low floor buses, and the availability of alternative transit services, ultimately dismissing the application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment more than one year after his termination.

A Notice of Intent to Dismiss was issued, but the applicant failed to provide submissions explaining the delay.

The applicant claimed he thought he had waived his rights by signing a document upon termination.

The Tribunal held that ignorance of one's rights does not amount to good faith delay unless the applicant establishes they had no reason to make inquiries.

The application was dismissed as out of time.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by counsel for the respondent during a previous Tribunal hearing.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) on the basis that the relationship between a lawyer and an opposing party is not covered by the Human Rights Code.

After considering the applicant's written submissions, the Tribunal concluded it was plain and obvious that the application fell outside its jurisdiction, as opposing counsel was acting in an adversarial role and not providing a service to the applicant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application while a related union grievance proceeding was ongoing.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer, noting that an arbitration hearing was imminent and would deal with the same allegations.

Following its general practice, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the resolution of the grievance process.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code but failed to attend the scheduled mediation.

After the applicant contacted the Tribunal claiming a scheduling mix-up, the Tribunal directed her to advise of her intentions and take steps to reschedule, warning that failure to respond within ten days would result in the application being deemed abandoned.

The applicant did not respond.

The Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability after his employment was terminated following a refusal to return to modified work duties.

The application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The applicant argued the delay was due to waiting for his union to decide whether to refer his grievance to arbitration.

The Tribunal found that waiting for other legal proceedings to conclude does not constitute a valid explanation for delay and dismissed the application as untimely under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal noted that a related matter was proceeding before the Tribunal by way of a Transition Application.

The Tribunal invited submissions on whether the current application should be held in abeyance.

The respondents requested abeyance due to overlapping facts and issues, and the applicant did not object.

The Tribunal ordered the application held in abeyance until the conclusion of the Transition proceeding.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed or deferred because the applicant had an ongoing appeal with the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) regarding a claim for psycho-traumatic disability benefits arising from the same events.

The Tribunal found a significant factual overlap between the two proceedings and deferred the human rights application pending the conclusion of the WSIB appeal to prevent inconsistent findings.