Anita Balakrishna

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the human rights application because the applicant had filed a concurrent Employment Standards complaint with the Ministry of Labour.

The applicant opposed deferral, arguing the ESA complaint dealt with wage issues and working conditions, while the human rights application alleged discrimination and harassment.

The Tribunal found that the issues were separate with little potential for conflicting findings of fact or law, and directed that the application continue in the Tribunal's process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment and accommodation.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application pending the conclusion of the applicant's related Employment Standards Act claim, which was before the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB).

Finding a significant overlap of facts and issues regarding the termination of employment, and noting the OLRB proceeding was at a more advanced stage, the Tribunal deferred the application to avoid inconsistent findings.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in housing based on colour by a fire inspector.

The application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The applicant argued the delay was incurred in good faith because he was unaware of the human rights system in Ontario due to language and cultural barriers.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was capable of making serious inquiries into his rights and did not act with due diligence.

The application was dismissed for delay.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in housing based on colour, specifically regarding the conduct of a Fire Marshall inspector during an investigation.

The Tribunal previously questioned its jurisdiction, noting the application appeared to challenge a court proceeding.

The applicant clarified the complaint related to the inspector's conduct during the 2008 investigation, not his later court testimony.

This clarification raised a new jurisdictional issue regarding the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal directed the applicant to provide written submissions explaining why the delay in filing the application was incurred in good faith.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and disability after her employment was terminated while she was on maternity leave.

The respondents requested early dismissal on the basis that the applicant had signed a full and final release.

The applicant argued the release was signed under economic duress and that she did not understand it.

The Tribunal found that the applicant voluntarily signed the release and was not subjected to illegitimate pressure or coercion.

The Tribunal dismissed the portion of the application relating to events prior to the signing of the release as an abuse of process.

However, the Tribunal allowed the application to proceed regarding allegations of a negative employment reference that occurred after the release was signed, holding that an agreement to waive future human rights protections is void as contrary to public policy.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of sex, family status, and marital status when she was not rehired after her pregnancy leave, during which the vendor sold the business to the purchaser.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal granted the applicant's request to amend the Application and to add the purchaser as a respondent.

The Tribunal denied the request to add the vendor's principal as a personal respondent, finding no compelling reason to do so.

The Tribunal also ordered the production of certain documents, including a limited portion of the applicant's medical records, and removed the purchaser's principal as a personal respondent.

The complainant, a child with autism, brought a motion before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario seeking interim injunctive relief to reinstate funding for his intensive behavioural intervention therapy.

Concurrently, the complainant and others obtained an interim interim mandatory order from the Superior Court of Justice reinstating the same funding pending an interlocutory injunction hearing.

The Tribunal found that the relief sought was identical to that granted by the Court.

Applying the doctrine of mootness, the Tribunal dismissed the motion, concluding that the factual underpinning for the urgency and irreparable harm no longer existed, and declined to decide the abstract question of its jurisdiction to grant such relief.