Herman J.

The applicant, a postgraduate medical resident in Cardiac Surgery, sought judicial review of a university Senate Appeals Committee decision requiring her to enter a six-month remediation period before advancing to the next year of her program.

She argued the decision was unreasonable and that she was denied procedural fairness due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, an inability to cross-examine witnesses, and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the academic decision was reasonable and that the requirements of procedural fairness were met, noting courts should only interfere in university academic affairs in cases of manifest unfairness.

The appellant, a motor vehicle salesperson, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Registrar to revoke his registration.

The revocation followed the appellant's criminal conviction for counselling a customer to commit arson to destroy a leased vehicle.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal's decision was fully supported by the evidence.

The court held that a single isolated mistake involving a serious industry-related criminal offence could reasonably support the belief that the appellant would not carry on business with honesty and integrity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Nurses Association brought a motion to review and set aside a decision of Molloy J., which struck out an affidavit containing correspondence between an arbitration chair and the employer's nominee.

The underlying judicial review application by the Board of Health alleged a denial of natural justice because the arbitration board did not discuss the evidence before the chair issued a proposed decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with Molloy J. that the correspondence was unnecessary to introduce as evidence because the facts it sought to establish were already addressed in the chair's reasons and were not disputed.

The moving parties brought a motion to vary or set aside a decision of Swinton J., which had dismissed their motion to extend the time to perfect an appeal.

Swinton J. had dismissed the motion on the basis of res judicata, as Jennings J. had previously dismissed a motion seeking the same relief.

The Divisional Court agreed with Swinton J. that she was bound by the decision of Jennings J., and that the proper recourse was to appeal or move to vary the decision of Jennings J., rather than bringing another motion before a different judge.

The motion was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.