Gurdeep S. Nanua

The applicant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent insurer limited the applicant to the $3,500 Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) funding limit.

The Tribunal found that the applicant suffered accident-related psychological injuries, including depression and anxiety, which removed him from the MIG.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay for a psychological assessment and a psychological treatment plan, plus interest on the incurred assessment, but denied the remaining disputed treatment plans as the applicant failed to prove they were reasonable and necessary.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision which found that the applicant mail carrier was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant was struck by a cyclist on a sidewalk while standing near her parked delivery vehicle.

The respondent argued the Tribunal made errors of fact regarding whether the applicant struck the vehicle and her location, and an error of law regarding whether a cyclist on a sidewalk was an intervening act.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the request, finding no significant errors of law or fact that would have changed the outcome of the original decision.

The applicant, a letter carrier, was struck in the head by a cyclist while standing on the sidewalk retrieving mail from her parked work vehicle.

She applied for statutory accident benefits, which the insurer denied on the basis that the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under section 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's body made contact with the vehicle after being struck by the cyclist.

Applying the Amos and Greenhalgh tests, the Tribunal concluded that the purpose test was met as the applicant was engaged in an ordinary activity attached to a vehicle.

The causation test was also met because the use and operation of the vehicle was a direct cause of the injuries, and the cyclist was not an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Tribunal ordered that the incident was an accident.

In a motor vehicle action involving catastrophic injuries and an alleged unidentified motorist, the defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment arguing there was no evidence of a second vehicle’s involvement.

At a case conference, the parties agreed that competing expert evidence would require viva voce testimony to determine whether a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The court held that summary judgment under Rule 20 is not equivalent to bifurcation under Rule 6.1 and may proceed even where a jury notice has been served.

Applying the proportionality principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court exercised case management authority to direct that the summary judgment motion proceed with limited oral evidence and structured time limits.

Detailed procedural directions were issued to ensure an efficient and proportionate determination of the discrete liability issue.