Edward S.E. Kim

The appellant was injured as a passenger in a vehicle owned by his spouse and driven by an uninsured driver without the spouse's consent.

The vehicle was insured by Jevco.

The appellant claimed coverage under uninsured automobile coverage, but Jevco denied the claim on the basis that the vehicle was not an "uninsured automobile" because it was owned by the insured's spouse.

The motion judge agreed with Jevco and dismissed the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statutory and contractual definitions of "uninsured automobile" unambiguously exclude vehicles owned by the insured or their spouse, regardless of whether the vehicle was taken without consent.

The appellant insurer appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion regarding uninsured automobile coverage.

The respondent argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory, not final.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that unless a motion judge explicitly invokes Rule 20.04(4) to make a binding determination of law, an order dismissing summary judgment is presumed interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

The plaintiff was injured while a passenger in his spouse's vehicle, which was allegedly taken without consent by the uninsured driver.

The insurer argued that coverage was precluded because the vehicle was owned by the plaintiff's spouse.

The court found the statutory and contractual definitions of 'uninsured automobile' to be ambiguous in these circumstances.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation, the court construed the ambiguity against the insurer and dismissed the motion for summary judgment.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order arising from a pleadings motion in a civil action.

The Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory, and emphasized that the motion judge had only determined that the pleadings survived the plain and obvious test.

The court noted that nothing in the motion judge's reasons was determinative of issues to be decided at trial.

The appeal was quashed, with agreed costs fixed at $5,000 payable in the cause.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their slip and fall action following a jury verdict finding no liability against the respondents.

The day after the jury was discharged, all six jurors returned to the courthouse, with one stating they were there to 'count the money', suggesting they misunderstood the effect of their verdict.

The trial judge dismissed a motion to inquire into the jury's return.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial judge has no jurisdiction to inquire into a jury's verdict post-discharge unless it involves a mere error in recording or transmitting the verdict.

Because the jury's written answers were clear and any error would involve a misunderstanding requiring further deliberations, the trial judge was functus officio.

The appellants were injured when an elevator in the respondents' building malfunctioned and dropped several floors.

At trial, a jury found against the appellants on liability, accepting the defence theory that the malfunction was likely caused by the occupants' misbehaviour.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the review of evidence, adverse inferences for an uncalled witness, and the burden of proof, as well as in an evidentiary ruling restricting their expert's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge or the evidentiary ruling.

The appellant hired the 13-year-old respondent to perform chores at his cottage.

The respondent negligently started a fire while trying to refuel a lawn mower, causing $285,000 in damage.

The appellant's insurer brought a subrogated claim against the respondent in tort and contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an employee is generally not liable to indemnify an employer for ordinary negligence.

Applying the Anns test, the court found that while the harm was foreseeable, the parties' relationship lacked sufficient proximity to make liability just and fair, and residual policy considerations weighed against imposing a duty of care.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The Court noted that the appellants offered no explanation for their lengthy delay in moving to set aside the default judgment, which alone was sufficient to dispose of the appeal.