Duncan J.

The defendant, Trevell Rumbaki, was charged with several firearm offences after an encounter with police officers who targeted him without grounds.

The defendant fled when ordered to return to his vehicle, discarding a loaded handgun in a compost bin during the pursuit.

A subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle led to the discovery of a second loaded handgun.

The court found that the police conduct constituted an arbitrary detention and an unlawful search, violating the defendant's Charter rights.

Applying the framework from R. v. Le, the court excluded both firearms under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant brought an application to stay proceedings on two counts of fraud over on the grounds of abuse of process and issue estoppel.

The Crown sought to proceed on two surviving counts from an eight-count information after the court had stayed a consolidated single-count information on section 11(b) Charter grounds (trial within a reasonable time).

The court rejected both the issue estoppel argument and the abuse of process argument, finding no prejudice to the accused's fair trial rights and no conduct offensive to societal notions of fair play.

The application to stay was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to stay proceedings on a charge of defrauding the public (offence dates 2013-2018), alleging a violation of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The Crown and defence disagreed on the calculation of net delay.

The court determined that the net delay was 19 months 28 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months.

The Crown presented no exceptional circumstances to justify the extension.

The court granted the stay of proceedings on the consolidated count and addressed the status of remaining multi-count informations.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a traffic stop on November 14, 2015.

The defence raised two Charter violations: (1) that the police stop was racially motivated and unlawful under section 9, and (2) that the defendant was denied his right to counsel under section 10 by being denied access to his cell phone to contact a lawyer of choice.

This was the second trial following reversal of an acquittal on summary conviction appeal.

The court found no racial profiling but upheld the section 10 Charter violation regarding denial of access to counsel of choice.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the charge was dismissed.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following the defendant's guilty pleas to robbery and failure to comply with probation.

The defendant, who represented himself despite the court's urging that he retain counsel, presented a self-defeating defence and repeatedly stated his agreement with the Crown's position.

The court found that the defendant's pattern of repetitive robberies, escalating violence, substance abuse, and personality disorders established the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, while noting the defendant's tragic background and the possibility of eventual parole if he demonstrates genuine rehabilitation.

An appeal from a Justice of the Peace's order for destruction of a dog under the Dog Owner's Liability Act.

The appellant owned a dog that had previously attacked persons and animals, resulting in a control order.

The dog subsequently escaped and was found wandering loose in breach of that order.

The trial court convicted the owner under section 4(1)(b) of the Act (dog behaving in a manner that poses a menace) and ordered destruction.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial court erred in law by relying solely on the breach of the prior order to establish the menace allegation, without requiring proof of additional menacing behaviour on the date in question.

The court held that destruction is not available as a penalty for breach of a prior order under the Act, and that the statutory scheme carefully distinguishes between breaches of orders and original menacing behaviour.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood (exceed 80) for an offence occurring on November 25, 2017.

This was a transitional case, as the offence predated the December 18, 2018 amendments to drinking and driving laws, but the trial occurred after those amendments came into force.

The defence raised two arguments: (1) the Shaikh point, contending that the new legislation failed to provide for the continuing applicability of the presumption of identity in transitional cases, requiring expert toxicologist evidence to link blood alcohol test results to the time of driving; and (2) the Flores-Vigil point, challenging whether the Crown had adequately proven the calibration check requirements under the new presumption of accuracy.

The court rejected both arguments and found the defendant guilty as charged.

The appellants, an employer and a supervisor, appealed their convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after a worker was seriously injured by a wood splinter ejected from an industrial saw.

The trial judge had convicted them, finding they failed to exercise due diligence because there was 'no evidence' of a system to regularly check and clean the saw's anti-kickback fingers.

The appeal court found this conclusion was unreasonable as it contradicted the uncontradicted and unrejected testimony of a worker who detailed his daily cleaning and maintenance routine.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered for both appellants.

The accused, an NFL player, was charged with failing to provide a breath sample for roadside testing.

He argued that his right to counsel was breached because the testing did not proceed 'forthwith' given his unique ability to quickly access legal advice via cell phone.

The court rejected this argument, holding that constitutional rights do not vary based on a detainee's wealth or connections.

However, on the substantive charge, the accused testified he tried but was unable to provide a sample.

The court held that the Crown must prove the failure was intentional beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finding the accused credible and noting his modest alcohol consumption, the court had a reasonable doubt about his intent and dismissed the charge.