Diamond

The applicant, Covanta, brought an application to set aside an arbitrator's decision to join two subcontractors to an ongoing arbitration between Covanta and the general contractor.

The arbitrator had joined the subcontractors under Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Covanta argued the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction because the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the arbitrator's decision was jurisdictional in nature and subject to review on a standard of correctness.

The Court found that the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement, as the subcontract did not properly incorporate the arbitration clause by reference.

The Court set aside the arbitrator's ruling and awarded costs of $50,000 to the applicant.

The self-represented plaintiff failed to comply with a court order to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim by the specified deadline.

The defendants subsequently sought to schedule a motion to strike the pleadings.

The case management judge scheduled an in-person case conference to address the breach.

The plaintiff requested an adjournment due to a newly discovered scheduling conflict in Small Claims Court.

The court denied the adjournment, ordering the case conference to proceed as scheduled and noting that the Superior Court proceedings should take priority.

The applicant condominium corporation sought a compliance order against a unit owner who carried out extensive, unauthorized renovations that altered the common elements.

The respondent argued the application was barred because the applicant failed to mediate or arbitrate the dispute first.

The court held that mediation is not required for disputes regarding initial compliance with section 98 of the Condominium Act.

The court granted the compliance order, allowing the applicant to inspect the unit and restore the common elements, but found insufficient evidence to order a full repair of the unit under section 92.

The statutory third party, Economical Mutual Insurance Company, brought a motion for leave to serve and file a jury notice after the close of pleadings.

The parties had previously entered into a consent judgment settling the plaintiffs' damages and agreeing that the remaining insurance coverage issues would be tried by a judge.

The court found that the third party's motion was a tactical attempt to avoid the consequences of the consent judgment and have the issue of the defendant's intent tried by a jury.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that granting leave would rewrite the terms of the consent judgment and cause substantive prejudice to the responding insurer.

The defendants brought an urgent motion to set aside a default judgment and writ of possession obtained by the plaintiffs after the defendants defaulted on their mortgage.

The court applied the five-part test for setting aside a default judgment.

While the defendants had a plausible excuse for their delay, the court found they had no arguable defence on the merits, as the interest calculations were standard and the three-month interest penalty was valid.

The motion was dismissed, though the default judgment was varied on consent to remove $1,875 in administrative fees.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.

The plaintiff sued her employer, CIBC, and the plan administrator, Great-West Life, for long-term disability benefits, funding for treatment plans, and damages for mental distress and punitive damages.

CIBC brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it.

The court found that CIBC did not breach its duty of good faith in refusing to fund the proposed treatment plans, as its decision was based on proper principles and supported by medical opinions.

The court also found no bad faith in CIBC withholding one month of benefits due to the plaintiff's failure to provide advance notice of out-of-province travel.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against CIBC were dismissed.

Following a previous endorsement, the parties participated in a case conference to schedule the trial of an issue regarding whether they engaged in a course of conduct to vary the terms of a subcontract for extra work.

The court ordered the parties to file a Joint Supplementary Brief of Evidence by April 11, 2016.

A full-day hearing was scheduled for May 11, 2016, in the event cross-examinations and further legal argument are necessary.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) from her insurer until they were terminated in 2003.

She commenced an action against the insurer for other benefits in 2005, but did not claim IRBs.

In 2007, she commenced a new action against the insurer for IRBs and against her former lawyer for negligence.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the IRB claim as statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the insurer's 2003 notice of termination was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period, which had long expired.

The plaintiff, acting as receiver for a masonry subcontractor, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant general contractor for $100,701.83 in unpaid invoices and holdbacks.

The defendant argued the extra work was unauthorized and claimed set-offs for back charges and alleged deficiencies (efflorescence).

The court dismissed the set-off defences, finding no evidence of required prior notice for the back charges and no evidence that the remedial work for the efflorescence was necessary.

However, the court ordered a mini-trial to determine whether the parties' course of conduct varied the strict contractual requirement for written authorization of extra work.

The parties appeared at a case conference to settle a draft Order arising from previous Reasons for Decision.

The plaintiff advised the court of its intention to discontinue the proceeding and make a voluntary assignment into bankruptcy.

The draft Order, including costs, was settled and signed by the court.

Intact Insurance Company appealed an arbitrator's decision in a priority dispute over statutory accident benefits.

The claimant was injured in a vehicle driven by his father, whose insurance policy with Intact had been cancelled for non-payment prior to the accident.

The father was subsequently convicted of operating a motor vehicle without insurance.

The arbitrator ruled that Federated Insurance Company could relitigate the father's uninsured status, finding the abuse of process doctrine did not apply.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice overturned the arbitrator's decision, holding that under s. 22.1 of the Evidence Act, the conviction was proof of the offence absent evidence to the contrary, which Federated failed to provide.

The court found the arbitrator erred in law by misapplying the abuse of process doctrine and its exceptions.

The plaintiff's former lawyers brought a motion for leave to appeal a Master's order requiring them to personally pay costs thrown away and motion costs.

The costs were awarded after a law clerk inadvertently failed to book an examination for discovery.

The Superior Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the Master failed to apply the second step of the Galganov test, which requires extreme caution before ordering costs against a lawyer personally for an innocent error.

The defendants requested an adjournment of an upcoming trial after their previous counsel was removed from the record for non-payment of a retainer.

One defendant also sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) to bring a summary judgment motion based on a limitation period defence.

The court dismissed the request for leave, noting the limitation defence had been pleaded from the outset and the matter was already set for trial.

The court also dismissed the adjournment request, drawing an adverse inference from the defendants' failure to file evidence of prejudice, and ordered the trial to proceed as scheduled.

The defendant Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff, who was previously acquitted of fraud charges, sued for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches.

The court found the claim was replete with unnecessary assumptions and failed to plead material facts supporting the absence of reasonable and probable cause and the presence of malice.

The motion to strike was granted, but the plaintiff was given 90 days leave to amend the claim.

The plaintiff landlord brought a motion for summary judgment against a commercial tenant and its indemnifiers for damages arising from a breached lease.

The tenant failed to complete fixturing or pay rent, prompting the landlord to terminate the lease.

One indemnifier opposed the motion, arguing lack of consideration, defective notice, non est factum, and lack of independent legal advice.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found no genuine issues requiring a trial, holding that the indemnifier received consideration and the landlord's notice of termination properly preserved its right to claim future damages.

Partial summary judgment was granted for arrears and future losses up to a specified date, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

At a case conference, the court noted that the self-represented plaintiff had commenced three separate actions with overlapping defendants and identical material facts, potentially constituting an abuse of process.

To avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, the court ordered the plaintiff to deliver a single Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim consolidating all allegations and defendants into one pleading, and set a timetable for the defendants to respond or bring motions to strike.

Following a consent order terminating a residential lease and enforcing compliance with condominium rules regarding smoking, the court determined the costs of the application.

The condominium corporation sought costs against both the unit owner and the tenants.

The court found that the unit owner had taken all reasonable steps to ensure tenant compliance under s. 119(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998, and ordered no costs between the corporation and the owner.

The tenants, who caused the smoking complaints, were ordered to pay $10,000 in partial indemnity costs to both the condominium corporation and the unit owner.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order that stayed his action pending the payment of several outstanding costs orders.

The plaintiff argued the Master lacked jurisdiction to vary a previous order to include additional costs awards reinstated by the Divisional Court.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master had jurisdiction under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 59.06(1) to vary the order based on the changed factual landscape.

The court also reprimanded the self-represented plaintiff for making unauthorized audio recordings of the proceedings in violation of section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant son sought a declaration of beneficial ownership in his mother's residential property based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, claiming he made financial and physical contributions to the property over decades.

The court found significant credibility issues with all parties.

The court held that the son did not establish the elements of proprietary estoppel, as his evidence regarding his expectation of an interest in the property was inconsistent and any alleged promise was for an inheritance, not a present interest.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding that the son did not confer a net benefit on his mother, as the value of his rent-free accommodation far exceeded any financial contributions he made.

The application was dismissed with no costs awarded due to the unreasonable conduct of all parties.