Diamond

The applicants and respondents are neighbours sharing a mutual driveway subject to registered rights of way.

The applicants brought an application seeking a declaration that their right of way included the right to park their vehicle on the mutual driveway.

The respondents brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that the right of way was limited to ingress and egress, and an order for the removal of obstructions.

The court held that the applicants' right of way did not include an ancillary right to park, as doing so would substantially interfere with the respondents' right of way.

Both parties were ordered to remove any obstructions preventing vehicles from driving down the mutual driveway.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully resisting the defendants' motions to strike and for summary judgment.

The court awarded the plaintiff $7,500 in costs for the motion to strike.

However, the court denied the plaintiff costs for the summary judgment motion because the plaintiff's principal sent an improper email threatening the defendants with criminal charges to extort a settlement.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, which was commenced nearly 16 years after the allegedly negligent jaw surgery.

The plaintiffs argued the 15-year ultimate limitation period should be tolled under section 15(4) of the Limitations Act, 2002, claiming the mother lacked capacity to commence a proceeding and that the defendants wilfully concealed medical records.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide persuasive medical or psychological evidence of incapacity and failed to establish any wilful concealment by the defendants.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

In a bifurcated family law trial, the court determined the issue of decision-making responsibility for the parties' two children.

The applicant father sought sole decision-making authority, while the respondent mother sought split decision-making authority.

The court found the parents to be highly conflicted, with the mother exhibiting medical hypervigilance and the father showing aloofness regarding educational needs.

Applying the newly amended Children's Law Reform Act factors, the court concluded that a split order was unworkable and awarded final decision-making responsibility to the applicant father, subject to a structured consultation process.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim to add unnamed directors and officers of the corporate defendant, alleging negligence in a workplace harassment investigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed defendants were not identified, there is no tort of negligent investigation against employers in Ontario, and the plaintiff failed to plead material facts showing the directors and officers exhibited a separate identity of interest from the corporation.

The applicants sought to enforce two letters rogatory issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to compel documentary and oral evidence from the respondent, a non-party in the underlying U.S. patent infringement litigation.

The respondent opposed, arguing the requests were overly broad, moot due to discovery deadlines, and contrary to public policy as they sought proprietary source codes.

The court granted the applications, enforcing the letters rogatory but narrowing their scope and imposing protective conditions, including compliance with a supplemental protective order and the deemed undertaking rule.

Following a trial and the release of Reasons for Decision, the parties were unable to agree on the final equalization payment based on the court's findings.

The court reviewed the parties' respective Net Family Property statements and submissions.

Finding the applicant's calculations more in line with the Reasons, with some adjustments, the court ordered the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $59,929.86.

As success at trial was divided, no costs were awarded.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 31.11(6) to read in the discovery transcripts of its deceased corporate representative.

In response, the plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking production of communications between the deceased representative, the defendant, and its lawyers, as well as documents relating to a consulting agreement between the representative and the defendant.

The court dismissed the request for general communications, finding it was too late to seek discovery documents and that the communications were privileged.

However, the court ordered the production of documents relating to the formation of the consulting agreement, as they were relevant to the credibility of the deceased witness's evidence for the pending Rule 31.11(6) motion.

The applicant law firm brought a motion seeking directions to assess all legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm, including those rendered to predecessor counsel between 2012 and 2018.

The respondent argued that only its final account rendered to the applicant was subject to assessment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that under the Solicitors Act, the applicant lacked standing to assess the prior accounts as it was neither a client, a party chargeable, nor a party who had paid those accounts.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the vehicle he was in was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant.

The main action settled for $220,000.

The defendant brought a third party claim against another driver, alleging that the third party's road rage and threatening behaviour caused the defendant to flee the scene and strike the plaintiff's vehicle.

The court found that the third party's conduct materially contributed to the accident and apportioned liability 50/50 between the defendant and the third party, ordering the third party to pay $110,000.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action, arguing that delays in jury trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic would prejudice the plaintiff's loss of income claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to discharge their onus to show that justice would be better served by discharging the jury.

The court noted that the delay was partly due to the parties' own pre-trial timelines and that jury trials might resume in the near future.

The plaintiff purchased a commercial property from the defendants.

After closing, the plaintiff discovered that the version of a commercial lease provided by the defendants prior to closing was allegedly incorrect, and that the true lease obligated the landlord, rather than the tenant, to repair the roof.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for misrepresentation and breach of contract, arguing the plaintiff had already negotiated a price abatement for the roof and did not rely on the lease.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the plaintiff lost the opportunity to seek contribution from the tenant based on the incorrect lease provided.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages after the defendant failed to close on an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The property was originally sold for $1,450,000 but, following the breach, was resold for $1,120,000.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages by including an 'as is' clause in the second listing.

The court rejected the defendant's expert evidence regarding the property's value and found the plaintiffs acted reasonably in mitigating their damages.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs for $250,442.08, representing the difference in sale price plus carrying costs and legal fees.

The parties, both self-represented, proceeded to trial on issues of date of separation, equalization of net family property, unjust enrichment, and spousal support.

The court found the date of separation to be January 31, 2015, as argued by the applicant.

The court dismissed the applicant's claims for unjust enrichment and an unequal division of net family property, finding no binding agreement regarding in-kind contributions and that the threshold for unconscionability was not met.

The court made specific findings on various disputed assets and debts for equalization purposes.

Both parties' claims for spousal support were dismissed.

The plaintiff pharmaceutical manufacturer sued the corporate defendants and their sole director, a pharmacist, alleging unauthorized 'vial-splitting' of a specialty ophthalmic drug.

The individual defendant moved to strike the claims against him personally, arguing they duplicated the claims against the corporate defendants.

The court struck the intentional tort claims but allowed the negligence and unjust enrichment claims to proceed, finding it possible the individual acted in his personal capacity as a pharmacist.

The plaintiff also successfully moved to strike a paragraph in the statement of defence that referenced the contents of its complaint to the Ontario College of Pharmacists, as such contents are inadmissible under section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision permitting the respondent mother to relocate with their child to Mongolia.

The trial judge had found that the mother's improved life in Mongolia would benefit the child.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by focusing almost exclusively on the mother's reasons for moving, without sufficient admissible evidence demonstrating how the relocation would be in the child's best interests.

The appeal was allowed, the relocation order was set aside, and the mother's cross-appeal regarding access was dismissed as moot.

The applicant father sought to relocate with the two children from Toronto to Lindsay, Ontario.

The respondent mother opposed the move and brought multiple motions to adjourn the bifurcated trial, citing unsupported medical issues.

The court dismissed the adjournment requests and proceeded with the trial.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz framework, the court found that the high-conflict environment was primarily driven by the mother and that the children desired the move.

The court concluded it was in the children's best interests to relocate to Lindsay with the father, and ordered a specified parenting schedule to ensure maximum contact with the mother.

The applicant brought a motion seeking the release of 50% of the net sale proceeds from a jointly owned property, with a portion to be paid to the respondent for child support arrears.

The respondent opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a mediation/arbitration clause in their prior agreement, and claiming damages for the applicant's alleged misconduct regarding the property sale.

The court found the respondent had waived the arbitration clause by actively participating in the litigation.

The court ordered the release of $604,500.00 to the applicant, less $19,200.00 for child support arrears, with the balance remaining in trust.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the parties' four children attend school for in-person learning and that parenting transitions take place at the school.

The respondent father, a medical doctor, opposed in-person learning due to COVID-19 risks and the children's alleged history of respiratory issues.

Applying the Zinati factors, the court found no compelling medical evidence that the children were at increased risk and concluded that the benefits of in-person learning, including structure and peer interaction, outweighed the risks.

The court ordered the children to attend school in-person and requested further submissions on the issue of parenting transitions.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside ten previous court orders, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because he was not properly served under the Hague Service Convention.

The applicant brought a cross-motion seeking to refuse the respondent an audience because he remained in continuous breach of those orders.

The court held that a litigant cannot ignore court orders and still demand an audience.

The court directed that the respondent must first bring a motion to stay the impugned orders; if successful, he may proceed with his jurisdiction motion, but if unsuccessful, he will be refused an audience until he complies.