David A. Hurren

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order granting joint custody of their three-year-old son in the form of a parallel parenting arrangement.

She argued that joint custody was inappropriate given the parties' inability to communicate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision reasonable and necessary to preserve the respondent father's relationship with his son, especially given findings that the mother overstated her fear and refused to cooperate.

Following dismissal of an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act as out of time, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The applicant argued the matter was public interest litigation and that no costs should be awarded.

The court held that applications under the Act do not attract a blanket public interest exception and that unsuccessful applicants may be ordered to pay costs.

Although the respondents sought substantial indemnity or significant partial indemnity costs, the court found the claimed hours excessive and declined to award enhanced costs.

Costs were fixed at a reduced all-inclusive amount reflecting reasonableness and access to justice considerations.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a fentanyl patch contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

She attended a detention centre to deliver forms to an inmate.

A fentanyl patch was discovered attached to one of her personal documents by a correctional officer during inspection.

The accused denied knowledge of the patch.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and found that while the Crown's evidence raised suspicions, it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of or was complicit in the smuggling.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a Fentanyl Patch contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused elected trial in the Ontario Court of Justice and pled not guilty.

The Crown sought to introduce an analyst's certificate regarding the substance found.

The defence argued that proper notice of the certificate had not been given to counsel because the documents were served on counsel's agent but never reached counsel personally.

The court ruled that service on counsel's authorized agent constitutes valid service on counsel, and the failure of the agent to deliver the documents to counsel does not invalidate the service.

The certificate was admitted into evidence.

In a motion arising from an application relating to municipal council conduct, the court addressed refusals made during examinations for discovery and whether the applicant must disclose the identity of individuals financing the litigation.

Respondent councillors had refused to answer questions about matters discussed during closed municipal council meetings under s. 239 of the Municipal Act.

The court held that in camera municipal meetings are not cloaked with confidentiality and that councillors may be required to disclose what transpired, subject only to solicitor-client privilege.

The court also ordered the applicant to disclose the identity of the person or persons who funded the legal retainer, rejecting claims that solicitor-client or litigation privilege protected the identity of the financiers.

The defendant was charged with driving while disqualified.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case-in-chief, the defence brought a motion for non-suit, arguing there was insufficient evidence that the defendant knew she was disqualified from driving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant's acknowledgment of the prohibition order, combined with the certificate of suspension and deemed knowledge provisions under the Highway Traffic Act, provided sufficient evidence of mens rea for a jury to consider.

The applicant, an economic development corporation, sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner finding it to be an 'institution' under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

The Commissioner ordered the applicant to respond to a freedom of information request.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's original decision, finding it was reasonable to interpret the relevant regulation as capturing the applicant, despite the repeal of the underlying statutory provision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and possessing cocaine.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

At trial, defence counsel conceded sufficient evidence of guilt but argued the evidence should be excluded under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that sections 8, 9, and 10(b) had been infringed.

The defence argued the approved screening device demand was not made "forthwith" and the test was not conducted "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter infringement occurred and, in any event, would not have excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The appellant, the Federal Trade Commission, appealed a judgment finding it was properly served with a notice of application under the State Immunity Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence capable of supporting the conclusion that the appellant was an 'agency of a foreign state' under section 2 of the Act.

Furthermore, even if service had been proper, the respondents obtained judgment before the mandatory sixty-day period under section 10 of the Act had expired.

The judgment was set aside.