Cromwell JJ.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which held that several provisions of the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act were ultra vires Parliament.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part.

A majority of the Court found that the provisions regulating controlled activities (such as clinical practice and research) exceeded Parliament's criminal law power and intruded into provincial jurisdiction over health and property and civil rights.

However, provisions prohibiting specific negative practices, such as the use of reproductive material without consent, were upheld as valid criminal law.

The debtor company commenced CCAA proceedings and obtained a stay.

It owed unremitted GST to the Crown.

The ETA creates a deemed trust for unremitted GST, but the CCAA nullifies statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown.

The chambers judge ordered the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account.

When reorganization failed, the debtor sought to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

The Crown sought immediate payment of the GST funds.

The Supreme Court held that the CCAA rule prevails, meaning the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor for GST claims during CCAA proceedings.

The Court also held that the chambers judge had the discretion to partially lift the stay to allow the assignment in bankruptcy, and that no express trust was created by segregating the funds.

The union filed a grievance against the Cégep's decision to withdraw employment priority from a teacher, alleging it constituted dismissal without good and sufficient cause under s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found she lacked jurisdiction to apply s. 124 as the collective agreement did not provide an equivalent remedial procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 124 is not implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, and where an agreement lacks adequate protection, the Commission des relations du travail has exclusive jurisdiction.