C. Rippell

The accused pleaded guilty to a serious, planned offence that involved travelling from Kitchener to Vaughan and posed a risk of serious harm to residents.

The accused had a significant criminal record including weapons offences.

Accepting a joint submission, the court sentenced the accused to 1.5 years in jail, consecutive to a sentence already being served, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on charges related to human trafficking.

The accused had booked hotel rooms used by co-accused to exploit a 16-year-old complainant.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the totality of the circumstantial evidence and failing to draw reasonable inferences favourable to the Crown regarding the accused's knowledge of the exploitation.

The application was granted, the discharge was set aside, and mandamus was issued directing committal for trial.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after CBSA officers found the drug in food cans in his luggage.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements to CBSA and RCMP officers as voluntary, while the accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged arbitrary detention, an unreasonable strip search, and sleep deprivation.

The court found the statements voluntary, noting that while keeping the accused awake was minor misconduct, it did not induce the statements.

The court also dismissed the Charter application, finding no detention during routine customs questioning and no unreasonableness in the brief strip search.

A mid-trial ruling also admitted a Certificate of Analyst.

On a severance motion in a multi-accused criminal prosecution involving conspiracy to traffic cocaine and firearms and possession offences, one accused sought to introduce a co‑accused’s police statement admitting ownership of seized cash or alternatively sought severance to compel the co‑accused’s testimony.

The statement had previously been excluded under s. 24(2) following a breach of the co‑accused’s s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The court held the statement was hearsay and its prejudicial effect—particularly the risk that a jury would improperly use it against the co‑accused—outweighed its probative value.

Applying the principles governing severance under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the framework in R. v. Savoury and R. v. Last, the court found there was a reasonable possibility the co‑accused would testify if trials were separated and that her evidence could materially assist the moving accused’s defence.

Balancing prejudice to the accused with efficiency concerns, the court ordered separate trials.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and firearms, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of other discreditable conduct.

The court considered whether count‑to‑count reasoning and comparator wiretap intercepts relating to unrelated drug transactions were admissible.

Applying the principles governing propensity and bad character evidence, the court held that certain evidence relating to drug trafficking could be used as contextual circumstantial evidence for possession of proceeds of crime and firearms, but not to infer guilt on unrelated firearm trafficking counts.

The court further ruled that comparator wiretap intercepts involving alleged drug dealings with third parties were inadmissible because their probative value was low and their prejudicial effect extremely high.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained during execution of a search warrant at a residence, arguing that police conducted an unlawful “no‑knock” dynamic entry contrary to common law principles and s. 8 of the Charter.

The issuing justice of the peace had declined to authorize a no‑knock entry, leaving the issue to be justified by exigent circumstances at common law.

The court found that police had reasonable grounds to believe a firearm was present, that the occupants had violent histories, and that safety risks and escape concerns justified a surprise entry.

The court held that the dynamic entry was reasonable and did not violate s. 8.

In the alternative, the evidence would have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

In a criminal trial involving charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and firearms and related firearm and proceeds offences, the accused brought a motion seeking to excise portions of intercepted wiretap communications before they were presented to the jury.

The court assessed the admissibility of various excerpts under the common law balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

While many portions were found highly probative of the alleged conspiracies—particularly discussions identifying a firearm, the motive for acquiring it, and relationships between alleged co‑conspirators—other segments containing inflammatory threats, gang‑related references, reckless conduct, or irrelevant personal remarks were ordered removed.

The court emphasized the importance of limiting prejudice while preserving context necessary for the Crown’s theory of conspiracy and firearms trafficking.

Numerous specified line ranges across several intercepts were ordered excised, while the remainder of the recordings were admitted.

Four members of the Five Point Generals street gang were convicted of various offences including trafficking in cocaine and marihuana for the benefit of a criminal organization, conspiracy to traffic, and firearms offences.

The court considered the application of the Kienapple rule and found it did not preclude multiple convictions for the conspiracy and substantive trafficking offences.

The court sentenced the offenders to total terms ranging from 5.5 to 9 years imprisonment, after accounting for pre-sentence custody and the principle of totality.

During a jury trial involving alleged drug trafficking and criminal organization offences, the defence sought to call two expert witnesses to challenge the Crown’s interpretation of coded language in intercepted communications.

One proposed expert, a journalist, intended to testify about hip hop culture and marijuana terminology, while the other, a former police officer, had previously testified as an expert on drug-related street language but had not maintained his expertise.

Applying the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan as refined by R. v. Abbey, the court found the proposed evidence either irrelevant, unnecessary, or offered by witnesses who were not properly qualified experts.

The court further held that admitting the evidence would provide minimal probative value while risking significant delay and prejudice to the trial process.

Both proposed experts were therefore excluded.

The applicants sought an order for costs against the Crown following a stay of criminal charges for breach of their Charter s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

They argued that costs were justified due to late and illegible disclosure, alleged misconduct by the investigating officer, and alleged failures by the Crown in addressing inaccurate evidence given by a police witness.

The court reviewed the governing principles that costs may be awarded in criminal proceedings only for Crown misconduct or in other exceptional circumstances where fairness requires relief.

The court found that disclosure problems were attributable to the investigating officer and police administration rather than the Crown, and that the Crown neither participated in nor knowingly tolerated misconduct.

The court further held that the circumstances were not exceptional enough to justify a Charter remedy of costs.