Administrative Law - CMAC

The prosecution appealed an order staying six fraud and fraud-related charges against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The 18-month presumptive ceiling under Jordan was exceeded after the trial was adjourned to accommodate the respondent's Charter challenge, but the Military Judge attributed the ultimate delay to the unavailability of prosecution counsel on earlier dates.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found no reviewable error in the Military Judge's conclusion that the delay was attributable to the prosecution and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding an earlier stay application was dismissed for mootness.

The respondent pleaded guilty before a court martial to dangerous driving under the Criminal Code, charged as a military offence.

At sentencing, the prosecution and defence jointly recommended a driving prohibition under the Criminal Code.

The military judge held he lacked jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition.

The prosecution appealed.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the National Defence Act establishes a distinct sentencing regime for military offences, and courts martial do not possess jurisdiction to impose discretionary penalties like driving prohibitions that are set out only in the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Sergeant Meeks, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to 30 days' detention.

Following his sentencing, he was administratively released from the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

On appeal, he sought to admit fresh evidence of his release and argued that his sentence should be suspended or declared inoperative based on prior jurisprudence (Tupper).

The Court admitted the fresh evidence but held that Tupper should be read narrowly, concluding that a sentence of detention remains legally valid despite administrative release.

However, given the change in circumstances and the Crown's consent, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and suspended the remaining period of detention, subject to statutory conditions and a no-contact order.

The appellant, a retired corporal, appealed his conviction by a Military Judge for conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline under s. 129 of the National Defence Act.

The sole ground of appeal was a constitutional challenge asserting that military judges lack independence and impartiality because they are also officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its recent jurisprudence to hold that the status of military judges as officers does not render them partial or lacking in independence.

The applicant, a Naval Cadet, was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to two years' incarceration.

He applied for a stay of execution of his sentence pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Edwards et al., which involves a constitutional challenge to the independence and impartiality of military courts.

The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada granted the stay, noting that the Supreme Court's recent decision to grant leave to appeal in Edwards et al. created uncertainty regarding the validity of the applicant's conviction.

The Court found that the applicant did not pose a flight risk or a danger to the public, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay to preserve the applicant's right to a trial by an independent and impartial court.

The appellant, a Naval Cadet convicted of sexual assault at a court martial, appealed on the basis that the subjugation of military judges to the Code of Service Discipline violates the right to an independent and impartial tribunal under section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, relying on its previous decisions in Edwards, Proulx, Christmas, and Brown, which had already determined that the military justice structure does not violate the Charter.

The Crown appealed a military judge's order staying proceedings against the respondent.

The military judge had ruled that the subjugation of military judges to the Code of Service Discipline violated the respondent's right to an independent and impartial tribunal under section 11(d) of the Charter.

Relying on its recent decisions in related appeals, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada found no Charter violation, allowed the appeal, lifted the stay, and ordered the trial to proceed.

The respondent, Corporal Christmas, brought a motion to re-impose a stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court of Canada's disposition of a leave to appeal application in related matters (Edwards et al.).

The original stay was granted on the basis that the military judge lacked independence, but was lifted after the Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeals in the related matters.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is not intended to freeze the wheels of justice and that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to proceed expeditiously.

The appellant, a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces, pleaded guilty to five offences and was sentenced by a military judge to three months in prison, to be served in a service prison.

The appellant appealed the place of incarceration, arguing that the military judge erred in finding that the exigencies of the service required him to serve his sentence in a service prison.

The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the military judge made a procedural error by failing to invite the parties to make submissions on the place of incarceration before making the order.

Given the appellant's personal circumstances, the fact that he had not been a member of the Armed Forces for over a year, and the Crown's position that it would not have opposed a civil prison, the Court ordered the sentence to be served in a civil prison.

The applicant, a sailor in the Canadian Armed Forces, was arrested for alleged drunkenness and released on conditions by a Custody Review Officer before any charges were laid.

He brought a motion arguing that the imposition of release conditions without charge violated his section 7 Charter rights.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the motion, holding that the National Defence Act permits a military judge to impose conditions on release even if no charge has yet been laid.

The Court found that while the conditions constituted a deprivation of liberty, they were not imposed contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, and any such deprivation would be saved under section 1 of the Charter given the unique context of the military justice system.

The Crown appealed decisions staying proceedings against the respondents on the basis that the military justice system violated their section 11(d) Charter rights to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The respondents argued that the Office of the Chief Military Judge's organizational structure and the application of the Code of Service Discipline to military judges created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeals, finding that the organizational structure, including the Canadian Forces Organization Order, did not violate the Charter.

The Court held that military judges remain officers subject to the Code of Service Discipline and that the military justice system respects the core requirements of institutional independence.

The stays were lifted and the trials ordered to proceed.

The applicant was arrested and released on conditions by a military judge before any charges were laid.

He filed a motion to cancel the conditions, arguing that a member should be released without conditions if no charges are laid by the time of a custody review hearing.

The charges were subsequently laid but then stayed by his commanding officer, rendering the motion moot.

The applicant requested the motion be heard anyway to clarify the law.

The Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court applied the factors for hearing moot cases and concluded that the confusion created by previous obiter dicta in *R. v. Larocque* constituted special circumstances warranting a hearing.

The motion was ordered to be set down for hearing despite its mootness.

The appellant, Her Majesty the Queen, brought motions to consolidate four separate appeals involving different respondents.

Following a case management conference and upon the consent of the parties, the Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court ordered that the appeals be heard together by a bilingual panel pursuant to Rule 28(1)(f) of the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules.

The court also set a schedule for the filing of submissions and the appeal book, and directed the provision of simultaneous translation services for the hearing.