Donald J. Rennie

The applicant, Master Corporal Houde, was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment following a Standing Court Martial.

After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, he sought a stay of execution of his sentence pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court found it had jurisdiction to hear the motion under section 65.1(2) of the Supreme Court Act even though the leave application had not yet been filed.

Applying the RJR-Macdonald test, the Court found there was a serious issue and potential irreparable harm, but concluded the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

Given the serious nature of the offences, the factual findings regarding the respect for the applicant's language rights at trial, and the need for public confidence in the timely enforcement of judgments, the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant, a Master Corporal, appealed his sexual assault convictions and 42-month sentence imposed by a Standing Court Martial.

He raised several grounds: breach of language rights during a bilingual trial, unreasonable delay under Jordan following an adjournment caused by his inappropriate comment to the prosecutor, errors in finding lack of consent, and errors in applying the private records regime to exclude text messages he claimed showed a motive to fabricate.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's language rights were met through simultaneous interpretation, the trial delay was properly attributed to the defence, the judge correctly assessed consent, and the judge appropriately excluded text messages that relied on stereotypical reasoning to suggest a motive to fabricate.

The Canadian Military Prosecution Service moved to have the appellant's appeal dismissed for failure to file a memorandum of fact and law within the extended time limits previously ordered.

The appellant concurrently applied to restart the appeal and for an extension of time.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the prosecution's motion, noting that an earlier order denying an extension could be revisited with compelling new evidence.

Finding that new evidence explained the delay caused by counsel's conflict of interest and that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous, the Court granted the appellant until February 28, 2024, to file his memorandum.

The appellant, a Sergeant in the Canadian Armed Forces, appealed his court martial conviction for sexual assault.

He argued that the military judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and that the military status of the judge violated his right to an independent and impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the military judge correctly applied the substance of the W.(D.) test by assessing the appellant's evidence in the context of the whole record.

The Court also held that the military judge's factual findings were reasonable, and any minor misapprehension of evidence was harmless and curable under the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

Finally, the Court reaffirmed its prior jurisprudence that the military justice system and the status of military judges do not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The appellant, a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces, pleaded guilty to five offences and was sentenced by a military judge to three months in prison, to be served in a service prison.

The appellant appealed the place of incarceration, arguing that the military judge erred in finding that the exigencies of the service required him to serve his sentence in a service prison.

The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the military judge made a procedural error by failing to invite the parties to make submissions on the place of incarceration before making the order.

Given the appellant's personal circumstances, the fact that he had not been a member of the Armed Forces for over a year, and the Crown's position that it would not have opposed a civil prison, the Court ordered the sentence to be served in a civil prison.

The Crown appealed decisions staying proceedings against the respondents on the basis that the military justice system violated their section 11(d) Charter rights to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The respondents argued that the Office of the Chief Military Judge's organizational structure and the application of the Code of Service Discipline to military judges created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeals, finding that the organizational structure, including the Canadian Forces Organization Order, did not violate the Charter.

The Court held that military judges remain officers subject to the Code of Service Discipline and that the military justice system respects the core requirements of institutional independence.

The stays were lifted and the trials ordered to proceed.

The Crown appealed four court martial stay orders entered after military judges held that the possibility of prosecuting military judges under the Code of Service Discipline undermined the accuseds' right to an independent and impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court held that the decisions below were inconsistent with binding Supreme Court of Canada authority recognizing the dual military and judicial role within the military justice system.

Applying the contextual reasonable-apprehension-of-bias analysis, the court found that military judges remain subject to the National Defence Act and that the impugned order did not compromise institutional independence.

The cross-appeal challenging ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act was dismissed, and motions to admit fresh evidence concerning the appellate court's own independence were also dismissed.

The appellant, a corporal in the Canadian Armed Forces stationed in Washington, D.C., was convicted at a Court Martial of voyeurism, sexual assault, and other offences.

The charges arose after Canadian military investigators, with the assistance of local police and a Virginia search warrant, searched his residence and seized electronic devices following a waiver of his diplomatic immunity.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the search violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Charter does not apply extraterritorially to searches conducted under foreign sovereign authority, even when Canadian investigators participate.

The Court further held that the admission of the evidence did not render the trial unfair, as the search was authorized by a valid foreign warrant, conducted reasonably, and would have complied with Charter standards had it occurred in Canada.