Clarke Lazell Melville

The applicant sought declarations of her mother's incapacity to manage property, personal care, and instruct counsel, and an order for a new capacity assessment, as well as removal of her mother's s. 3 counsel.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that previous assessments of incapacity for property and personal care were sufficient and that a further assessment for capacity to instruct counsel was unnecessary and intrusive.

The court affirmed the role of s. 3 counsel and the principle that counsel determines their client's capacity to instruct, absent strong evidence to the contrary.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action claiming a 50 percent ownership interest in real property and in a corporation based on an alleged oral joint venture agreement.

The plaintiffs argued that the agreement arose through oral discussions and email communications relating to a real estate acquisition.

The court held that even assuming a joint venture agreement existed, the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Evidence showed the plaintiffs were aware by late 2008 that the alleged agreement was not being honoured.

As the claim was issued in February 2011, it was statute‑barred and the action was dismissed on summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing relief from forfeiture of an option agreement after it was terminated by the respondent due to persistent late payment of rent.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge was entitled to find the late payments constituted a material breach of the tenancy agreement.

Furthermore, the application judge made no error in principle in applying the test for relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.