Clarke Lazell Melville

The applicant sought declarations of her mother's incapacity to manage property, personal care, and instruct counsel, and an order for a new capacity assessment, as well as removal of her mother's s. 3 counsel.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that previous assessments of incapacity for property and personal care were sufficient and that a further assessment for capacity to instruct counsel was unnecessary and intrusive.

The court affirmed the role of s. 3 counsel and the principle that counsel determines their client's capacity to instruct, absent strong evidence to the contrary.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action claiming a 50 percent ownership interest in real property and in a corporation based on an alleged oral joint venture agreement.

The plaintiffs argued that the agreement arose through oral discussions and email communications relating to a real estate acquisition.

The court held that even assuming a joint venture agreement existed, the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Evidence showed the plaintiffs were aware by late 2008 that the alleged agreement was not being honoured.

As the claim was issued in February 2011, it was statute‑barred and the action was dismissed on summary judgment.