C. Glaister

At a judicial pre-trial, the court addressed several procedural issues for a self-represented accused facing a jury trial.

The Crown was directed to bring its application to appoint counsel for cross-examination of the complainant in writing.

The court also ordered the Crown to provide the entire disclosure package to the accused and remanded the matter to allow the accused to decide whether to bring applications under s. 11(b) of the Charter or s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, charged with fraud and related offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the date of charges to the anticipated end of trial was over 35 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework to determine whether periods of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability should be deducted as defence delay.

The court concluded that certain periods of unavailability for rescheduled preliminary inquiry and trial dates constituted defence delay, reducing the net delay to 27 months.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown sought to adduce a statement made by the accused to police after he turned himself in.

The accused had refused to be video or audio recorded but agreed to answer questions, which the officer noted down.

The defence opposed the admission of the statement, arguing it was involuntary due to the police's failure to video record the interview as required by appellate jurisprudence.

The court found that the police did not deliberately avoid recording the statement, but rather respected the accused's refusal to be recorded while answering questions.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible.