Catzman

The appellant appealed summary judgment dismissing her action for ongoing statutory accident benefits as statute-barred.

The central issue was whether the insurer's termination notice complied with s. 71 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, which required written notice of the procedure for resolving disputes under the Insurance Act.

The majority held that the provision required the insurer to inform the insured of the next procedural step, namely mediation, and did not require notice of the two-year limitation period for commencing arbitration or an action.

Because the insurer's notice was found compliant, the limitation defence under s. 281(5) was available and the appeal was dismissed.

A dissent would have required fuller notice, including the limitation period, and would have allowed the appeal.

Criminal appeal arising from a conviction for criminal negligence causing death following a police shooting during a land claim protest.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge was required to hold a voir dire before permitting cross-examination on statements allegedly made by the accused to a superior officer, including whether that superior was a person in authority and whether the statements were voluntary.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, holding that the inquiry obligation was triggered and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the absence of a voir dire caused no substantial wrong and did not affect the verdict; the mistrial appeal, fresh evidence motion, and Crown sentence appeal were also dismissed.

The appellant challenged both conviction and sentence following a jury trial, arguing among other things that the trial judge's charge improperly referred to the accused's criminal record and that the response to a jury question was inadequate.

The court held that the impugned reference was evidently a mistaken attribution intended for another witness and, in any event, caused no prejudice in light of the context and overwhelming evidence.

The court further found no basis to conclude the jury was confused about the causal link between the assaults and bodily harm, and held the trial judge's answer was complete.

The conviction appeal was dismissed; leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

In a labour appeal from a Divisional Court order quashing an arbitration award, the appellant union argued that the arbitration board had adequately resolved the retroactivity issue arising from the repeal of a statutory provision governing appointment to a provincial schools authority.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that determination of retroactivity was essential to disposition of the grievance and that the board failed to address all relevant considerations.

The appeal was therefore dismissed and the matter remained remitted to the board for redetermination of retroactivity.

A dissent would have found the board's reasons, read as a whole, sufficient to decide the issue and would have reinstated the award.

This addendum to a criminal appeal judgment clarified that the court did not intend to preclude the respondent from applying for a discharge.

Relying on prior authority indicating that even a conviction would not necessarily bar a discharge, the court nonetheless amended its earlier reasons for absolute clarity.

The acquittal was set aside and replaced with a finding of guilt for common assault, thereby preserving the respondent's ability to seek a discharge.

The appellant mortgagee appealed an order staying its action against one corporate respondent after a foreclosure action had been converted to one for judicial sale.

The court held that the consent order arising from the negotiations was clear and unequivocal, and did not result from mistaken intentions or a failure to reflect the parties' agreement.

The appellant knew it had to choose which defendant would be the subject of judgment and that consequences flowed from that choice.

By signing judgment against another defendant, the appellant's right to recover against the respondent corporation was terminated by s. 20(3) of the Mortgages Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants sought to restore a motion order extending the time for service of a statement of claim issued within the limitation period but not served before the service deadline expired.

The court held that the controlling question was whether the respondent would suffer prejudice caused by the delay, and confirmed that while the onus remained on the plaintiffs, a defendant asserting prejudice had at least an evidentiary obligation to provide some particulars.

The court further held that a defendant could not manufacture prejudice by failing to take reasonable steps earlier to preserve evidence, and that prejudice unrelated to the delayed service was irrelevant.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the original extension order was restored.

On an appeal from the Divisional Court in an employment standards matter, the court held that the applicable standard of review of the adjudicator's decision was reasonableness.

Adopting the dissenting view in the Divisional Court, the court concluded that the adjudicator's interpretation of the relevant provision of the Employment Standards Act was reasonable.

The appeal was therefore allowed, the application for judicial review was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the employer in favour of the employee, with no costs for or against the adjudicator.

Commercial appeal arising from a bribery scheme that diverted a longstanding supply contract from the plaintiff to the corporate respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the consultant and his company, although described by contract as independent contractors, functioned as integrated members of the corporate respondents' sales organization and therefore attracted vicarious liability under the organization test.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial after post-judgment affidavit evidence from the consultant implicated the principal officer in the bribery scheme, as the evidence was apparently credible and could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained earlier.

Judgment was granted against the corporate respondents for compensatory damages and prejudgment interest, punitive damages were not extended vicariously, and a new trial was ordered on the officer's personal liability.

The appellant challenged a partial summary judgment arising from a dispute over whether an oral agreement had been made in the spring of 1997 and whether its terms were breached.

The majority held that the existence and terms of the alleged oral agreement raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded that only after those factual issues were resolved could the legal enforceability of the agreement be determined.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment was set aside, and the respondent's summary judgment motion was dismissed with costs to the appellant.