Caitlin Milne

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The applicant, a defendant in a Small Claims Court defamation action regarding a Google review, brought a motion to transfer the action to the Superior Court of Justice.

The transfer was sought solely to enable the applicant to bring an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which the Court of Appeal previously ruled is unavailable in Small Claims Court.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the unavailability of a section 137.1 motion does not mean the action cannot be justly and fairly resolved in Small Claims Court, and that the traditional factors for transfer were not met.

The plaintiff, a former Minister of State, brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused during the examination for discovery of the defendants, a lawyer and his law firm.

The defendants had refused to answer questions based on solicitor-client privilege and parliamentary privilege.

The court held that asserting privilege was not a collateral attack on a previous order refusing to strike the claim.

The court upheld the assertion of parliamentary privilege regarding testimony before a parliamentary committee.

However, the court found the assertion of solicitor-client privilege to be overbroad and ordered the defendants to answer certain questions that did not reveal privileged communications.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of prisoners and their families, alleging that Bell Canada and Ontario charged unconscionable rates for collect calls from provincial correctional facilities.

The plaintiffs sought certification, while the defendants brought cross-motions to stay the action, arguing the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Justice struck the plaintiffs' claims for an ultra vires tax and breach of the Telecommunications Act, finding it plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court permanently stayed the remaining claims, concluding that the pith and substance of the dispute concerned telecommunications rates, which fall squarely within the specialized jurisdiction and remedial authority of the CRTC.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

In a proposed class action regarding the rates charged for collect calls made by prisoners in Ontario correctional facilities, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of an affidavit sworn by an employee of the defendant telecommunications company.

The plaintiffs argued the affiant was improperly giving expert opinion evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the affiant was providing factual evidence regarding the regulatory framework and the operation of the telephone system, not expert opinion.

Following a 14-day trial on an application to pass accounts where the applicant trustees were ordered to repay $150,531.14 to the trust, the respondent sought $567,157.64 in substantial indemnity costs.

The court found the respondent was the successful party and entitled to costs.

However, the court declined to award enhanced costs, finding that while the applicants failed to keep proper records and created documents to reconstruct the accounts, their conduct was not reprehensible or scandalous.

The court also found the respondent's costs claim was disproportionate and unreasonable due to over-lawyering and unreasonable litigation conduct.

The court awarded the respondent $90,000 in costs inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application and motion for leave to file fresh evidence, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $110,654, arguing the applicant's conduct was reckless and the application meritless.

The court found the applicant's conduct did not rise to the egregious level required for substantial indemnity costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court declined to award costs for the fresh evidence motion, finding the respondent's evidence was confusing and undisclosed.

The applicant was ordered to pay $50,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The applicant developer sought declarations and mandatory orders alleging the respondent municipality breached a Costs Sharing Agreement by failing to construct municipal services with sufficient capacity for a proposed high-density residential development.

The municipality argued the application was premature because the proposed development was not permitted under current zoning and capacity studies were ongoing.

The court dismissed the application, finding it premature and lacking practical utility, as the meaning of 'full development' in the agreement could not be determined while zoning appeals and municipal processes were still pending.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The applicants, parents and trustees of a trust established for their son following a serious brain injury, applied to pass their accounts.

The trust received $418,675.25 over 17 years, but the trustees administered it entirely in cash and lacked receipts for most disbursements.

The court found that the trustees failed to keep proper records and included fictitious loans and unpaid services in the accounts.

While some expenses were allowed, the trustees failed to account for $165,531.14.

After deducting $15,000 for trustee compensation, the court ordered the trustees to repay $150,531.14 to the trust.