A. Sosna

The applicants, jointly charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson, brought a pre-trial motion seeking leave to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The media coverage included sensationalized reports of an alleged attempted prison break by one of the applicants.

The court found that despite the passage of time, the prominence and ready access to the coverage on the internet created an air of reality that the publicity could potentially undermine a prospective juror's impartiality.

The application was granted, and specific questions were approved to be put to the jury pool.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and arson following the discovery of his wife's charred body in their garage, applied to exclude a statement he made to police.

The court found that the two-and-a-half-hour police interview constituted an investigative detention, triggering the accused's Charter rights.

The police failed to properly inform the accused of his right to silence, the reasons for his detention, and his right to counsel, resulting in serious breaches of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statement under section 24(2), concluding that the breaches were deliberate and admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

A young person convicted of first‑degree murder for causing the death of a police officer while fleeing a traffic stop was sentenced under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The accused, who was 15 at the time of the offence, survived the crash but was rendered a quadriplegic with profound lifelong medical needs.

The Crown sought the maximum youth sentence of 10 years with five years of open custody followed by four years of community supervision.

The court found the offender’s catastrophic disability, lack of prior record, demonstrated remorse, and low risk to reoffend constituted exceptional circumstances.

The judge concluded that incarceration would not meaningfully enhance accountability and that the correctional system had not demonstrated an ability to meet the offender’s extensive medical needs.

A one‑day custody component with credit for pre‑trial custody and a nine‑year conditional supervision order was imposed.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to the police's failure to retain a 2007 videotaped statement made by the complainant.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish that the loss of the video was not due to unacceptable negligence.

Given that the complainant's credibility was the central issue and she had a history of recantations and perjury, the loss of the video irreparably prejudiced the applicant's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court concluded this was one of the clearest of cases and ordered a stay of proceedings on the sexual assault count.

In a reference to determine the distribution of proceeds from a mortgage sale, the first mortgagee sought to claim increased fees and expenses arising from amending agreements entered into with the mortgagor after the second mortgagee registered its charge.

The court held that the second mortgagee was not bound by the amending agreements, as it had no notice of them at the time of registration.

The first mortgagee was only entitled to claim fees specifically set out in the registered mortgage and standard charge terms.

The increased fees were disallowed and legal fees were reduced.

The applicant condominium corporation sought declarations that the respondent, a former director, breached his duties under the Condominium Act and should be declared a vexatious litigant.

The respondent brought a cross-application seeking the removal of other directors and claiming oppression.

The court found that the respondent breached his duties as a director by acting unilaterally, rendering the board dysfunctional, and failing to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent person.

However, the court declined to declare him a vexatious litigant or grant a sweeping injunction against him.

The respondent's cross-application was dismissed in its entirety, as the court found no bad faith by the other directors and no breach of the respondent's reasonable expectations to support an oppression claim.