Family and Matrimonial Law

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a status review application.

The court addressed the issue of whether a party from a previous status review application automatically remains a party in a new one.

The court determined that party status does not automatically roll over and that the maternal grandfather, who was a party in a prior proceeding, no longer met the statutory definition of a "parent" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, nor did he meet other criteria for party status or notice.

Relying on its inherent authority to control its own process, the court ordered the removal of the maternal grandfather as a party, finding it to be in the child's best interests and to prevent unnecessary delays and costs.

The applicant father brought a contempt motion against the respondent mother for alleged breaches of a December 2021 final order, specifically regarding facilitation of parenting time, provision of government documents (birth certificate, passport), and a list of medical professionals.

The court found the mother was in willful breach of the order concerning parenting time and document provision, but declined to make a formal finding of contempt.

The court emphasized that contempt is a remedy of last resort, and alternative enforcement measures, such as temporary consent orders already in place, had rectified the non-compliance and were in the child's best interests.

The motion for contempt was dismissed.

Child protection appeal concerning the standard of appellate review for disposition decisions under child protection legislation.

A child was apprehended by the Director of Child Protection; both the maternal grandmother and the biological father sought permanent custody at the disposition hearing.

The hearing judge awarded custody to the grandmother, finding it was in the child's best interests, but the Court of Appeal reversed and awarded custody to the father.

The Supreme Court restored the hearing judge's order, holding that appellate intervention is only warranted where there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law.

The Court held that a biological tie carries minimal weight in a best interests analysis and does not serve as a tie-breaker; a court may also consider the conduct of a child protection agency in determining how the status quo arose and assessing the weight of evidence presented by or through the agency.

The appellant mother sought permission to relocate with the child, which was granted by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judge's orders on mobility, custody, parenting arrangements, and spousal support, finding misapprehension of evidence and failure to consider relevant factors, and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada found no reviewable error by the trial judge, even assuming the fresh evidence tendered by the respondent would have been admitted.

The trial judge's orders on mobility, custody, parenting arrangements, and spousal support were restored.

Côté J. dissented, holding the appeal should be dismissed as moot given she would have admitted the fresh evidence and remanded the matter to the Court of Queen's Bench.

The appellants, as liquidators of a deceased spouse's estate, sought a declaration that the value of the family residence — held under a discretionary trust controlled by the surviving spouse — should be included in the partition of the family patrimony under art. 415 of the Civil Code of Québec.

The majority held that family residences held in trust are not in principle outside the scope of the family patrimony and that the 'rights which confer use' at art. 415 C.C.Q. are not limited to real rights.

Wide discretion should be accorded to the trier of fact in determining whether such rights exist, and the absence of an intention to evade family patrimony rules is irrelevant.

The trial judge's finding that the surviving spouse held rights which conferred use was supported by the evidence and disclosed no palpable and overriding error.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by conflating the trustee's powers with rights and failing to consider the purpose of the trust and the beneficiaries' rights.

Appeal allowed (Côté and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting).

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that two children be found in need of protection pursuant to clauses 37(2)(b) and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act and be made Crown wards with access to their mother.

The mother opposed the motion and sought the return of the children to her care.

The court found that the children were in need of protection based on uncontested evidence of the mother's inability to provide stable housing, her use of the children to sell chocolates to supplement income, the children's excessive school absences, and the mother's failure to cooperate with the society or maintain consistent contact with the children during their time in care.

The court granted the society's motion and made the children Crown wards, with the issue of access to be determined at a further hearing.

The applicants applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board for a review of the Internal Complaints Review Panel (ICRP) process conducted by the respondent society.

The applicants complained that the society failed to provide sufficient reasons for its decision to close their home as a foster home.

The Board found that the ICRP process did not provide the applicants with sufficient reasons that addressed their challenges to the validity of the society's decision.

However, the Board declined to order the society to provide further reasons, as the underlying issues were addressed in a concurrent hearing regarding the placement of the child.

The applicant sought his medical records from the respondent Society relating to a brief period in care following a car accident in his youth.

He required the records for an application to the Ontario Hepatitis C Assistance Plan.

The Society maintained it had no medical records in his file.

The Board found that while the Society met its obligations to hear the applicant and provide reasons in 2011, it failed to do so in 2014 when it did not provide a full copy of his file upon request.

However, as the Society subsequently conducted thorough searches and confirmed no medical records existed, the Board made no order, but permitted the applicant to use the decision to assist with his assistance plan application.

The applicants filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging the Huron-Perth Children's Aid Society failed to respond to their concerns about the safety and care of their children in foster care.

The Society argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the applicants had raised the exact same service concerns in a motion before the court seeking the return of their children.

The Board agreed, finding that under section 68.1(8)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act, it has no jurisdiction to hear complaints involving matters that are already before the court.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, a father and stepmother, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the children's aid society failed to hear their concerns and provide reasons for its decisions regarding the mother's care of the children.

The Board found that the society initially failed to meet its obligations to investigate and communicate effectively regarding allegations of parental alienation, exposure to conflict, and other child protection concerns.

However, the society later met its obligations by developing a service plan.

The Board ordered the society to provide written explanations for several outstanding issues and to develop a communication plan with the applicants.

The applicants, who previously adopted the child's older biological sister, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review the Society's decision refusing their application to adopt the child.

The Society had supported placing the child with a kinship family after a court ordered temporary placement with them.

The Board found that the Society placed too much weight on the temporary court order and failed to adequately consider the kinship family's history of child protection involvement, financial instability, and parenting limitations.

The Board concluded it was in the child's best interests to be placed for adoption with the applicants, allowing the child to grow up with her biological sister in a stable environment.

The Society's decision was rescinded and the child was ordered placed with the applicants.

The applicants applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board under section 144(3) of the Child and Family Services Act for a review of the respondent Society's decision refusing their application to adopt a child.

After hearing the evidence and representations, the Board granted the application.

The Board annulled the Society's decision and ordered that the child be placed with the applicants for adoption, with reasons to follow.

The applicants, former foster parents of the child, sought a review of the Society's decision to refuse their adoption application.

The Society argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the child was placed with another family by a court order and subsequently made a Crown ward.

The Board held that the final Crown wardship order superseded previous interim placement orders and returned the child to the Society's care to determine long-term placement.

Therefore, the Society's refusal of the applicants' adoption request was a reviewable decision under section 144(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, and the Board confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the application.

The Society brought a motion arguing that the Child and Family Services Review Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the applicants' request under section 144(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Board determined that it had jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing.

The Board also ordered the Society to comply with a previous disclosure order and set deadlines for the applicants' disclosure.

A confidentiality order was issued prohibiting the distribution or publication of any documents or information related to the proceedings.

The applicant applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review the Society's refusal of his application to adopt his grandchild.

The application was adjourned pending a status review in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court subsequently ordered Crown Wardship of the grandchild without access to the applicant.

The Board dismissed the application, finding it could not make an order inconsistent with the court's order denying access.

The Applicant, a youth in the care of the Society, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board under section 36 of the Child and Family Services Act for a review of her residential placement.

She sought a transfer to a less restrictive placement such as a group home or youth shelter.

The Society argued that the current placement was necessary to address the Applicant's complex mental health needs and to facilitate family reintegration.

The Board found that the current placement was in the Applicant's best interests, given her significant psychiatric needs, the lack of appropriate less restrictive alternatives, and the need for continuity of care.

The application was dismissed and the current placement was confirmed.

The Child applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review his emergency admission to a secure treatment program.

The facility argued the admission was necessary due to the Child's aggressive behaviours and risk of self-harm.

The Board found that while the Child had a mental disorder, the facility failed to prove that he had caused or threatened serious bodily harm, or that no less restrictive treatment method was appropriate.

The Board granted the application and ordered the Child's release.

The applicant filed a complaint against the children's aid society regarding access to his infant daughter.

The society argued the board lacked jurisdiction because the issues were already before the court in a temporary care and custody proceeding.

The board reviewed the court materials and found that the issues complained about were indeed before the court.

Consequently, pursuant to section 68.1(8)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act, the board determined it had no jurisdiction to hear the application.

The Applicant, a mother whose child was subject to a crown wardship order with no access, brought an application alleging the Children's Aid Society failed to hear her or provide reasons regarding the child's out-of-province kin placement and its communications with police.

The Society argued it was not obliged to consult the Applicant due to the crown wardship order and child protection concerns.

The Board found that the Society failed to meet its statutory obligations to hear the Applicant and provide reasons regarding the kin placement and her service concerns about the police.

The Board ordered the Society to receive and genuinely consider the Applicant's written input regarding the kin placement and to provide a detailed written response.

In a child protection motion under the Child and Family Services Act, the society sought orders restraining the father from contacting the mother and suspending his access to the child due to domestic violence, substance abuse concerns, and threatening conduct.

Evidence included numerous police incidents involving domestic violence and a forensic psychiatric assessment indicating a high risk of future spousal assault.

The mother had separated from the father and relocated to an undisclosed location for safety.

The court held that the child’s best interests required placement with the mother under the society’s supervision and suspension of the father’s access until specified conditions were met.

The decision emphasized the relevance of domestic violence and parental conduct toward a partner when assessing child protection risks and access.