Anna L. Towlson

The mother applied for sole custody and primary residence of the parties' four-year-old child, while the father sought joint custody and equal parenting time.

The court found both parents fit but noted historical acrimony and the father's instability.

The court ordered joint custody, with the mother having final decision-making authority over education.

The child's primary residence was ordered to remain with the mother, with the father receiving alternate weekends and Wednesday overnights during the school year, and equal parenting time during the summer.

The father was also ordered to pay ongoing child support and arrears based on his ODSP income.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking sole custody and child support.

The parties settled the parenting issues, agreeing to a week-about shared parenting schedule.

The remaining issue was child support, specifically whether the respondent met the 40% threshold under section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court found that the time the children spent in school should be considered neutral, as both parents shared responsibility for the children during school hours.

Consequently, the respondent met the 40% threshold, and the applicant, having the higher income, was ordered to pay set-off child support and arrears.

Following a 30-day trial regarding custody, access, and support, the applicant father sought costs capped at $30,000 pursuant to a partial settlement agreement.

The court found the costs request premature because the remaining outstanding issues, specifically the mother's access review pending a psychiatric assessment, had not been fully determined.

The determination of costs liability was deferred until the completion of the access review.

The parties separated after a high-conflict marriage.

The applicant father sought sole custody of their two children, while the respondent mother sought custody and unsupervised access.

The court found that the mother had exhibited concerning behaviour and communications suggesting potential mental health issues, and had failed to comply with previous court orders regarding access.

The court awarded sole custody to the father, ordered the mother's access to remain supervised, and directed the mother to undergo a psychiatric assessment.

The father was ordered to pay time-limited spousal support, and the mother was ordered to pay child support.

This costs endorsement relates to a child protection appeal where the non-party foster parent, T.N., sought costs against the maternal grandmother, M.T., following the dismissal of M.T.'s appeal.

The court declined to order costs against M.T., reiterating that in child protection cases, cost awards are rare and require more than mere success.

The court found that M.T.'s appeal, though unsuccessful, did not demonstrate unreasonable conduct or bad faith sufficient to warrant a costs order, aligning with the principle that the right to oppose child protection proceedings should not be lightly interfered with.

The maternal grandmother appealed an order granting the foster parent expanded rights of participation and disclosure in a focused hearing regarding the grandmother's access to the child, who had been made a Crown Ward.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge reasonably exercised her discretion and properly applied the relevant factors in determining that the foster parent's participation was in the child's best interests.

The parties resolved their dispute without a trial.

The respondent requested costs on a partial indemnity scale, while the applicant opposed any costs order, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction for costs in a negotiated settlement.

The applicant also submitted her own costs if the court decided to address the issue.

Citing the difficulty in determining success or inappropriate behaviour without an adjudication on the merits, the court declined to make any order with respect to costs.

The applicant sought to vary a consent order regarding custody, access, and child support for two children, requesting equal time-sharing and divided decision-making.

The respondent opposed any changes.

The court found a material change in circumstances, primarily due to the applicant's significantly improved mental health and the children's expressed wishes for more time with their mother.

Applying the 'best interests of the child' test, the court granted the variation, ordering joint custody with equal time-sharing and divided decision-making authority for medical, dental, and educational matters.

Child support was reserved for further agreement or hearing.

The moving party (respondent in the main proceeding) brought a motion to set aside a final order that struck his pleadings and released the proceeds of the sale of the family home to the responding party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction as the proper route to challenge a final order is an appeal to the Court of Appeal or Divisional Court.

In the alternative, the court held that the motion would be dismissed on the merits due to the moving party's recalcitrant conduct, failure to comply with disclosure orders, and failure to provide evidence supporting his claims.

Costs were awarded to the responding party.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court received written submissions on costs.

The court noted unprofessional comments made by the appellant's counsel in their submissions.

As the respondent was substantially successful on the appeal, the court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $4,483.11 on a partial indemnity basis pursuant to Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

This is an appeal by the father (appellant) and a cross-appeal by the mother (respondent) from a trial decision concerning custody and access.

The trial judge had deleted a clause from a prior order requiring the mother to seek employment in the Waterloo Region and allowed the children to remain with the mother in Lindsay, Ontario.

The father argued the trial judge erred by treating the matter as mobility rather than enforcement of a contempt order and misapprehending evidence regarding the children's best interests.

The mother cross-appealed on costs and child support.

The appellate court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision to treat the matter as mobility and to determine the children's best interests based on current circumstances, upholding the mother as the primary caregiver.

The court also found no reason to intervene on the costs and child support issues.

The appellant appealed a trial costs order arising from an eight‑day family law trial in which the respondent had sought over $53,000 in legal fees and related expenses.

The trial judge had reduced the requested amount to $25,500 after finding the successful party had acted very unreasonably by breaching an interim court order.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding the interpretation and application of Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules concerning costs at each procedural step.

While affirming the trial judge’s broad discretion and the respondent’s entitlement to costs as the successful party, the court found the quantum should be further reduced after applying the flexible and proportional approach to costs mandated by Rule 24(11).

The court substituted a costs award of $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST and ordered that there be no costs of the appeal due to divided success.

The appellant sought to overturn a custody and access order on the basis of alleged reasonable apprehension of bias, failure to consider the child's best interests, and findings said to be contrary to the evidence.

Applying the appellate standard of deference to factual findings and the objective test for bias, the court held that the trial judge's numerous interventions reflected an active case-management style rather than prejudgment or partiality.

The court found ample evidence supporting the custody and access determination and no palpable and overriding error, misapprehension of evidence, or ignored evidence.

The appeal from the trial judgment was dismissed and the respondent was awarded costs of that part of the appeal, while the separate costs appeal was left open for further submissions.

Following an appeal, the court received written costs submissions.

The appellant had made an assignment in bankruptcy.

Adopting the joint submissions of the respondent and the appellant's trustee in bankruptcy, the court ordered costs of $15,000 in favour of the respondent.

The appellant husband appealed judgments in a debt action and a matrimonial proceeding.

In the debt action, the trial judge found the husband jointly liable with his former wife for three loans advanced by her father.

In the matrimonial proceeding, the trial judge ordered spousal support, child support including section 7 expenses, and determined equalization amounts without discounting the wife's debts to her father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions or assessment of credibility.

The appellant mother appealed an order changing the primary residence of her children to the respondent father unless she relocated to Waterloo.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a material change in circumstances due to the mother's failure to relocate as contemplated in a prior settlement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the lower courts failed to conduct the required analysis of whether changing the children's primary residence was in their best interests.

A costs decision following a family law application determined on June 16, 2014.

The respondent mother sought costs for the application.

The applicant father opposed the award and sought to exclude various cost items.

The court found the mother was the successful party and entitled to costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court examined the father's unreasonable and misleading conduct throughout the litigation, including false affidavit evidence and continued attacks on the mother's parenting despite lack of substantiation.

The court awarded costs to the mother while considering the father's financial circumstances and child support obligations.

Following a successful family law appeal and motion for further evidence, the court considered the appropriate costs award.

The respondent did not participate in the costs submissions, leaving the court to assess costs without information about her financial circumstances.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs but rejected a claim for full recovery or indemnity costs based on alleged bad faith.

The court declined to overturn the trial judge’s original costs order but rescinded any unpaid balance owing by the applicant due to changed parenting circumstances.

A reasonable and proportionate costs award of $12,000 plus disbursements of $4,379.96 was ordered, payable by the respondent at $300 per month.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision that allowed the respondent mother to relocate with their child to Casselman, Ontario.

The trial judge had relied on the mother's assurances that she would facilitate extensive access.

The appeal court found that the mother had completely obstructed the father's access and marginalized him from the child's life, constituting a material change in circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, and the child was ordered to be returned to the Waterloo Region immediately, with primary care transferring to the father if the mother chose not to return.

A custody and access dispute between a young father and mother regarding their child born in October 2010.

The father initially sought sole custody with no access to the mother after she relocated with the child to Orillia.

The court found that the father was not the primary caregiver, was reluctant in his parenting role, and was motivated by hostility toward the mother rather than genuine parental concern.

The mother, despite her youth and some poor decisions, was found to be the primary caregiver and more child-focused parent.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother with generous access to the father, finding that the father's inflexibility and hostility would prevent him from supporting the child's relationship with the mother.

The decision also criticized the Children's Aid Society for inappropriate interference with court-ordered access and for failing to follow proper procedures.